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Abstract
The North Korean People's Army: Its Rise and Fall. 1945-1950
The aim of this thesis is to look into the structural, ideological 
and strategic features of the (North) Korean People's Army from its 
birth in late 1945 to the debacle in late 1950, thereby forming a 
coherent and up-to-date account of the early KPA, which is essential 
to a proper enquiry into the origins and character of the Korean War.
The cadre members of the KPA were from three origins: the Soviet-
affiliated Kim IISung group; the Yenan group, the returnees from
China; and the Soviet-Korean group, a functionary group of the Soviet 
occupation authorities. Among them, the Kim IlSung group was to play 
the key role in the making of the KPA. The People's Army started from
the founding of the Pyongyang Institute in November 1945. By August
1946 the basic conditions and preparations for building the regular 
armed forces of North Korea were settled. By February 1948, when the
founding of the KPA was proclaimed, the People's Army was well
established; though, the actual strength of the KPA remained rather 
modest until mid-1949. The rapid expansion and modernisation of the 
KPA took place between July 1949 and May 1950. The quantum leap of
the KPA during March to May 1950 was exceptionally clear evidence of
the likelihood of the outbreak of war in the near future.
The Korean War decision was made among the leaders of North Korea, 
the Soviet Union, and the PRC, during the winter of 1949-50. Most 
probably it was initiated by the North Korean leadership who were 
increasingly confident of their strengthened position over the south 
which itself was in disarray. The all-out attack against South Korea 
in June 1950 was only the final phase of the 'Southern Strategy' which 
the North Korean leadership had been pursuing since late 1945. It was 
neither the only alternative left nor a pre-emptive strike in a 
desperate mood. That the North Korean leadership started the invasion 
in an over-confident mood can be proven through the close examination 
of KPA preparations for and conduct of the war.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is two fold: (1) to examine the
structural, ideological and strategic features of the (North) Korean 
People's Army (KPA) from its birth in late 1945 to the debacle in 
1950; and (2) to establish a theory on the origins and nature of the 
Korean War, inter alia through the examination of the KPA in that era.
The literature on the early KPA is not rich. Notwithstanding 
growing concern, accumulating knowledge and novel viewpoints in North 
Korean and Korean War studies, the history of the early KPA has 
remained meagrely researched. In 1986 Keith D. McFarland, an American 
writer, produced a superb reference work on the Korean War entitled, 
The Korean War; An Annotated Bibliography. Among over 2,300 entries 
in this work there is no book-length account in western languages
dealing exclusively and comprehensively with the early history of the
KPA. In 1985 the Institute for Korean War Studies in Seoul produced a 
thorough reference work titled Han'guk Chonchaeng Kwankae Charyo 
Munhonchip [Collections of Source Materials on the Korean War], which 
included materials in Korean and Japanese. Among more than 3,500 
entries in this reference work, there are only a few scholarly works 
on the early KPA, with the exception of primary source materials 
mostly produced by the ROK Ministry of National Defence or its armed 
services. As such the history of the early KPA has remained a
wasteland in the West, having many questions unresolved even in the 
cases of basic data, such as names of prominent figures, dates and 
places of major events, or lineage of units.
The poor state of in-depth study of the early KPA does not
necessarily mean that relevant knowledge and materials are wanting. 
The problem is that existing knowledge and source materials related to 
this topic are uneven in their quantity and quality and have yet to be 
organised into a coherent system of knowledge. It would be helpful to 
examine the situation of relevant knowledge and source materials in
7three parts: the origins of the cadres of the KPA; the founding and
development of the KPA from late 1945 to June 1950; and the employment 
of the KPA in the first year of the war.
To trace the origins of the cadres of the KPA is actually to 
inquire into the Korean communist movement before 1945. In this field 
significant scholarly works have been produced only in the late 1960s. 
In 1967 Dae-sook Suh produced The Korean Communist Movement. 1918- 
1948. probably the first significant work in this field. In 1972
Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee produced Communism in Korea in
two volumes, a monumental work in Korean communism and North Korean 
studies. During 1967 and 1976, Kim Chun-yop and Kim Ch'ang-sun 
produced Han'guk Kongsanchuui Undonqsa [History of the Korean 
Communist Movement] in five volumes, perhaps the standard work in this 
field. With the publication by the two Kims of the above work, it may 
well be said that the pre-1945 history of the Korean communist 
movement has been organised into a coherent system of knowledge. 
Though there are still many controversies and questions to be settled 
in this field, as far as the origins of the cadres of the KPA are 
concerned it has become possible to get an established and fairly 
detailed knowledge.
On the founding and development of the KPA from 1945 to 1950 the
volume and quality of the information available to westerners has not
much improved since the early 1950s, when western intelligence reports 
comprised the main source on this issue. In 1960 Roy. E. Appleman 
produced South to the Naktong. North to the Yalu, volume one in the 
series, The United States Army in the Korean War, the official history 
of the Korean War, by the US authorities. Although Appleman's book is 
a definite work on the military aspects of the first six months of the 
Korean War, his account of the KPA before the war is sketchy and 
remains largely within the range of the "History of the North Korean 
Army", an intelligence report prepared by US Far East Command, G-2 
Section, in July 1952. In spite of this limitation, Appleman's 
account on the early KPA has been the main source of knowledge on this 
topic to many western scholars. In 1967 the War History Compilation
8Committee of ROK Ministry of National Defence produced Haebang-kwa 
Kon'gun [Liberation and Establishment of ROK Armed Forces], the first 
volume of Han * guk Chonchaengsa [History of the Korean War], the 
official Korean War history, by the ROK authorities. Haebang-kwa 
Kon * gun, contains one chapter dealing with the early KPA exclusively. 
Since the publication of this work there has been little original 
research, official or scholarly. As a result, even some new findings 
have not been fully incorporated into a coherent knowledge of the 
early KPA. So it is fair to say that the existing knowledge in the 
West regarding the early KPA is in a poor situation compared to that 
regarding the origins of the cadres.
The main cause for the meagre state in the existing knowledge of 
the early KPA is that there are too few primary source materials 
accessible to western scholars. Before the Korean war the existence 
of the KPA had been a closed book both to foreign powers and to the 
North Korean people. Even among the leadership structure of the North 
Korean regime those who were not directly involved in the making and 
running of the KPA had little idea of what was going on with the KPA. 
In this circumstance relevant information, let alone archival 
materials, regarding the pre-war KPA was seriously limited to western 
sources. A consolation for western scholars interested in Korean 
studies is the research potential of the famous 'seized materials' 
deposited in the Washington National Records Centre, Suitland, 
Maryland. Those 'seized materials' are 'probably the most valuable 
collection of records anywhere in the world outside of North Korea 
concerning the political, economic and military activities during the 
1945-50 period'.* However, these materials have not been fully 
utilised by western scholars yet. A reason for this insufficient use 
of these materials is, though not an intrinsic one, the language 
problem to most westerners. Without a good knowledge of the Korean 
and Japanese languages, and Chinese characters, together with military 
terminology, these 'seized materials' are not easily accessible. For 
these reasons the knowledge on the early KPA has not advanced much 
since the early 1950s, when the "History of the North Korean Army" was 
produced.
9On the conduct of KPA operations in the Korean War vast volumes of 
official histories from South and North Korea and the United States 
(and some Commonwealth countries) provides sufficient basic data. 
Appleman's South to the Naktonq. North to the Yalu is indispensable. 
Two other volumes in the series, The United States Army in the Korean 
War should also be consulted. From 1972 to 1973 the War History 
Compilation Committee of the ROK Ministry of National Defence produced 
The History of the United Nations in the Korean War in five volumes. 
During 1979 and 1980, the War History Compilation Committee completed 
eleven volumes of Han'guk Chonchaengsa [History of the Korean War], 
each over 1,000 pages. In 1981 North Korea produced three volumes of 
Choguk Haebang Chonchaensa [History of the Fatherland Liberation War], 
in the series Choson Chonsa [The History of Korea]. Apart from these 
official histories, hundreds of memoirs, narratives, official 
documents, scholarly accounts of the Korean War produced in the West 
have relevance to the KPA performance in the war. However, academic 
works mainly focused on the military activities of the KPA during the 
war are not rich. Most literature on the Korean War, produced in the 
West, has continued to focus on the political or diplomatic features 
of the war, mainly on the part of the United States and its allies.
The major concern of this thesis is, in the first place, to form a 
coherent account of the early KPA ranging from the pre-1945 accounts 
of its cadre members to the war time performance in 1950. Major 
research efforts were given to the founding and development stage of 
the KPA since the knowledge on this period is the weakest, at present, 
despite the fact that the period is crucial. For this purpose I have 
looked through the 'seized materials', which amounts to about 1,000 
archive boxes. Though the materials directly related to this topic 
were not rich in quantity, in terms of quality many of the newly found 
materials were invaluable, especially, in tracing the lineage of KPA 
units and confirming the preparations of the KPA for the invasion. 
For instance it has become possible to draw the whole picture of the 
invasion plan, which was a surprisingly complacent one, envisaging a 
three-week war. It is also established that the KPA strength in June
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1950 was not so big as had been estimated by western intelligence. 
Another major primary source for this study is Kim IlSung's Works, 
especially volumes one to six. With code-breaking efforts and 
imagination a lot of information regarding the early KPA and the 
political direction of the KPA was extracted from Kim IlSung's Works. 
By correcting some inaccuracies and inconsistencies through newly 
available materials a much more coherent account of the early KPA has 
been possible.
It is the contention of this author that the cross-examining of 
the KPA is a key clue to looking into the origins and nature of the 
Korean War. Controversies on this issue can be categorised into three 
questions:
1. Who started the war?
2. Who masterminded the war?
3. What caused the war?
On the question 'who started the war?' it is now firmly established 
that the North, not the South, started the war. A sufficient amount 
of evidence undeniably points to North Korea as initiating the war. 
Among others documents captured by the UN Forces provide detailed
accounts of the mobilisation, movement and deployment of KPA troops 
for the all-out attack in June 1950. Earlier in the 1950s, when 
extant evidence was not easily accessible to western scholars, there
were some scholars who attempted to build the case for American and
2
South Korean responsibility for the initiation of the hostilities.
But, as will be presented in the thesis concretely, it is now a firmly 
established view that North Korea started the invasion.
There are also some scholars who hold the view that the question 
of 'who started the first shooting on 25 June 1950' is of secondary 
importance. They argue that North Korea might have been caught m  a 
trap prepared by shrewd leaders, who had been expecting a communist 
initiative which would cause indignation in the American people. This
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kind of interpretation is very searching, but somewhat speculative. 
It is true that, judging from the results, the Korean War provided the 
Truman Administration with the opportune rationale for the 
implementation of policy initiatives embodied in the NSC 68. But it 
would be too much to accuse the Truman Administration of having 
misrepresented itself purposefully to lure the communists into a 
miscalculated adventure. Such a speculation is, just as the famous 
Roosevelt conspiracy theory on the Pearl Harbour attack by the 
Japanese, too dubious and has not been substantiated with reliable 
extant evidence. Evidence attests to the proposition that what the 
North Korean attack imposed upon the US government was a strategic 
surprise in the deepest sense, as meticulously described in Glen D. 
Paige's The Korean Decision: June 24-30. 1950.
The question of 'who masterminded the war?' is closely related 
with the question, 'what caused the war?' So it is preferable to
examine these questions in a package. On this question it is fair to 
acknowledge that until we gain access to archival materials in 
Pyongyang, Moscow (and Peking) many parts of various explanations will 
have remained conjectural. Having said that, controversies on this 
question have converged on two kinds of explanations. The so-called 
traditionalists view is that the Korean War was a Soviet-directed or 
initiated scheme. Detailed examination of the traditionalist view
will be presented in the main text. But to say the conclusion first, 
it is now outdated and insufficient to explain the cause of the Korean 
War primarily in the context of an 'expansionist-minded Stalin'. The 
currently accepted view of the majority of Korean War historians is to
see the war as the result of a complex interplay of local as well as
international factors. Now it is almost established that the North 
Korean leadership initiated the idea of a Korean War, and Stalin, 
after consultation with Mao Tse-tung, approved and supported the North 
Korean initiative. This author takes the same position as the above 
proposition. The main purpose of this thesis is to advance this 
proposition with more reliable evidence and consistent logic.
In looking into the Korean War decision by communist leaders the 
crucial point is to settle the question, 'when the decision was made?' 
This is because the timing of this decision is the key factor in 
analysing the rationale and reasoning of the Korean War decision. 
Here you should distinguish a 'declared aim' from the 'action
programme'. Since 1945, the North Korean leadership avowedly 
professed the unification of Korea as their supreme goal. However, 
the open declaration of intent to reunify Korea in 1945 and later, did 
not necessarily mean that North Korea was preparing the invasion of 
South Korea from 1945 on. Let me give an analogy. Hitler made it 
clear from his early days that Russia should be eliminated as first- 
rate power in Europe. However Operation 'Barbarossa' which was to 
realise his long dream was decided only in the late summer of 1940. 
The 'Directive 21' which ordered preparation for Operation
'Barbarossa' was issued on 18 December 1940. The actual beginning of 
the German invasion of Russia started on 6 June 1941. Is it not 
possible to compare the the conquest of Russia to the unification of 
Korea, and the German invasion of Russia in June 1941 to the North 
Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950? Then what was the likely
date for a 'Directive 21' for the KPA? In other words what was the
likely date when the declared goal of the unification had been 
transformed into the action programme? If we settle this question the 
controversies regarding the origins and nature of the Korean War will 
be much advanced. The cross-examining of the KPA in this thesis will 
be a step forward towards this settlement.
This thesis is organised into six chapters each dealing with the 
following central questions. Chapter One is on the international and 
domestic settings of the Korean issue leading to the Korean War. 
Chapter Two asks the question 'who were the cadres of the early KPA?' 
Chapter Three addresses the policies and preparations in founding the 
KPA. Chapter Four examines the growth and development of the KPA into 
a full-fledged regular army. Chapter Five is on how the KPA was 
prepared for the Korean War. Chapter Six is a critical assessment of 
KPA performance in the war. In the conclusion a brief anatomy of the
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KPA will be presented together with a summary of my explanation of the 
origins of the Korean War.
Chapter One is on the making of post-World War II Korean problems 
in the context of US-USSR rivalry and its impact on the course of the 
North-South confrontation, focusing on the analysis of the strategic 
reasoning of both superpowers towards the Korean issue. The main 
themes of this Chapter are as follows. First, the US political and 
military leaders failed to pay due attention to Korean aspirations in 
the making and implementing of their Korean policy. Second, the 
Russians and their North Korean protege made use of this Korean 
aspirations factor much more adroitly than the Americans for the 
advancement of their causes and interests. Third, the two basic 
political lines which the North Korean leadership under the Soviet 
tutelage formulated - the Democratic Base Line and United Front Line - 
were two faces of the same coin in their efforts for the communisation 
of the whole of Korea. As such this chapter is intended to form a 
frame of reference which can be applied in comprehending the interplay 
of international as well as domestic factors regarding the Korean 
issue, in the late 1940s.
Chapter Two is on the central figures in the making of the KPA: 
their social and educational backgrounds, military career, connection 
with the Soviet Union and Chinese communists, the degree of coherence 
among each group and their future positions in the KPA and the North 
Korean regime. The cadres of the KPA were mainly from three groups: 
the Partisan group (later Kim IlSung group); the Yenan group; and the 
Soviet-Korean group. Since the Partisan group was to play the key 
role in the making of the KPA, special attention will be given to the 
examining of this group. The identity of Kim IlSung has been 
controversial until very recently. It is now almost established that 
he was a junior figure in the anti-Japanese partisans in Manchuria in 
the 1930s, affiliated, first, with Chinese communists, and later, with 
the Soviet Army. A good understanding of these Manchurian-Korean 
partisans in the 1930s, their backgrounds, temperament, ability and 
comradeship is a prerequisite to the construction of KPA history.
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Chapter Three is on the founding stage of the people’s army. For 
this inquiry a proper understanding of the basic arrangements by the 
Soviet occupation authorities and their North Korean protege for 
establishing a North Korean regime - the party, the government, the 
police system, and the army - is necessary. The main concern of this 
chapter is to make a clear distinction between the development of the 
security forces and the founding of the future people's army. So far 
there have been some confusions on this issue among western scholars. 
For example some scholars see the organisation of Boandae (the 
Security Unit) in late 1945 as the beginning of the people's army, 
which is not the case. Boandae was strictly a police force. Even if 
the people's army was disguised under the title of the Security Cadres 
Training Corps until February 1948, the organisers of the people's 
army made the distinction clear between a police force and an armed 
force from the very beginning of the organisation of these two forces.
Chapter Four is on the growth and development of the KPA as a 
regular armed force of North Korea. Emphasis will be given to the 
following: (1) the significance of the founding of the KPA in
February 1948 (2) the policy and strategy of the Soviet occupation 
authorities and the North Korean leadership in fostering the KPA; and 
(3) the structural features and ideological orientation of the KPA. 
The main themes of the this chapter are as follows. First, the 
founding of the KPA in February 1948 was a major initiative by the 
North Korean leadership towards the reunification issue. Second, the 
organisers of the KPA opted for a gradual approach to the development 
of the KPA, which was largely owing to the presence of the Soviet 
troops and the effective internal security system. Third, the 
foremost feature of the KPA was that it advocated a people's army 
inheriting the anti-Japanese struggle tradition of Kim IlSung and his 
associates.
Chapter Five traces the course of the immediate events and 
political decisions leading to the all-out war in June 1950 and the 
process of the KPA expansion in line with these events and decisions.
15
The main themes of this chapter are as follows. First, the Korean war 
decision was made among communist leaders by February 1950. The North 
Korean leadership initiated the idea and Stalin and Mao Tse-tung 
sanctioned and supported the plan. Second, the invasion of South 
Korea was the 'finalisation' of the 'southern strategy' rather than 
the only alternative left when all other methods had failed. To back 
up this proposition a new look into the pseudo-warfare between the 
north and the south from late 1948 to early 1950, in the form of 
guerrilla provocations and border conflicts, will be presented.
Chapter Six is a critical assessment of KPA performance in the 
first phase of the war. First, the North Korean leadership started 
the invasion from a much more complacent war plan and more modest 
strength than had been evaluated by western military experts and 
scholars. Second, the KPA performance was not so effective as to 
alleviate the disaster brought about by the political misjudgment of 
not predicting the massive US intervention. (The same was true with 
the UN Forces during their advance to the Yalu, which exacerbated, 
rather than alleviated, the political mistake of having taken the 
possibility of Chinese intervention lightly.) The main concern of 
this chapter is to analyse the strategic calculation behind the 
battles and campaigns rather than to present detailed descriptions of 
those battles and campaigns.
In the conclusion: first, an anatomy of the structural,
ideological, and strategic features of the early KPA will be 
presented; second, a synthesis of arguments in this thesis regarding 
the North Korean leaders' reasoning on the Korean War decision will 
also be presented.
In the presentation of Korean names the Romanisation system 
adopted by ROK Ministry of Education in 1988 was used with the 
exception of Kim IlSung's and Rhee Syngman's names.
CHAPTER ONE
POLITICAL SETTING
During the 1945-1950 period, the political line of North Korean 
communists under the aegis of the Soviet Union can be summed up in two 
main themes; the Democratic Base Line and the United Front Line. The 
Democratic Base Line was meant 'to transform north Korea into a 
powerful democratic base for the building of a unified, independent 
and democratic state.'* The United Front Line was intended to 'form a
united front with all the democratic political parties and social
2
organisations in north and south Korea and strengthen it in every way' 
in order to establish a unified government over the whole of Korea. 
The two lines were interlinked with each other and were being pursued 
together throughout the period, 1945-1950.
These two lines were in effect a North Korean version of Soviet 
policy on Korea during this period. Traditional wisdom regarding the 
Soviet policy on Korea in the aftermath of the Second World War has 
been that the Soviet Union had no master plan or elaborate programmes 
to communize Korea except for such general guidelines as 'a keen 
interest in Korea being a true democratic and independent country, 
friendly to the Soviet Union, so that in the future it will not become 
a base for an attack on the Soviet U n i o n . T h e r e  is not enough 
explicit evidence to refute these suggestions flatly. Nevertheless, 
circumstantial evidence requires such themes to be qualified 
cautiously. At least it would be very unwise to assume that Soviet 
policy and preparations on North Korea at the initial stage of its 
occupation were approximate to those of the opposite number in South 
Korea - the United States.
The Soviet government was clear on the significance of the 
occupation of north Korea. The Soviet forces were not meant simply to
17
receive the surrender of the Japanese troops north of the 38th
parallel. Even though the division of Korea into the US-USSR 
occupying zones along the 38th parallel was arranged hastily and
expediently on the eve of the Japanese surrender, the historical and
political significance of the 38th parallel was such as should have
been felt immediately and obviously to all the parties concerned. The 
38th parallel was none other than a precise manifestation of the 
developing rivalry between two opposing powers in East Asia and the 
West Pacific - the Americans and the Russians. By the end of the
Second World War, the Soviet Union which had so far been 'an' Asian 
power became 'the' Asian power whereas the United States which had so 
far been 'a' Pacific power became 'the' Pacific power. And the two
powers met each other in Korea along the 38th parallel. That was the
stark reality of power politics in the mid-1940s in East Asia and the 
West Pacific. Now that the Soviet Union secured north Korea, north 
Korea should be transformed into a sphere of Soviet influence. In 
April 1945 Stalin told Milovan Djilas; 'This war is not as in the
past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social
system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach.
4
It cannot be otherwise.'
There have been controversies on the question of why Stalin 
accepted the American proposal on the partition of the Korean
peninsula between the US and Soviet troops in a seemingly favourable 
position in taking full control of the whole of Korea on the eve of
the Japanese surrender. Did Stalin make the decision out of a desire
to maintain allied cooperation with the United States? Did he 
anticipate securing a similar arrangement with regard to Japan? Or 
did he aim to secure a favourable position vis-A-vis the United States 
in other settlements in Europe? A pivotal point in this question is 
that the partition of the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel
was, from the Soviet point of view, a political rather than a military
5
issue.
On the partition of Korea at the 38th parallel, concerns have so 
far focused on the decision-making process of US security planners and
political leadership. Traditional wisdom on this issue is that the 
partition was initially proposed from an urgent military consideration 
on the part of the United States to prevent advancing Soviet troops 
into north Korea from sweeping the whole of Korea. The fact is, as of
13 August 1945 when Stalin consented to the US proposal on the
partition, Soviet troops operating in north Korea were not in a 
position to sweep the whole of Korea rapidly in terms of operational 
plan and strength. The 25th Soviet Army which entered north Korea 
from 8 August was only one of six armies comprising the First Far East
Front, which was in turn a subsidiary body of the Soviet forces
fighting under the command of Vasilievsky against the Japanese 
Kwantung Army. At that time, Vasilievsky's main concern was in 
trapping the Kwantung Army before it could retreat into its prepared 
positions in southern Manchuria. The mission of the 25th Soviet Army 
was, according to the initial operation plan, to prevent Japanese 
reinforcements moving from north Korea into southern Manchuria. So in 
mid-August 1945, in terms of intent and strength, the Soviet forces 
operating in Manchuria and the northernmost part of Korea, were not in 
a position to sweep the whole of Korea at once5
Important was the fact that the Korean question as of August 1945 
was not a sort of race between two competitors where the fastest get 
the most. The basic formula on the post-war settlement in Korea had 
been discussed between Roosevelt and Stalin well before the sudden 
collapse of Japan in August 1945. At the Yalta conference in February 
1945, Stalin and Roosevelt concurred on the need of a trusteeship for 
Korea, composed of a Soviet, an American, and a Chinese 
representative. Stalin 'felt' that the British should be invited. 
However, Roosevelt did not feel it was necessary to invite the British 
into the trusteeship of Korea. On the period of the trusteeship 
Roosevelt 'felt' that from twenty to thirty years might be proper
7
while Stalin said 'the shorter the period the better'. The Korean 
question had not been elaborated further than the ad hoc political 
understanding or oral assurance between Roosevelt and Stalin at the 
Yalta Conference for the rest of the war. The core of the Yalta 
agreement was that the post-war Korean settlement should be solved
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politically through the common understanding of both superpowers. It
was this political pledge rather than military correlation which
induced Stalin to accept the US proposal to divide Korea along the
0
38th parallel at the end of the war.
The American reasoning behind the trusteeship formula started from 
a necessity to stem growing Soviet influence in East Asia within the 
limits of US military capabilities. Although acknowledging the 
traditional interests of the Soviet Union in Korea, US security
planners defined, from the early 1940s, Soviet control of the whole of
Korea as a likely threat to the security of the United States in the
post-war Pacific. To counter Soviet influence over Korea in the
post-war era, the US security planners were seeking a political 
solution rather than preparing a military counterbalance in the Korean 
peninsula. Basically a naval, Pacific power, the United States was 
not favourable to the idea of sustaining a large contingent of ground 
forces in continental Asia. The trusteeship formula was, for the
United States, such as to secure its basic security interests
g
regarding Korea without involving itself in Korea militarily.
Even though the trusteeship formula looked subtle and economic, it 
was based on many wishful premises and serious misjudgments. One 
premise was that with the completion of military operations in Korea 
there should be a military government represented by those countries 
which have a real interest in the future political status of Korea and 
'that such military government should be organised on the principle of 
centralised administration with all of Korea administered as a single 
unit and not as separate zones. ( e m p h a s i s  by author) As it turned 
out, a centralised military government (other than superficial Allied 
Councils) shared by both the United States (and its close allies) and 
the Soviet Union did not materialise in any of the occupied countries 
(Germany, Japan, Korea). If a centralised military government over 
the whole of Korea was unattainable, the prospect of a multilateral 
(virtually bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union) 
trusteeship over Korea was also very obscure since the trusteeship 
would be in effect an evolution of the centralised US-USSR military
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government in Korea with a political mantle. So the underlying 
premise of the US security planners that a centralised international 
administration over the whole of Korea could be established after the 
war ended, whether in the form of a centralised military government or 
a trusteeship, or a guardianship over a Korean interim government, was 
not well founded in reality!*
The US political and military leaders were also lacking a proper 
appreciation of the internal situation of Korea in this period, a 
tendency which more or less continued throughout the occupation period 
until the outbreak of the Korean War. They overlooked the possibility 
that even if a genuine political compromise regarding the post-war 
status of Korea could be made between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the whole course of post-war Korea would not be bound by that 
settlement alone. To determine the destiny of thirty million people 
with a long history and a strong sense of identity could not be simply 
a counting of beans or drawing of lines in the context of 
international power politics. The US leaders should have reckoned 
with Korean aspirations more seriously. Moreover, there was a strong 
possibility that the Soviet Union could make use of Korean aspirations 
more adroitly than the United States. Such a possibility turned out
n
to be a reality less than couple of months after the war ended.
In Korea liberated from thirty-five years' Japanese colonial rule, 
aspirations for restoring national pride and establishing a free and 
independent state was naturally the highest calling for all Koreans at 
that time. Without the proper understanding of the magnitude and 
direction of these aspirations, any Korean leader or foreign power was 
doomed to failure. The insensitivity and unpreparedness of the 
Americans with regard to Korean aspirations in the first phase of the 
occupation was almost scandalous. Korea was at first treated as a 
former enemy territory rather than an ally. Any sort of 
self-generated Korean government, including the Korean Provisional 
Government which had been for the last twenty-six years the most 
legitimate centre of the Korean independence movement, was flatly 
denied. The English language was promulgated as the official
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language. The positions of influence in the US Army Military 
Government in Korea (USAMGIK) were mainly filled with such Korean 
'gentlemen' as were mostly persona non grata to grassroots Koreans 
because of their records of collaboration with or acquiescence to the 
Japanese colonial oppression. In a word, the Americans arrived in 
Korea in 1945 with too little knowledge of its history and people. 
They were to have great difficulties even in managing to police Korea, 
let alone making use of the internal dynamics of post-war Korea for
n
the advance of their interest.
On the other hand, the Russians acted along different lines from 
the American ones. The Soviet occupation authorities promptly took 
the lead in buying the goodwill of the Koreans. They declared that 
the Red Army (as such the Soviet Army was called in 1945) came to 
Korea as a liberator and friend, not as a conqueror and another 
master. All sorts of self-generated people's committees were 
recognised and nurtured while the presence of the Soviet occupation 
authorities was skilfully restrained. Pro-Japanese elements were 
ruthlessly purged from influential positions, not only political but 
economic, social, and cultural. Instead of a rapid socialist 
revolution, a 'people's democracy' embracing all but pro-Japanese
elements and traitors was put forward. In short, the Soviet Union 
started from the beginning of the occupation with a good understanding
of the significance and utility of Korean aspirations for restoring
14national pride and establishing an independent state.
The real significance on the part of the two powers of
understanding and utilising the internal Korean dynamics was that the 
development of such internal dynamics could significantly influence 
the US-USSR political pledge itself regarding the status of post-war 
Korea, the essence of which was that Korea should not be an exclusive 
domain of either side. It was even more the case that the Soviet
Union could take the position that the two powers had no right to
interfere with spontaneous Korean initiatives on their own affairs, 
for example, the unification issue. As far as the Soviet leaders and 
their Korean protdgds could have faith in their ability and
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preparedness to manipulate Korean aspirations, they did not have to 
cling to the trusteeship formula which 'would probably mean USSR
1C
having but one of three or four votes.' J It was this reckoning of the 
communist leaders which was to shape the course of post-war Korea more 
substantially than the spirit of Yalta which had stipulated a 
multilateral trusteeship formula in which the Americans could, in the 
American reasoning, dominate.
At the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in December 1945, the 
Soviet government won a diplomatic coup over the US government on the 
Korea issue. The-agreement was composed of four articles: (1) There 
shall be set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government (2) A 
Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the two occupational 
commands in Korea shall be established in order to assist the 
formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government; (3) A four 
power trusteeship of Korea, period of up to five years, shall be 
considered on the proposals of the Joint Commission following 
consultation with the provisional Korean government (4) A conference 
of the representatives of the two commands in Korea shall be convened 
within a period of two weeks for the consideration of urgent economic 
and administration matters as well as permanent coordination.^
From Moscow's point of view the core of the Moscow agreement was
the decision to establish a provisional Korean government prior to the
coming of the four power trusteeship over Korea. (In Soviet terms,
'guardianship' over the provisional Korean government.) The Soviet
government deemed 'that the unification of Korea under the leadership
of the Korean national government was the important prerequisite for
the restoration of Korea as an independent state and the establishment
of bases for the development of the country on democratic 
17principles.' A trusteeship was to be considered (emphasis by author)
on the proposals of the Joint Commission in line with the wishes of
the provisional Korean government. That is, a Korean government would
1 0
come before, not after, trusteeship. If the ex-Koreanisation of the 
Korean issue - a diplomatic solution among major powers - was the
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basic theme behind the American rationale of the trusteeship formula, 
the Koreanisation of the Korean issue was the basic strategy behind 
the Soviet rationale of the 'Korean government first' formula. The 
Soviet formula was a clear indication that the Soviet government was 
gaining confidence in their ability in mobilising Korean internal 
dynamics for the advancement of their interests in the whole of Korea. 
The United Front Line which was intended to produce a favourable 
condition for manipulating a unified Korean government was the 
embodiment of this 'Korean government first' formula.
During the period 1945-1950, North Korean communist leaders and 
the Soviet authorities were to act upon these strategic calculations, 
which were in turn translated into two basic political lines - the 
Democratic Base Line and the United Front Line, that is, (1) to build 
a strong 'Democratic Base' in possible areas - Soviet-occupied north 
Korea and (2) to launch an offensive to gain the hegemony of a future 
unified Korean government. It is possible to say that almost all the 
policy initiatives, achievements, strategies and tactics by the North 
Korean leadership and the Soviet authorities during this period can be 
comprehended within the context of these two basic political lines. 
The initiation of the Korean War by the North Korean leadership was a 
culmination of these two basic political lines based on their 
confidence in the strengthened Democratic Base of North Korean vis-A- 
vis a South Korea weakened by the various provocations by North Korea 
along the United Front line.
However, the internalisation of the Korean War came to evidence 
the fact that the Korean question in the late 20th century is still a 
major international issue which requires an international settlement 
as well as an intra-national solution. The North Korean failure in 
the invasion of South Korea in 1950 was more than anything else due to 
the fact that the North Korean leadership failed to pay due attention 
to the international nature of the Korean issue. In this regard, the 
Soviet Union which sanctioned and supported the North Korean 
initiative also made a mistake in the proper understanding of the US-
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USSR pledge regarding the status of post-war Korea. So during the
period 1945 to 1950 both the United States and the Soviet Union in the
end failed in grasping the whole nature of the Korean issue properly. 
Both Korean leaderships in the north and the south were also lacking
in the proper understanding of the Korean reunification and
independence issues in their entirety. The five year history of post­
war Korea was mainly an interplay of these four parties who had been 
pursuing their own goals in their restricted, and often ill-founded, 
perception of their opponents. Such was the international and 
domestic setting in which the KPA was born, grown, tested and rebuilt 
during the period, 1945-50.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ORIGINS OF THE CADRES
Those who were to form the nucleus of the Korean People's Army 
were , for the most part, from three backgrounds: the Partisan group; 
the Yenan group; and the Soviet-Korean group. Most of them had a good 
deal of political and military experience, largely in affiliation with 
the Soviet Union or the Chinese communists. The formation of a North 
Korean army was an alignment of these experienced men under the
direction and support of the Soviet Union. Therefore a history of the
KPA may well begin with the pre-1945 history of these three groups.
The Partisan Group
The Partisan group came mostly from the remnants of the Korean 
communists who had engaged in the anti-Japanese guerilla warfare in 
Manchuria in the 1930s. Ever since Japan annexed Korea in 1910,
Manchuria had served as a strategic base for the Korean independence
struggle abroad. During the 1910s and 1920s the mainstays of these
anti-Japanese struggles in Manchuria were the nationalists. However, 
by the late 1920s, the nationalists' large-scale anti-Japanese
fighting was waning. From the early 1930s small-scale guerilla 
activities by communists were gradually becoming the mainstream of the 
Korean independence movement in Manchuria. The growth of Korean 
communist activities in Manchuria was largely in line with the
development of the Chinese communist movement in Manchuria! After the 
Japanese took over Manchuria in 1931 (the Manchurian Incident) the CCP 
began to organise a united anti-Japanese front among Chinese and
Korean communists in Manchuria. The first noteworthy formation of 
this kind was the First Division of the First Army of the North-East 
People's Revolutionary Army (NEPRA), organised by Yang Jing-yu (a
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Chinese) in September 1933. By November 1934, Yang Jing-yu's unit 
expanded into the First Army of the NEPRA. By late 1935 another five 
armies of this kind were organised:
In February 1936 most of the anti-Japanese armed formations in 
Manchuria were integrated into the North-East Anti-Japanese United 
Army (NEAJUA). The integration was in line with the 8.1 declaration 
of the CCP, issued on 1 August 1935, appealing to the whole of China 
for the formation of a united front against Japanese aggression. By 
the late 1930s the NEAJUA expanded into eleven armies, which were in
turn regrouped into three route armies. In spite of its impressive
titles such as army, route army (army group), the actual strength of
the NEAJUA did not exceed a division-strength force having about
15,000 men and women at its peak. The title of each echelon was 
exaggerated possibly for two purposes: (1) to boost the morale of
friendly people and to mislead the Japanese; and (2) to prepare for 
future expansion. Judging from various sources the titles were
upgraded by two grades over the actual strength. So a 'division' was 
actually a battalion size unit with around 300 men. An 'army' was a
regiment size unit having around 1,000 men.^
Many Korean communists took part in the NEAJUA. Koreans who
commanded an 'army' were three - Ch'oe Yong-gon, Yi Hak-man, and Ho
Hyong-sik. About half a dozen Koreans took command of a 'division'.
Another dozen Koreans were made political commissars of an army or a 
division or a regiment. Among those the following figures were to 
play key roles in the KPA and political leadership of North Korea 
after 1945.*
Ch'oe Yong-gon Commander, the 7th Army;
later Minister of National Defence (1948-1957) and 
Head of State (Symbolic) (1957-1972)
Kim Ch'aek Political Commissar, the 3rd Army;
later Commander-in-Chief, the Front Command (1950) 
and Deputy Premier (1947-1951)
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Commander, the 6th Division of the 2nd Army; 
later Supreme Commander (1950-),
Premier (1946-1972) and 
Head of State (all powerful) (1972-)
Commander, the 5th Division of the 2nd Army; 
later Minister of National Defence (1968-76) 
Political Commissar, the 14th Regiment of the 2nd
Army;
later Chief of the General Staff (1946-1947) 
Political Commissar, the 9th Regiment of the 5th
Army;
later Chief of the General Staff (1947-1950)
During the mid-1930s the NEAJUA was causing no small disturbance 
to the security of Manchukuo, a Japanese puppet regime, and were 
harassing the rear of the Japanese army which was then engaged in the
invasion of China proper (from 1937 onwards). Some units led by
Korean commanders infiltrated even into northern Korea across the Yalu 
river and inflicted a shock upon the Japanese security forces and
boosted the morale of the Koreans in this region. The 'Battle of
Poch'onbo' in June 1937, which was staged by Kim IlSung and his unit, 
was one of the most shocking incidents. Through this campaign Kim 
IlSung became known throughout northern Korea and southern Manchuria. 
Later the 'Battle of Poch'onbo' was to be an enormous political asset 
of Kim IlSung in his advancement in the NEAJUA and future career as a 
possible leader of North Korea.
With the growth of the NEAJUA punitive campaigns of the Japanese 
Kwantung Army and the Manchukuo Army were also intensifying. The
first large scale punitive campaign, which lasted nearly two years
from May 1936, was not successful enough to put an end to the 
provocations of the NEAJUA. After the Nomonhan campaign in 1938, in 
which the Japanese Kwantung Army had suffered humiliating defeat by 
the Soviet Army under the command of Zhukov, the Japanese launched a 
massive retaliatory campaign against the NEAJUA. The campaign lasted 
two and a half years until the NEAJUA was almost uprooted by the end
Kim IlSung
Ch'oe Hyon 
An Kil
Kang Gon
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of 1940. The NEAJUA suffered fatal defeats and was forced to scatter 
into China proper or the Soviet Union. Many Korean communists in the 
NEAJUA, including Kim IlSung and his followers, allegedly entered the 
Soviet Union by January 1941
Many conflicting versions have so far emerged as to Kim IlSung's 
whereabouts during the 1941-1945 period. Kim IlSung's own account of 
his activities during this period is brief and obscure:
In 1941 or thereabouts, during the most difficult period in 
the anti-Japanese struggle. We changed the line of struggle.
We trained many cadres in the territory of the Soviet Union 
in anticipation of the future development of the revolution, 
with a view to preserving our forces, we switched over from 
large to small unit operations and intensified the
7
underground struggle:
Recent North Korean publications even deny that Kim IlSung left
0
Manchuria for the Soviet Union during this period. Judging from 
various evidence, there is no denying that Kim IlSung, with other 
surviving members of the NEAJUA, escaping the pursuit of the Kwantung
q
Army, entered the Soviet Union at around the end of 1940.
The remnants of the NEAJUA who entered the Soviet Union in this 
period were to be utilised by the Soviet Army for the future 
Soviet-Japanese War. Those who crossed the border of the Soviet Union 
were, at first, to be cleared of suspicion of being Japanese espionage 
agents. After verifying their political and military backgrounds, the 
Soviet authorities placed them under the control of the Reconnaissance 
Bureau (intelligence section) of the Headquarters of the Far East 
Military District. The Reconnaissance Bureau organised the Chinese 
and Korean partisans into the 88th Special Brigade and placed them at 
Biyask, near Khabarovsk. Zhou Bao-zhong, who was former Commander of 
the 2nd Route Army of the NEAJUA, was appointed Commander of the 
brigade. Both Vice Commander and Chief of Staff were Soviet Army 
Majors. Ch'oe Yong-gon was appointed Political Commissar of the
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brigade, together with two Chinese members. The brigade consisted of 
four battalions. Two of the battalion commanders were Koreans - Kim 
IlSung and Kang Gon. The brigade was in fact a company-size unit, 
totalling about 200. Among them, Koreans from the NEAJUA, numbered 
about 60. Chinese numbered about 100 and the rest were from the 
Soviet Army. Among the personnel from the Soviet Army there were a 
dozen Soviet-Koreans who had been serving in the Soviet Army for 
several years. The main task of the 88th Special Brigade was to train 
experienced Korean and Chinese partisans for reconnoitring activities 
in the future Soviet-Japanese war. The brigade was neither an 
institute to prepare party or government leaders nor a training centre 
for the secret police.^
The key members among Korean partisans in the 88th Special Brigade 
and important portfolios which they attained in the future KPA were as 
follows.^
Ch'oe Yong-gon Brigade Political Commissar;
Ch'oe Yong-jin
Ch'oe Hyon
Kim Kwang-hyop
An Kil
Kim Ch'aek
Kim II
Kim IlSung
Kang gon
later Minister of National Defence (1948-1957)
Battalion Commander;
later Supreme Commander (1950-)
Battalion Commander;
later Chief of the General Staff (1947-1950) 
Battalion Political Commissar;
later Commander-in-Chief, the Front Command (1950)
Battalion Political Commissar;
later Chief of the General Staff (1946-1947)
Company Commander;
later Director of the Cultural (Political) Training 
Bureau (1946-1950)
Company Commander;
later Minister of National Defence (1957-1962) 
Company Commander;
later Minister of National Defence (1968-1976)
Company Commander;
later Army Corps Commander (1950)
30
So Ch'ol Company Political Commissar;
later Chief of the General Political Bureau 
(1958-1960)
Platoon Leader;
later Chief of the General Staff (1963-1969, 1988-) 
Platoon Leader;
later Army Corps Commander (1950)
Platoon leader;
later Army Corps Commander (1950)
Platoon leader;
later Chief of the General Political Bureau 
(1960-1967)
Ch'oe Kwang
Yi Yong-ho
Yu Kyong-su
Ho Bong-hak
Kim IlSung was at that time only one of five leading Korean partisans 
in the 88th Special Brigade. At least two men - Ch'oe Yong-gon and 
Kim Ch'aek - were more than equals to Kim IlSung.
Whereas the actual open hostilities between Japan and the Soviet 
Union came to occur only in August 1945, during the period 1941-1945 
the activities of the 88th Special Brigade were actually limited to 
intelligence activities. The Korean and Chinese partisans were well 
acquainted with the geographical features of the rear of the Japanese
Kwantung Army. Some of them had a good command of the Japanese
language. The Korean and Chinese partisans received mainly such
political and military training as was suitable for small
reconnaissance operations and propaganda activities. All members of 
the brigade took part in small unit operations at least twice, and 
some as many as five times. On the whole, the military contribution 
of the 88th Special Brigade to the Soviet Far East Military District 
was not very significant. After Japan surrendered , most of the 
Korean members of the 88th Special Brigade returned to north Korea by 
mid-September 1945.^
The foremost feature of the Partisan group was that they were 
already seasoned political and military fighters when they returned to
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north Korea. Most of them were still in their early 30's - notable 
exceptions were Ch'oe Young-gon, 45 years old, and Kim Ch'aek, 43 
years old - as of 1945. They had been fighting guerrilla warfare for 
more than ten years by the time they returned to north Korea. Among 
them there were few who had received higher education - academic or 
military. There were virtually none who had received university or
war college level education. Instead of regular, formal education
n
they had forged themselves in the hardship of the real world.
Members of the Partisan group came to have some ambivalent 
attitudes towards the CCP and the Soviet Union through their 
experiences in the NEAJUA and the 88th Special Brigade. When they 
were under the control of the CCP, the CCP was not in a position to 
impose fastidious discipline upon the Korean partisans. The Chinese 
and Korean partisans in the NEAJUA were fighting the formidable 
prowess of the Japanese armed and police forces. Without resorting to 
spontaneous and comradely cooperation from the Korean partisans, the 
Chinese leadership of the NEAJUA could not expect good results in the 
anti-Japanese united front. Therefore the relationship between Korean 
and Chinese partisans was cordial. The NEAJUA was literally a united 
army.** Each divisional commander was actually commander-in-chief of 
an independent unit. Armies were an alignment of these independent 
divisions. In this sense Kim IlSung might well have thought that he 
is entitled to claim that he created a Korean People's Revolutionary 
Army in 1932, when he is allegedly said to have gathered a handful of
1 c
Korean partisans for anti-Japanese struggle. As such Korean 
communists could maintain the position that they fought for their own 
cause, even while fighting under the overall control of the CCP. 
Meanwhile, in the 88th Special Brigade the Soviet officers were 
superiors, not comrades of the Korean partisans. Under these 
circumstances the Korean partisans were obliged to learn the wisdom 
and patience needed to serve 'Big Brother'. The surprising extent of 
flexibility and adaptability shown by the North Korean leadership in 
meeting various internal and external challenges in the years after 
1945 seemed much influenced by their experiences in the 88th Special 
Brigade.
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Although the partisans were fairly quick learners in practical 
things, the lack of normal education and limited scope of intellectual 
training remained bitter shortcomings. Most of them came to high 
positions in North Korea from late 1945, with Soviet backing. 
However, the actual running of the party and the government was, under 
Soviet instructions, mainly performed by more cultivated and 
experienced Korean communists - the Soviet-Koreans, the Yenan group, 
and domestic communists. Even such important departments dealing with 
ideology, agitation and propaganda, and organisation were largely in 
the hands of other communists than the partisans!^ Most partisans 
were not only unable to master the 'theology' and social sciences of 
Marxism-Leninism but also unwilling to be bound by such pedantic
doctrines. (It is no wonder that from the late 1950s Kim IlSung began
to put forward a Chu-Ch'e idea, the so-called creative application of 
Marxism-Leninism into the reality of Korea.) This state of affairs
continued until the mid-1950s when Kim IlSung and his partisan
followers could manage their jobs for themselves with the help of
17newly emerging elites whom they had fostered since 1945.
Until the mid-1950s, the bulk of the partisans were active mainly
in the KPA. They had occupied the most important positions of the KPA
from its birth in late 1945. In the making and running of the KPA,
the contribution of other communists than the partisans - the
Soviet-Koreans, the Yenan group - was also enormous as in the case of
running the party and government. However, Kim IlSung and his
followers were keen enough not to lose the tight control of the KPA.
The KPA was the bastion of the Partisan group. The Partisan group was
well aware of the first rule in power politics that political power
comes from the barrel of a gun. The solidarity among the Partisan
group was much stronger compared to the Yenan group or the
Soviet-Koreans. It is no wonder that for the last forty years since
the establishment of the Kim IlSung regime, there has not been a
10
serious coup d'etat attempt in the KPA.
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The Yenan Group
The Yenan group grew out of the North China Korean Independence 
League and its military arm - the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA). The 
Independence League and the KVA was an assembly of left-wing Koreans 
who were affiliated with the Chinese communists in China proper. The 
leadership of the Independence League were mostly from senior Korean 
communists who had engaged in communist activities from the early 
1920s. The cadres of the KVA were mostly from the youths who had 
taken part in anti-Japanese struggle from the late 1930s. While the 
leadership of the Independence League were to play mainly political 
roles in North Korea, the cadres of the KVA were incorporated into the 
KPA and were to play a major role in the making and running of the 
KPA.19
The forerunner of the KVA was the Korean Volunteer Corps (KVC) 
which was organised by Kim Won-bong, leader of the Korean National 
Revolutionary Party, in Hankow, China, in October 1938. The KVC was 
intended to mobilise Korean efforts in fighting against the Japanese 
invasion of China proper from July 1937. The KVC came into being 
under the auspices of the Military Committee of the Chinese 
Nationalist Government. At its birth in October 1938, the KVC had 
about 140 men. The cadres of the KVC were mostly graduates of the 
Xingzi Military Academy in Nanking, which had set up a special class 
for Korean youths. The KVC conducted mainly psychological warfare, 
such as inspiration of anti-war sentiment among Japanese soldiers and 
indoctrination of Japanese prisoners of war, together with 
intelligence activities. As of September 1940, the KVC numbered over 
300 men, organised into three branches and operating over all Chinese 
theatres. Remarkable men in the KVC during this period were the 
following: Pak Hyo-sam, Commander of the First Branch; Yi Ik-song, 
Commander of the Second Branch; Kim Sae-il, Commander of the Third 
Branch: Kim Min-san; Chang P'yong-san; Yi Ch'un-am; Kim Han-jung: Kim 
Ung; Yi Sang-jo: Kim Ch'ang-man and Chang Chi-min.
Around late 1940, the KVC split into two groups. Until that time 
the KVC had been operating under the operational control of the 
Chinese Nationalist Government and the members had been scattered in 
twos or threes over all the theatres. So, the commanding authority of 
Kim Won-bong, Commander of the KVC, became very weakened. Many 
left-wing members of the KVC, especially in the 2nd Branch operating 
in North China, became affiliated with the CCP, which was then 
gathering Korean youths to set up a Korean unit under the auspices of 
the CCP. The Chinese Nationalist Government's weakening resistance 
against Japanese aggression and resuming anti-communist policy from 
early 1939 was certainly an important factor which eventually pushed 
the left-wing Koreans of the KVC into the arms of the CCP. As Kim 
Won-bong was willing to remain in the Nationalists' area, the 
left-wing Korean youths deserted the KVC and entered Yenan, the seat 
of the headquarters of the CCP. By the middle of 1941, more than 80 
per cent of the KVC members moved into Yenan. Kim Won-bong and his 
followers, about 60 men, remained in Chungching, the seat of the 
Chinese Nationalist Government. Kim Won-bong agreed to establish a 
coalition between left and right Koreans. In accordance with this 
agreement the remaining members of the KVC were reorganised into the 
First Branch of the Korean Restoration Army of the Korean Provisional 
Government.
The CCP had developed its own scheme to form a Korean unit from
•
1937. Mu Chong was appointed the organiser of this unit. Mu Chong 
was one of about ten Korean communists who participated in the Long
March. He is said to have graduated from a Chinese military academy.
At first he served a Chinese warlord. In 1925, he joined the CCP and 
during the Long March, he worked in the Operation Section of the
Headquarters of the CCF. He was one of the founding members of 
artillery troops of the CCF.^ After the CCP settled into Yenan in 
1937, many left-wing Koreans including such prominent Korean
communists as Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik and Han Bin entered Yenan. They were 
to receive education at the famous Anti-Japanese Military and 
Political College, an education and training institute for the cadres 
of the CCP. Some Korean members of the NEAJUA who had entered the
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Soviet Union in the middle of the 1930s and received military and 
political training there were also arriving in Yenan in this period. 
Prominent among them were Kim Ch'ang-dok, Bang Ho-san, and Yi Kwon-mu. 
The arrival of many KVC members was another encouragement to the CCP 
scheme of setting up a Korean unit. The CCP leadership and Mu Chong
concluded at the end of 1940 that the time was ripe to set up a
22military organisation utilising these Koreans.
In July 1941, a Korean Volunteer Army (KVA) was formally launched 
in Jinnandong, Shanxi Province. Mu Chong was named Commander of the 
KVA. Pak Il-u, later Minister of the Interior of North Korea, was 
appointed Political Commissar and Pak Hyo-sam, former Commander of the 
2nd Branch of the KVC, was appointed Chief of Staff. Total strength 
of the KVA was around 300 men at that time. Unlike the KVC which had 
mainly been engaged in propaganda and intelligence activities, the KVA 
took part in actual fighting against Japanese troops. Fragmentary 
information shows that the KVA scored some victories against the 
Japanese Army. By the end of the war in August 1945, the KVA had 
grown to around 1,000 men. Korean deserters from the Japanese army 
were the main source of personnel and arms.^
After the defeat of Japan the advance column of the KVA entered 
Manchuria in late August 1945, following the Chinese Communist Forces. 
By incorporating many Korean vigilantes, the KVA unit reached a 
strength of about 2,500 men by September 1945. With these troops the 
KVA unit attempted to enter North Korea in late September. At the 
Yalu River bridge which links Korea with Manchuria, the KVA troops 
were halted by local Soviet occupation authorities. The official 
pretext of the Russians was that there could be no armed forces in 
Korea other than those of the Soviet Union and the United States. The 
KVA unit could not defy the Soviet authorities. So the KVA troops 
were obliged to remain in Manchuria until they were given permission 
to enter North Korea.
In late November 1945, the Soviet authorities gave permission for 
the KVA troops to enter North Korea. The KVA, which was boosted to a
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strength of 4,000 men at that time, entered Sinuiju, a border city 
between Korea and Manchuria, on 18 November. Before the dawn of the 
day following its entry to Sinuiju, the KVA unit was taken by surprise 
and disarmed by Soviet troops and local Korean security forces. The 
Soviet authorities suggested that the seized weapons would be returned 
if the KVA troops would return to Manchuria. The KVA had no option 
but to succumb to this 'suggestion'. The hostility of the Soviet 
authorities was manifestly meant to curb possible Chinese influence in 
North Korea. As a consequence, leading figures of the Independence 
League and the KVA were obliged to return to North Korea in December 
1945 only as individuals and not as members of an organised political 
or military organisation. Most mid-ranking cadres of the KVA were to 
return to North Korea much later, passing through three stages in 
accordance with the expansion scheme of the KPA.
While the advance column of the KVA was disputing with the Soviet 
authorities in late 1945, other cadres of the KVA were organising 
Korean youths in Manchuria into a volunteer force for the Chinese 
communists in preparation for the coming Chinese Civil War. 
Altogether four Branch Corps were organised by these Koreans by early 
1946. The 1st Branch Corps was organised from the advance column of 
the KVA which had been chased back to Manchuria by the Soviet 
authorities in November 1945. The 1st Branch Corps was commanded by 
Kim Ung and its Deputy Commander was Bang Ho-san. The 3rd Branch 
Corps was organised by Yi Sang-jo, and its Deputy Commander was Kim 
Ch'ang-dok. The 5th Branch Corps was commanded by Yi Ik-song and Pak 
Il-u. The 7th Branch Corps was raised in China proper with Pak Hun-il 
as Commander. By April 1946 each brigade numbered around 5,400 men. 
With the intensification of the Chinese Civil War, these Korean 
volunteers were reorganised into regular divisions of the CCF. It was 
these Korean troops which entered North Korea during the period from 
July 1949 to April 1950 to augment the KPA in preparation for the 
Korean war. At the outbreak of the Korean War, the Korean veterans 
repatriated from China totalled about 30,000 men and offered very 
seasoned soldiers and able cadres to the KPA.
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The cadres of the Korean Volunteer Army were invaluable assets in 
the making of the KPA. Although they were not whole-heartedly welcome 
in Soviet-dominated North Korea, the Soviet authorities and Kim IlSung 
were intent to make use of the manpower and experience of the KVA in 
the making and running of the KPA. More than 30 men from the KVA 
attained the rank of Major-General or above in the KPA by the
mid-1950s. Among them prominent figures and their important
nportfolios in the KPA were as follows.
Mu Chong 
Pak Il-u 
Kim Ung 
Bang Ho-san 
Yi Kwon-mu 
Kim Ch'ang-dok 
Pak Hun-il 
Wang Yon 
Chang P'yong-san 
Yi Sang-jo
Deputy Defence Minister (1946-1950)
Minister of the Interior (1946-1952) 
Commander-in-Chief, the Front Command (1951) 
Army Corps Commander (1950)
Army Corps Commander (1950)
Army Corps Commander (1950)
Commander, the Security Forces (1950) 
Commander of the Air Force (1950)
Delegate to the Armistice Talks (1951) 
Delegate to the Armistice Talks (1951)
Especially, Yi Kwon-mu and Bang Ho-san were the most able 
divisional commanders of the KPA during the first phase of the war. 
Later they also served well as army corps commanders. Kim Ung was one 
of two army corps commanders at the outbreak of the war. Pak Il-u was 
appointed Deputy Commander of the Sino-Korean Combined Forces in late 
1950. Mu Chong, the senior figure of the KVA and the protdgd of the 
CCP leadership, was too proud of himself to be a subordinate of Kim 
IlSung. But under the dominance of Soviet power his fate was from the 
first doomed. In the making of the KPA he served as Chief of the 
Artillery Training Bureau and Deputy Defence Minister. After the 
collapse of the KPA in late 1950, he became the first victim of Kim 
IISung's purge.^
The cadres of the KVA had better social and educational
backgrounds than the Partisan group. Most members of the Korean
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Volunteer Corps which came to constitute the core of the KVA were 
among the most educated and active Korean youths in China in the late 
1930s. The Korean deserters from the Japanese Army who augmented the 
KVA in the early 1940s had been in most cases attending higher 
education institutions before they were conscripted into the Japanese 
Army. The Korean communists who entered Yenan in the late 1930s, who
became spiritual and political leaders of the youths in the KVA, had
been ardent and intelligent Korean communists from the early 1920s. 
In addition to this good educational background, promising youths in 
the KVA, received high quality education and training in political 
activities and military affairs from the Chinese communist leadership 
in Yenan. Unlike the Korean partisans in the NEAJUA, who were mainly 
affiliated with relatively low-profile figures of the CCP, these KVA 
members had the opportunity to contact the highest leadership of the 
CCP. Such good educational background and abundant experiences of the 
cadres of the KVA were to be aptly utilised by Kim IlSung and the
Soviet occupation authorities in the making and running of the KPA.
The Soviet-Korean Group
The Soviet-Koreans were mostly descendants of Korean emigres in 
the Soviet Union. From the latter half of the 19th century thousands 
of Koreans mostly from the north-eastern region of Korea began to 
emigrate to the Russian Maritime Province, mainly to escape from 
political oppression and economic strife. By the late 1910s, about 
200,000 Koreans were reported living in the Maritime Province. Most 
of those Koreans were by that time acculturated to Russia and some of 
them were affected by communism. In 1918 a Korean Communist Party was 
organised in Khavarovsk by these Soviet-Koreans. This was the first 
communist party ever set up by Koreans. However, the influence of the 
Soviet-Korean communists upon the overall course of the Korean 
communist movement was not significant.^
In 1937 the Soviet government forced Korean residents in the 
Maritime Province to move to Central Asia. At that time the
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Soviet-Koreans numbered around 250,000. The Soviet government was 
aiming to appease Japan, which feared the possible use of these 
Koreans by the Soviet Union in the future Japan-Soviet conflict. In 
the new territory, the Koreans were mostly engaged in reclamation 
works. Some promising youths received higher education and became 
members of the CPSU. By the end of the Second World War a pool of 
able and experienced Soviet-Koreans had emerged in the Soviet Central 
Asian republics. It was this pool of Soviet-Koreans who were to 
render technical services to the Soviet occupation authorities in 
North Korea.^
In late August 1945, the first group of the Soviet-Koreans arrived 
in P'yongyang following the Soviet occupation forces. They belonged 
to the Romaneynko Command, the civil administration department of the 
Soviet occupation forces. In mid-September, the Soviet-Korean members 
of the 88th Special Brigade arrived in Wonsan along with the Partisan 
group. The Soviet-Koreans from these two groups served mainly as 
'intermediaries’ between the Soviet occupation authorities and Korean 
leaders (including nationalists, at that time) during the initial 
phase of the occupation. By December 1945, about eighty 
Soviet-Koreans had arrived in North Korea, mostly selected from the 
Soviet-Korean residents in Kazakhstan or Uzbekstan. They were more
able experts in party works, government administration, and military
vaffairs than the 'intermediaries'.
In the making and running of the KPA, the Soviet-Koreans furnished 
the bulk of instructors, interpreters, technical experts and 
political commissars. Among them prominent figures and their
TO
portfolios in the KPA were as follows;
Nam II Chief of the General Staff (1951-1953)
Kim II Deputy Chief, Cultural (Political) Training Bureau
Yu Song-ch'ol 
Pak Kil-nam 
Kim Yol
(1946-1950)
Chief, the Operations Bureau (1949) 
Chief, the Engineers Bureau (1948-50) 
Chief, the Rear Services Bureau (1950)
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Yi Ch'un-baek
Han II-mu 
Kim Bong-yul 
Ki Sok-bok
Chief, the Reconnaissance Bureau (1950)
Commander of the Navy (1950)
Commander of the Artillery Command (1951) 
President of the P'yongyang Institute (1948-1950)
The Soviet Koreans were basically part of the Soviet military 
government rather than a Korean communist group with its own 
identity. They were Soviet citizens and held membership of the CPSU. 
In view of their dubious identity, their influence upon the grassroots 
people in North Korea was limited. The fate of Ho Ka-i, once the real 
power of the party apparatus during 1945-1950, but the victim of Kim 
Ilsung's purge in 1953, well manifested the limit of the power and 
influence of this group in North Korea. In Korea liberated from long 
years' Japanese colonial oppression, a record of anti-Japanese 
struggle was a necessary condition of being a national leader. The 
Soviet-Koreans were lacking in this crucial credential. They were 
basically functionaries serving the Soviet military government. The 
Soviet authorities did not expect them to do more than that. In the 
making and running of the KPA, they were to play the role of 
functionaries between the Soviet 'advisers' and the indigenous 
military leaders - the partisans.
To sum up the origins of the cadres of the KPA, most of them
started their military and political activities during the anti- 
Japanese struggle in the 1930s. In the course of these struggles 
they were inevitably affiliated with the Soviet Union or Chinese 
communists. Those who were to constitute the mainstream of the KPA 
were mostly from the Soviet-affiliated Partisan group. Those who were 
to serve the Partisan group in the making and running of the KPA were 
mostly affiliated with Chinese communists. The Soviet-Koreans who 
were to serve as functionaries of the KPA were actually a part of the 
Soviet military government apparatus. Reflecting the revolutionary
nature of the anti-Japanese struggle the cadres of the KPA were
tenacious in temperament, and abundant in initiative. However, those 
revolutionaries were, especially the Partisan group, lacking in
strategic competence and managerial skills necessary for managing a 
regular armed force. The meticulous direction of the Soviet 
occupation authorities and extensive technical support by Soviet 
advisers and the Soviet-Koreans were to make up for such deficiencies 
in the KPA leadership. Nevertheless, the limited scope of experience 
and capability of the cadres of the KPA was to remain as a serious 
defect in the KPA for some years to come.
CHAPTER THREE
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK; 1945.8-1946.8
The Soviet occupation authorities and their Korean proteges set 
about organising a regular army shortly after their arrival in north 
Korea. The organising of a regular army was one of three immediate 
tasks, together with building a communist party and a government. 
These three tasks were to go abreast of each other in transforming 
North Korea into a socialist country. In building a regular army the 
communist leaders took a prudent approach preferring gradual 
development. Since the Soviet forces were offering credible defence 
against external threat, and police and militia forces were 
effectively policing internal strife, the regular army of North Korea 
was able to take a step-by-step advance toward a compact military 
organisation. The first phase of this development ranged from late
1945 when a politico-military academy was founded, to August 1946 when 
a Security Cadres Training Corps was established.
Political Setting
On 8 August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan, and 
from 10 August, the Soviet forces began to invade north Korea. 
Detachments of the Soviet forces landed at Najin on 12 August and at 
Ch'ongjin on 13 August. An advance column of the Soviet forces 
entered P'yongyang on 26 August. The Soviet forces continued to 
advance southward until they reached the 38th parallel in early
September. On 26 August, the Soviet forces established a 
'Headquarters, the Soviet Forces in North Korea' in P'yongyang. 
Colonel-General Ivan Chischakov, Commander of the 25th Army, took 
charge of the occupation command. Apart from Chischakov's command,
the Romanyenko Command, a civil administration department of the 25th
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Army was established under the command of Major-General Andrei 
Romanyenko, who was to perform the day-to-day business of 
administering North Korea. In addition, Major-General Lebjedjeev, 
Political Commissar of the 25th Army, was also one of the triumvirate 
in the Soviet occupation authorities. However, real power rested with 
Colonel-General Terenti Shtykov, Political Commissar of the Far 
Eastern Military District. Shtykov had abundant experience in party
political affairs and had participated in various front armies in the
Second World War. Being political commissar of the front army, 
Shtykov's prestige almost equalled that of such Marshals of the Soviet 
Union as Rokossovsky, Konev, or Malinovsky. It was he who actually 
created and supervised the North Korean regime during the Soviet 
occupation period.*
Unlike the United States Army Government in Korea (USAMGIK), the 
Soviet occupation authorities did not establish a military government 
over North Korea. Instead, they ruled North Korea through Koreans. 
In theory, the Korean people were on their own, but in practice, it 
was the Soviet authorities who had final authority over North Korea. 
This policy of indirect rule was a product of pre-1945 Soviet
experiences in the treatment of Central Asian minorities and Outer 
Mongolia. The basic principles of this indirect rule formula were the 
following: (1) the need for a strong indigenous regime; (2) the
usefulness of the Soviet political-Stalinist-system; (3) the 
reservation of internal political power in the hands of Soviet 
personnel or in the hands of natives thoroughly loyal to the Soviet
Union; and (4) the necessity of a reform programme and a democratic 
popular facade.
As early as 19 August 1945, before the Soviet forces arrived in 
P'yongyang, a South Pyongan Province Committee for Preparation for 
Korean Independence was organised in P'yongyang under the leadership 
of Cho Man-sik with around twenty members. Among them only two men 
were communists, reflecting the weakness of the communists in this 
province. Albeit a civic organisation in the P'yongyang area, the
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committee had great influence and prestige all over north Korea owing 
to Cho Man-sik's leadership and the geo-political significance of its 
location, P'yongyang. By 26 August, when the Soviet forces arrived in
P'yongyang, the committee was functioning as the central authority for
•\
north Korea.
On 29 August 1945, the Soviet authorities re-organised the 
preparatory committee with more communists. The committee was renamed 
the South P'yongan People's Political Committee. The Soviet 
authorities intended to create a coalition of communists and 
non-communists for the time being while they were consolidating their 
political base in North Korea. By 15 September, altogether five 
provincial people's committees were established in North Korea except 
for North Hamkyong Province, in which a people's committee was 
established on 26 October. On 8 October, the Soviet authorities 
convened a meeting of representatives of the five provincial 
committees. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the 
coordination of the business of the people's committees. On 19 
November, a North Korean Administration was organised. The North 
Korean Administration was the first embryonic government over North 
Korea and was headed by Cho Man-sik. The administration consisted of 
the following ten bureaus: Industry, Transportation, Agriculture,
Commerce, Communication, Finance, Education, Health, Justice and
4
Security Bureaus.
Whilst making a government, the Soviet authorities were also 
contriving a communist party. Immediately after the surrender of 
Japan, domestic Korean communists in south Korea set about 
reconstructing the Korean Communist Party (KCP), which had been 
disbanded in 1928 by the order of the Third Communist International. 
On 11 September 1945, they announced the re-creation of the Korean 
Communist Party in Seoul, with Pak Hon-yong as its leader. As in 
south Korea, the communists in north Korea resumed political 
activities in their own provinces and localities soon after the 
surrender of Japan. Among them, Hyon Chun-hyok, 0 Ki-sop, Chang 
Sun-myong, Chong Tal-hyon, and Yi Chu-ha were prominent figures.
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These communist leaders organised provincial or local party branches 
of the KCP in late August to September 1945, based upon the communist 
organisational principle that there should be only one communist party 
in a country. For them the only legitimate communist party in Korea 
was the KCP under the leadership of Pak Hon-yong in Seoul.
From late September 1945, the Soviet authorities were busy
contacting these domestic communists. On 10 October, the Romanyenko
Command summoned leaders of all the provisional branches of the KCP in 
north Korea. On 13 October, at the Conference of the North Korea Five 
Provincial Party Representatives and Enthusiasts, a North Korean 
Branch Bureau of the KCP was organised. Kim Yong-bom, a domestic 
communist affiliated with the Soviet authorities, was elected General 
Secretary of the Branch Bureau. Kim IlSung was reported to have 
delivered a key note speech at the inauguration conference titled ’On 
building a Marxist-Leninist party in our country and its immediate 
tasks.' The North Korean Branch Bureau paid homage to the Central 
Committee of the KCP in Seoul; however, in reality, the establishment 
of the North Korean Branch Bureau was the first step to organise a 
communist party in north Korea apart from the domestic communist
leaders centred in Seoul.®
On 17 December 1945, at the Third Enlarged Executive Committee 
Meeting of the North Korean Branch Bureau, Kim IlSung came to hold the 
reins of the Branch Bureau officially. He was elected General 
Secretary of the Branch Bureau. From this time on the Branch Bureau 
was changed in all but name into a North Korean Communist Party
7
(NKCP). At this meeting, Kim IlSung delivered a key note speech. The 
speech touched upon such crucial themes as the following: (1) on
improving the composition of the party; (2) on strengthening party
unity and discipline; (3) on strengthening party links with the 
masses; (4) on the guidance of trade unions; (5) on the training of
cadres and allocation of party members; (6) on the work of issuing
party membership cards and keeping membership statistics; (7) on the 
question of the united front.® Kim IlSung concluded the speech 
declaring that the political line of the party at the stage should be
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to 'establish a unified democratic government in our country based on 
an alliance with all the democratic political parties and social 
organisations and to transform north Korea into a powerful democratic 
base for the building of a unified, independent and democratic state. 
Kim II Sung's rise to General Secretary and his authoritative speech
indicated that Kim IlSung came to assume the commanding position among
Korean communists in North Korea.^
On 8 February 1946, a North Korean Provisional People's Committee 
(NKPPC) was established. The NKPPC was to function as a government in 
North Korea until Korea had been unified. Kim IlSung was named 
Chairman of the NKPPC. Thus, Kim IlSung became head of government as 
well as chief of communist party in North Korea. Among ten bureau
directors and four office chiefs, eleven positions were occupied by
members of the NKCP. The remaining three were also communists, but 
held membership in other parties. The establishment of the NKPPC, 
together with the consolidation of the NKCP, indicated that the 
groundwork for building a party, and a government in North Korea was 
settled.^
In the Soviet scheme of indirect rule of North Korea a crucial 
thing was to choose the chief Korean agent 'thoroughly loyal to the 
Soviet Union.' Kim IlSung was thought to be fit for this role. As to 
why, when and how Kim IlSung was chosen by the Soviet authorities as 
their chief agent in North Korea, definite evidence has yet to be 
found. However, it is possible to draw some kind of inferences on 
these questions from available materials. So far, the most plausible 
one among these inferences is that Stalin who had the final word on 
this matter preferred a young Kim IlSung who had served in the Soviet 
Army for several years to 'old' Korean communist leaders who had 
mostly been involved in bitter factional strife during the two decades 
before 1945. Kim IlSung's position as the chief Soviet agent was 
apparently settled in mid-October 1945. On 10 October Kim IlSung was 
nominated as the chief organiser of the North Korean Branch Bureau of 
the KCP. On 14 October, at a large-scale people's rally held in 
P'yongyang, Kim IlSung was introduced by Major-General Lebjedjeev as
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the hero who had led the anti-Japanese struggle of the Korean people. 
From this time on the status of Kim IlSung as the chief Korean agent
n
of the Soviet authorities was established. (So it would be rather 
appropriate to call the Partisan group the Kim IlSung group from that 
time on.)
Setting up Security Forces
From early September 1945, the Soviet occupation authorities set 
about organising an internal security system. After Japan surrendered 
many local vigilance groups emerged in north Korea. Since the 
Japanese police was demoralised these vigilance groups maintained law 
and order in the localities until the Soviet forces arrived. Aware of 
the importance of police power in such a fluid situation, many Korean 
communists participated in these vigilance groups. The Soviet 
occupation authorities did not challenge the activities of these 
vigilance groups for some weeks. Instead, they helped the Korean 
communists to gain control of the vigilance groups. In early 
September 1945, separate from these voluntary vigilance groups, the 
Soviet occupation authorities organised Red Guards on a provincial 
level. Merging police and militia functions, the Red Guards performed 
a transitional role before a systematic police system was activated in 
late October 1945.^
On 12 October 1945, Colonel-General Chistiakov ordered that all 
armed organisations in North Korea, including the Red Guards, should 
be dissolved and their weapons, ammunition and other military supplies 
should be surrendered to the Soviet occupation authorities. By this 
order all peace-preservation and quasi-military organisations which 
had existed since late August 1945 were disbanded by late October
1945. The Red Guards were disbanded on 21 October. Instead, the 
Soviet authorities ordered people's committees to organise police 
forces under their control. From early November 1945, each provincial
people's committee began to organise a Department of Security. At
14county level, police stations were organised.
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A Security Bureau having central authority over all police forces 
in North Korea was organised on 19 November 1945. The Security Bureau 
evolved from a conference on 15 November, chaired by Ch'oe Yong-gon, 
for the unification of police forces in North Korea. With the 
inauguration of the North Korean Administration Ch'oe Yong-gon was 
appointed Director of the Security Bureau. Many members of the Kim 
IlSung group and Soviet-Koreans were made provincial or county heads 
of the police forces. During the first four months of Soviet 
occupation, August-December 1945, there was a tendency, in the 
formation of the government and the party, to allow a certain degree 
of heterogeneity. It was partly due to the need to make those 
apparatuses seem to be an all-embracing united front, and partly due 
to the shortage of manpower. However, as regards security organs, the 
grip of the Soviet authorities through the most faithful Korean 
protdgd was such as to be unquestioned.1^
The internal security system of North Korea was predominantly 
patterned after the Soviet model. The Security Bureau headed by Ch'oe 
Yong-gon was a sort of Ministry of the Interior and approximated to 
the NKVD of the Soviet Union. In addition to the regular police 
functions, the Security Bureau was also in charge of border and 
railway security troops, fire brigades, the prison, and other 
residuary functions which had not been allotted to other bureaus 
exclusively. Moreover, the political police was also incorporated 
into the Security Bureau though it maintained much more autonomy than 
other departments. The central headquarters and its local system, of 
the Security Bureau, underwent many organisational changes in the 
first half of 1946. By July 1946 it could manage to set up a 
uniformed organisation.1^
As of 1 July 1946, the outline of the organisation and functions 
of the Security Bureau was as follows. There were four divisions in 
the Security Bureau, respectively in charge of general administration, 
civil policing, security forces, and criminal investigation. The 
General Administration Division consisted of three sections - the
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personnel, finance, and general service sections. The Civil Police 
Division was in charge of peace preservation, statistics, and fire 
brigade. The Constabulary Division was in charge of security forces - 
the police constabulary, the railway constabulary and the coast guard. 
The Criminal Investigation Division consisted of three sections - 
criminal investigation, intelligence, and the prison sections. Among
them the Constabulary Division was a sort of the headquarters of the
17security forces under the control of the Security Bureau.
From early November 1945, each provincial people's committee began 
to organise a security force of battalion size under the control of 
the Provincial Department of Security. At county level security units 
of various sizes, not bigger than a company, were organised under the 
control of the police chief of each county. The leadership of these 
security forces was mostly from the reliable elements among the Red 
Guards. The mission of the security forces was mainly to guard key 
governmental or industrial positions. The total strength of the 
security forces was estimated to be around 10,000 men in July 1946. 
Apart from ordinary security forces, a Railway Constabulary was 
organised on 12 January 1946, under the direct command of the Security 
Bureau. It was to perform guard duty along the railways, tunnels, and 
railway stations, reflecting the great concerns of the Soviet 
authorities in the railway system. The Railway Constabulary amounted 
to the strength of thirteen companies over all North Korea in July 
1946. A Coast Guard was first organised in Chinampo in March 1946. 
By July 1946, the Coast Guard expanded to two battalions stationed 
along the east and west coasts.
The security forces under the Security Bureau (later the Interior 
Bureau or the Ministry of the Interior) were to contribute to the 
steady development of the KPA. The effectiveness and readiness of the 
security forces in meeting internal security missions discharged the 
KPA from annoying politico-military activities such as policing mass 
upheavals or wearying, punitive operations against anti-communist 
provocations. Even in the border conflicts along the 38th parallel 
which intensified from early 1949 and lasted until just before the
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outbreak of the Korean War, the security forces were put in, instead 
of troops of the KPA. The brigades of the security forces which had 
fought border conflicts in this period were to be turned over to the 
Ministry of National Defence in early July 1950 to meet the need of 
rapid expansion of the KPA. Thus, the security forces were closely 
related to the development of the KPA.
There is an argument that the organisation of the security forces
in the provinces and counties from early November 1945 was the
beginning of the KPA. This is not the case. In communist countries,
there is a clear distinction between, the security force under the
Ministry of the Interior, and the defence force under the Ministry of
Defence, in terms of mission, organisation, equipment and training.
To quote Kim IISung's remarks, the security force is 'one that will
always defend the country, our state power and the people's interest
19against encroachment by internal and external enemies of all hues.'
On the other hand the defence force is 'an army which will play the
leading role in the event of war to defend the country against the
2(1armed invasion by foreign aggressors. In organising the security 
and defence force of North Korea, the Soviet authorities and their 
North Korean protegds made this distinction clear.
The P'yongyang Institute
The genuine beginning of the Korean People's Army was the 
establishment of a P'yongyang Institute, a politico-military academy, 
in P'yongyang in November 1945. The P'yongyang Institute was the 
first military and political academy in North Korea, preceding many 
schools and cadre-training institutions for various fields. The aim
of the institute was to train quickly 'military and political cadres
21who will constitute the backbone of modern regular armed forces.
The P'yongyang Institute was again to be the parent-body of military 
schools for various services and arms which were to emerge in the
future. So the founding of the P'yongyang Institute was the first
22step in organising a Korean People's Army.
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The P'yongyang Institute was predominantly staffed by members of 
the Kim IISung group. The institute was headed by Kim Ch'aek, a 
senior figure of the Kim IISung group. Altogether about thirty men 
from the Kim IISung group constituted the faculty of the institution. 
Judging from a directive by Kim IlSung on 19 November 1945 at the 
designation of a site for the institute, Kim IlSung group's 
involvement in the making of the P'yongyang Institute was from the 
first very much apparent and weighty. As of late 1945, most members 
of the Kim IlSung group were not well suited to occupy responsible 
positions in the government and the party; though, in the making of an 
army, they were in a position to claim a dominant role. They had 
abundant experiences of armed struggle from the 1930s, which other 
Korean communists, save the Yenan group, were lacking. And the Yenan 
group was not welcomed by the Soviet occupation authorities. So the 
hegemony of the P'yongyang Institute was naturally to be placed in the 
hands of the Kim IlSung group from the first.
The P'yongyang Institute was officially opened on 23 February 
1946. The first class of the institute had entered the institute on 3 
January 1946 and had received training to prepare for the official 
opening ceremony. Kim IlSung delivered a key-note speech at the 
opening ceremony. In his speech Kim IlSung made it clear that the 
'P'yongyang Institute is the beginning of the regular army to be built 
in the future.'^ Having defined the aim and character of the 
institute clearly, Kim IlSung then referred to tasks incumbent upon 
the students. First of all, Kim IlSung emphasised that 'the students
make themselves fighters who faithfully serve the people since they
2Swould become cadres of a People's Army in the future'. Kim IlSung 
referred to the experiences of the anti-Japanese armed struggles in 
the 1930s as a good example of a people's army who had received the 
active support of the people. Following the example of the 
anti-Japanese fighters, Kim IlSung stressed, soldiers in the people's 
army 'should have high regard for the interests of the people and 
strive to protect their lives and property no matter when and where 
and should under no circumstances isolate themselves from the people
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26but should learn from the masses with an open mind'. Thus, close 
links with the people was emphasised as the most important ideological 
doctrine of the People's Army.
Kim IlSung proposed as the philosophy underlying the education in 
the institute the combination of theory and practice. A combination 
of political education and military training was also stressed by Kim 
IlSung. He said that 'Military matters separated from politics and
politics separated from military matters are of no use, they are bound
27inseparably.' For political study it was emphasised to be equipped 
with the 'revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism and the
indomitable spirit of fighting resolutely to liquidate the survivals
28of Japanese imperialism and feudalism and to build a new country'.
In military training, Kim IlSung stressed the following: first,
physical strength; second, marksmanship; and third, knowledge of 
tactics. Kim IlSung's conception of military discipline in the 
revolutionary army was to stress 'rigid yet voluntary military
discipline under which everyone will observe set discipline without
29question and abide by it willingly'. Kim IlSung's speech at the 
opening ceremony of the P'yongyang Institute on 23 February 1946 was 
the embodiment of Kim IlSung's military thoughts and was to be one of 
the central themes of the ideological doctrine of the KPA ever since.
The curricula and duration of the education of the P'yongyang 
Institute underwent many changes. The first class graduated in April
1946. The second class finished in August 1946. The first two 
classes received less than six months' education, reflecting the 
urgent need for preparing for basic units and schools of the Security 
Cadres Training Corps which was being organised during this period. 
From the third class which began in August 1946 the emphasis of the 
education shifted from politico-military training to mainly political 
training since a Central Security Officers School for producing 
officers for the infantry, artillery, engineers and other arms of 
regular army was also operative from July 1946. The Central Security 
Officers School was founded in Kangso-gun, near P'yongyang on 20 July 
1946, with Pak Hyo-sam, a Yenan returnee, as its head. Pak Hyo-sam's
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appointment to head of the school was a step to make use of the 
experiences of the Yenan group in the development of the people's 
army. With the founding of the Central Security Officers school which 
was to produce the commanding officers of the people's army, the 
P'yongyang Institute was gradually transformed into a school for 
producing the political officers of the people's army.^
The Security Cadres Training Corps
In June 1946, a Security Cadres Training Centre was established in 
Kaech'on, South P'yongan Province. By August 1946, altogether three 
training centres of this kind were organised, the second in Nanam, 
North Hamkyong Province and the third in P'yongyang. The bulk of the 
cadres of the training centres were old members of the KVA who entered 
North Korea in the late spring of 1946 to be utilised for the future 
people's army. The training centres were in fact the parent body of 
the divisions of the KPA. Each training camp had three sub-camps, 
which were to be transformed into infantry regiments in the newly
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formed divisions.
On 15 August 1946, a Security Cadres Training Corps Headquarters 
was organised in P'yongyang. The Security Cadres Training Corps 
Headquarters was a General Headquarters for all the military schools 
and training centres which had been developing since November 1945. 
The P'yongyang Institute, the Central Security Officers School, and 
three Security Cadres Training Centres, together with a security unit 
and a medical unit, were placed under the command of the training 
corps headquarters. The establishment of the Security Cadres Training 
Corps Headquarters was a concluding step in the preparation of the 
groundwork of the future KPA.
The organisation of the training corps headquarters was, though 
rudimentary, patterned after the typical headquarters organisation of 
the ground force in communist countries. It consisted of the General 
Staff, the Cultural Department (a Political Department), the Rear
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Services Department and the Artillery Department. Ch'oe Yong-gon, 
Director of the Security Bureau since late 1945, was named
Commander-in-Chief of the training corps. An Kil, a senior figure of 
the Kim IlSung group, was appointed Chief of the General Staff. An 
Kil was also named Head of the P'yongyang Institute. Kim II, a 
faithful crony of Kim IlSung, was appointed Chief of the Cultural 
Department. Choe Hong-guk, a Soviet Korean, was made Chief of the 
Rear Services Department. Mu Chong, the leader of the Yenan group and 
one of the organisers of artillery troops of the Chinese Communist 
Forces, was appointed Chief of the Artillery Department. A Soviet 
Major-General named Smirnov was seconded to the training corps
headquarters as chief of the Soviet military advisers.
The Security Cadres Training Corps Headquarters was a General 
Headquarters rather than a Ministry of Defence. Its main function was 
to organise and train cadre members of the future KPA. Such affairs 
for a Ministry of Defence as formulating defence policy, administering 
the military establishment, building a defence industry or allotting 
resources was not yet the major responsibility of the training corps 
headquarters as of 1946. The Security Cadres Training Corps 
Headquarters was not represented in the organisational chart of the 
North Korean Provisional People's Committee, then government of North 
Korea.^ (This unique status of the armed forces in North Korea is not 
an extraordinary case. From April 1982, the Department of the Armed 
Forces was excluded from the Administration Council - the North Korean
Cabinet - and was placed under the direct control of the Military
Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea.)
The dominant position of the Kim IlSung group in the Security 
Cadres Training Corps was well represented in the structure of the 
high command. The three most important jobs - Commander-in-Chief, 
Chief of the General Staff, and Chief of the Cultural Department, all 
went to the Kim IlSung group. The three key figures of the Security 
Officers Training Corps Headquarters came to constitute the inner core 
of a defence council of the North Korean regime, together with Kim 
IlSung as supreme commander and Kim Ch'aek as Kim IlSung's deputy in
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charge of overall defence policy. Ch'oe Yong-gon was to be rather a 
symbolic head of the people's army. His reputation in the NEAJUA in 
the 1930s was highly regarded in these years. So he was in a good 
position to demand respect and obedience from not only members of the 
Kim IlSung group but those from the Yenan group and the Soviet-Korean 
group. An Kil, Chief of the General Staff, was to perform the 
day-to-day business of the General Headquarters. He was chief liaison 
officer between the training corps headquarters and the Soviet 
military advisers. Kim II was to perform the role of high priest in
the people's army, the chief advocate of the revolutionary and
35nationalistic tradition of the anti-Japanese guerrillas in the 1930s.
Mu Chong's appointment to Chief of Artillery was another step to 
utilise the experiences and manpower of the Yenan group. A month 
before Mu Chong's appointment, Pak Hyo-sam, former Vice Commander of 
the Korean Volunteer Corps, had been appointed Head of the Central 
Security Officers School. However, Mu Chong's position as Chief of 
Artillery was not a proper one considering his high reputation among 
the Yenan group. In December 1945, he had been elected Second 
Secretary of the North Korean Communist Party, (strictly speaking, 
the North Korean Branch Bureau of the Korean Communist Party). As 
Chief of Artillery and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Security 
Cadres Training Corps, Mu Chong ranked only twelfth in the hierarchy 
of the party. (As of August 1946, the North Korean Workers' Party.) 
So as of late 1946, Mu Chong was no more a national figure. Mu 
Chong's role and position in the North Korea regime well epitomised 
the status of the Yenan group in Soviet occupied North Korea.
By August 1946 the Soviet authorities and their Korean proteges 
had laid the groundwork for organising the people's army of North 
Korea. In the preparation of the groundwork of the people's army, the 
following policies were stressed. First, to build the cadres of the 
army first and not to improvise fighting units hastily; secondly, to 
make up the leadership of the army with members of the Kim IlSung 
group. To build the cadres first is an orthodox way of building an
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army. Since the Soviet forces were stationed in North Korea in this 
period, a people's army of North Korea could enjoy the advantage of 
not being compelled to undertake impending defence missions. The 
security forces under the Security Bureau freed the people's army of 
internal security missions. Owing to these two factors, builders of 
the people's army could take a gradual, developmental approach in 
laying the groundwork of the future people's army. To form the 
nucleus of the people's army with members of the Kim IlSung group was 
all too natural for the Soviet authorities and its chief agent in 
North Korea - Kim IlSung. Not only the Kim IlSung group secured the 
important positions of the embryonic people's army but also they were 
endeavouring to indoctrinate the people's army with the spirit and 
tradition of their anti-Japanese struggle so as to make the people's 
army their faithful bastion.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KPA; 1946.8-1948.12
During August 1946 to December 1948, the People's Army of North 
Korea was established as a modern regular army with all formalities 
and substantial strength. In formal terms, the official founding of
the Korean People's Army on 8 February 1948 was an epochal point in 
the history of the KPA. But in terms of the size of the forces 
involved, the official announcement on 26 September 1948 of the 
complete withdrawal of the Soviet forces in North Korea was a landmark 
in the development of the People's Army. During this period the 
division of Korea into two bitterly antagonistic camps became a 
reality with the advent of two separate governments in north and south 
Korea by September 1948. In spite of the rapidly changing 
international and domestic situations the development of the People's 
Army itself was steady and methodical largely owing to the presence of 
Soviet forces in North Korea and the effectiveness of the security 
forces.
Political Setting
Entering 1947, the prospects for a solution to the Korean issue 
were worsening. The second session of the US-USSR Joint Commission 
which was held from May 1947 became almost deadlocked by September 
1947, without any viable advance. The time was already that of the 
Cold War, well manifested in the Truman Doctrine of March 1947. So, 
by this time, it became evident that any viable solution between the 
United States and the Soviet Union on the Korean issue along the lines 
of the Moscow agreement of December 1945 was hardly to effect. The 
failure of the US-USSR Joint Commission was 'symbolic of mutual
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suspicion and acrimony between the Russians and the Americans 
exacerbated by the consuming tensions of Korean politics.'*
By mid-September 1947, US security planners reached a decision to 
bring the Korean issue to the United Nations. An accepted view by 
many western scholars on that US decision is to emphasise the 
discrepancy between US political objectives regarding Korea and its 
military and economic resources to meet the objectives. The US 
commitment to Korea was, at the time of late 1947, considered by US 
security planners to be an untenable burden in the context of global 
US strategic priorities. Notwithstanding, the Americans could not 
leave Korea without considerable loss of prestige and political
standing at large, and particularly in the Far East, in case the
United States relinquished its commitment to South Korea overnight. 
An alternative line of action was to bring forward the Korean issue to 
the United Nations where the United States effectively dominated at 
that time.^
The Soviet government, understandably, did not view favourably the 
US proposal of bringing the Korean issue to the United Nations. The 
Soviet government and the North Korean regime regarded the laying of 
the Korean issue before the United Nations as 'a grave act of
provocation betraying the Moscow agreement of December 1945' and 
'violating Paragraph 7, article 2 of the UN Charter which prohibits 
the United Nations intervention in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state.'* In late September 1947, the Soviet 
government counteracted the US proposal by proposing to withdraw all 
foreign troops from Korea simultaneously by the beginning of 1948 'to 
afford the Koreans an opportunity to form a government by themselves 
without the aid and participation of the Allies.' Here, the Soviet 
position of insisting on the Koreanisation of the Korea issue was well 
contrasted with the US position of seeking for a diplomatic solution 
of the Korean issue.
The US government contended that the withdrawal of foreign troops 
must be subsequent to the establishment of a Korean government. And
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it proposed a United Nations commission, whose function would be to 
observe elections to be held by the occupying powers in their 
respective zones, and to advise Korean representatives so elected on 
the establishment of a national government; and to advise the national 
government in making these arrangements necessary for Korean
independence.8 It is open to controversy to establish whether the US 
government genuinely believed that such a United Nations Commission 
could succeed in the place where two major components of the United 
Nations - the United States and the Soviet Union - had already failed 
to settle the dispute. A United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea 
(UNTCOK) was set up on 14 November 1947 based on this US proposal.^
The Soviet government who opposed even bringing the Korean issue 
to the United Nations repudiated the UNTCOK severely. The North Korea 
regime denounced the setting up of the UNTCOK as a conspiracy to 
perpetuate the division of Korea. Along with the arrival of the
UNTCOK in Seoul in early January 1948, vigorous demonstrations and 
mass rallies opposing the UNTCOK were organised both in north and 
south Korea. In south Korea the South Korean Workers' Party (SKWP) 
was the main instrument in these protests and denunciations against 
the UNTCOK. Opposition to the UNTCOK culminated in the so-called 2.7 
National Salvation Struggle of February 1947. Throughout the spring 
of 1948, the North Korean regime continued efforts to sabotage the 
UNTCOK.8
In April 1948, Kim IlSung called for a joint conference of 
political parties and social organisations of north and south Korea. 
Kim IlSung proposed to discuss necessary measures 'to save the nation 
by achieving national unity and solidarity and frustrating the 
"UNTCOK" plot to split the country permanently,'8 and to 'achieve the 
historic cause of establishing a democratic unified government.*8 For 
the North Korean regime the South-North Political Consultation
Conference of late April 1948 was a great propaganda success. From 
south Korea not only left-wingers but such prominent nationalist 
leaders as Kim Ku (formerly President of the exile Korean Provisional 
Government) attended the conference. A joint communique of the
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conference on 30 April 1948 endorsed North Korea's opposition to
general elections in the south. It also called for the withdrawal of 
all foreign troops and proposed to hold an all-Korean political 
conference to form a provisional government. The timing of the
conference was well calculated to torpedo the May 10 election which
was to be held in south Korea under the observation of the UNTCOK.^
After the May 10 election in south Korea ended in success, the 
North Korean regime moved quickly towards establishing its own 
government. In fact, it had been preparing 'a Constitution of a 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea' since November 1947. On 29 
June 1948 'a council of leaders of the political parties and social 
organisations in north and south Korea' unanimously approved Kim 
IlSung's proposal 'on the founding of a democratic people's republic.' 
The general election to form 'the supreme legislative organ of all 
Korea' was held on 25 August 1948 'in different ways in north and 
south Korea.' In North Korea, it was reported that 99.97 per cent of 
all eligible voters took part in the election. It was claimed that 
the people of south Korea participated in the election through 'secret 
balloting'. Altogether 572 Deputies of the Supreme People's Assembly 
(SPA) were 'elected'. The first session of the SPA was held on 2 
September 1948. On 9 September the SPA declared the founding of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and 'organised the
Government of the DPRK as the supreme executive organ of power' with
19Kim IlSung as its head. The DPRK claimed to have jurisdiction over 
the whole of Korea de jure, calling south Korea the 'southern half of 
the republic'. (Based on this justification the North Korean regime 
came to claim that the Korean War was a civil conflict and denounced 
the UN intervention as a violation of the UN Charter.)
The first DPRK Cabinet organised on 9 September 1948 was a 
federation of leaders of various origins. The cabinet consisted of 
the following portfolios: Premier; three Deputy Premiers; Chairman of 
the National Planning Commission; and Ministers for foreign affairs, 
defence, audit and inspection, internal affairs, industry, 
agriculture, commerce, transportation, finance, education,
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communication, justice, culture and propaganda, employment, and 
health; and one Minister without Portfolio. Under Kim IlSung the 
following three men were appointed Deputy Premiers: Pak Hon-yong,
leader of the South Korea Workers' Party; Hong Myong-hui, a moderate 
left wing intellectual; and Kim Ch'aek, a chief of staff of the Kim 
IlSung group. Among the members of the cabinet, only three men were 
from the Kim IlSung group, including Kim IlSung himself, the two 
others being Kim Ch'aek and Ch'oe Yong-gon, Defence Minister. Four 
members of the cabinet were from the South Korean Workers' Party. 
Chong ch'un-taek, a Soviet-Korean, was appointed Chairman of the 
National Planning Commission, a GOSPLAN. Other Ministerial posts were 
evenly distributed to the Yenan group, domestic communists and 
moderate left-wingers.^
Along with the founding of the DPRK, a unified system of 
leadership for the Workers' Parties in north and south Korea was also 
organised. Until August 1948 the South Korean Workers' Party 
maintained its own identity, although its leadership was depending on 
north Korean communists since late 1946. (Pak Hon-yong and his 
immediate followers defected from south Korea into north Korea in 
September 1946 to escape arrest by the US military government 
authorities.) Ever since, the south Korean communist leadership had 
been engaged in directing south Korean communists from their 
headquarters in Haeju, just north of the 38th parallel. It was mainly 
these south Korean communists who were to represent the south Korean 
people at the Supreme People's Assembly in September 1948. With the 
founding of the ROK government in south Korea in August 1948, the 
south Korean communists remaining in the south were faced with near 
total destruction and their leadership in the north was more isolated 
and weaker. The merger of the North and South Korean Workers' Parties 
in late August 1948 in the form of organising a Joint Central 
Committee of the North and South Korean Workers' Parties was in fact 
the absorption of the south Korean communists into the North Korean 
Workers' Party. (The complete merger of the North and South Korean 
Workers' Parties into the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) was made in 
June 1949.}*
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Growth of the People's Army
Until October 1946, the Security Cadres Training Centres were 
mainly engaged in doing preparatory works such as organising and 
training cadres and building accommodation and facilities for incoming 
recruits. From mid-November 1946, recruits from all over North Korea 
were pouring into the training centres. In this period, there was no 
nation-wide conscription. Recruits at this stage were acquired 
through the following methods: (1) enlisting party members; (2)
attracting such personnel who had military experiences in the Japanese 
army (mostly, as soldiers), the Korean Volunteer Army, or the Chinese 
Communist Forces; (3) transferring the recruits who had volunteered
for the police force to the training centres; and (4) persuading and
11;
enticing local youths by local party and governmental officials.
From early December 1946, the training centres began to receive 
Soviet arms and equipment. By that time, the people's army and the 
security forces were mainly equipped with confiscated Japanese 
weaponry. At first departing Soviet troops turned over their arms to 
the Korean troops. In January 1947, agreements were made regarding 
the payment for the Soviet arms. The NKPPC was to pay for the Soviet 
arms with foodstuffs. Thus, the Soviet arms were not free of charge. 
(The same was true for the large bulk of Soviet arms shipments 
received in the spring of 1950 in preparing for the Korean War.) By 
April 1947, there were few troops that lacked Soviet armament. Save 
heavy armoury such as self-propelled artillery guns and tanks, the 
training centres were equipped with Soviet arms at the standard of 
Soviet light infantry divisions.^
By mid-May 1947, the Security Officers Training Centres were 
transformed into (light) infantry divisions. The 1st Training Centre 
at Kae Ch'on with sub-camps at Sinuiju, Choeryong and Kanggye was 
designated the 1st Infantry Division. The 2nd Training Centre at 
Nanam with sub-camps at Hoeryong, P'yongch'on, and Kangtok became the
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2nd Infantry Division. The 3rd Training Centre at P'yongyang area was
reorganised into the 3rd Independent Mixed Brigade. Each division had
around 10,400 men and consisted of the following units: three infantry
regiments of 2,700 men each, an artillery regiment, a training
battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, an anti-tank battalion, an
engineers battalion, a signals battalion and divisional troops for
administration and rear services. The division headquarters was
patterned after the General Headquarters (The Security Cadres Training
Corps Headquarters), consisting of a General Staff, a Cultural
Department, a Rear Services Department and an Artillery Department. A
Political Defence Department, a secret police system, was also
detached to the division. The 3rd Independent Mixed Brigade had three
infantry battalions and an artillery battalion plus service and combat
17support troops, totalling about 3,400 men.
The General Headquarters of the people's army was also expanding. 
The General Staff consisted of operations, reconnaissance, personnel, 
communications and engineers sections. The Rear Services Department 
consisted of ordnance, veterinary, housing, medical, transportation, 
clothing, food, administration, intendance, finance and planning 
sections. In addition, the Cultural Department, the Artillery 
Training Department, the Military Prosecutor's Department and the 
Military Tribunal Department formed the General Headquarters. Under 
its direct control, the GHQ had a Central Guard Regiment of 1,200 men 
and a Central Hospital. The P'yongyang Institute and the Central 
Security Officers School were also under the control of the GHQ. In
all, as of May 1947, the people's army had a total strength of
1 Rapproximately 30,000 men.
In May 1947, a rank system in the people's army was introduced. 
Since the establishment of the people's army was not yet proclaimed 
officially, a temporary system was introduced. For example a Major 
Kim was recorded on paper as Medium Star One Kim or Rank Seven Kim.
However, colloquially, he was still called simply Comrade Kim. A
Major Kim wore a uniform with a medium star on his shoulder. Details 
of the system were as follows:
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General Extra Large Star One Rank Thirteen
Lt. General Large Star Two Rank Twelve
Maj. General Large Star One Rank Eleven
Senior Col. Medium Star Four Rank Ten
Colonel Medium Star Three Rank Nine
Lt. Colonel Medium Star Two Rank Eight
Major Medium Star One Rank Seven
Captain Small Star Four Rank Six
Senior Lt. Small Star Three Rank Five
Lieutenant Small Star Two Rank Four
Junior Lt. Small Star One Rank Three
Ch'oe Yong-gon, Commander-in-Chief of the people's army was ranked 
General and wore Extra Large Star One, but was called simply Comrade 
Ch'oe Yong-gon. On the payroll he was recorded as Rank Thirteen Ch'oe 
Yong-gon. The 'Rank' system was also used over the whole government 
structure. Ministers were given Rank Thirteen. Deputy Ministers were 
given Rank Twelve. In the people's army, three men were given Rank 
Twelve - An Kil, Chief of the General Staff; Kim II, Chief of the 
Cultural Department; and Mu Chong, Chief of the Artillery Training
Department. Divisional Commanders were ranked as Senior Colonels at
19first but soon promoted to Major-Generals.
Since the people's army was expanding rapidly in late 1946 and 
manpower and experiences of the Kim IlSung group was not enough to 
meet this expansion, more Yenan Koreans with military records were 
incorporated into the people's army. However, the set-up of the 
General Headquarters was not much affected by this new development. 
Those Yenan Koreans were mostly deployed below divisional commander 
level. Major-General Kim Ung, formerly Commander of the 1st Branch 
Corps of the Korean Volunteer Army, was appointed one of two 
divisional commanders of the people's army, commanding the 1st 
Infantry Division. Meanwhile, Kang Gon, a senior figure in the Kim 
IlSung group, was appointed Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division. 
Kim Kwang-hyop, a senior figure in the Kim IlSung group, was appointed 
Commander of the 3rd Independent Mixed Brigade. Under Kim Ung, Ch'oe 
Kwang, a junior figure in the Kim IlSung group, was placed as Chief of 
Staff, while Yi Ik-song, formerly Commander of the 5th Branch Corps of 
the Korean Volunteer Army, was made Chief of Staff to Kang Gon. Two
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of regimental commanders in the 1st Infantry Division were from the 
Yenan group while all three regimental commanders of the 2nd Infantry 
Division were from the Kim IlSung group. Thus, the Kim IlSung group 
and the Yenan group was living a kind of cohabitation during this 
period.^
The Soviet-Koreans were mainly deployed in technical services, 
military schools, and the secret police. For instance, Kim Pa, a 
Soviet-Korean, was in charge of the Political Defence Department of 
the people's army. The Political Defence Department was in fact a 
branch of the Soviet secret police. It was independent of the 
Cultural Department (a Political Department) and was functioning as a 
SMERSH (the Soviet Counter-Intelligence Corps) organisation over the 
people's army. Kim Pa was once called the most-feared man in North 
Korea. Ki Sok-bok, a former Major in the Soviet Army, was appointed 
Head of the P'yongyang Institute, succeeding An Kil. Kim Bong-yul, a 
Lieutenant in the Soviet Army, was appointed Deputy Chief of the 
Artillery Training Department. Pak Kil-nam, a Captain in the Soviet 
Army, was made Chief of the Engineers Department. Ch'oe Hong-guk was 
serving as Chief of the Rear Services Department, one of three main 
departments of the GHQ?^
In the building of the people's army, the authority and influence 
of the Soviet military advisers was enormous. The Soviet advisers 
were instrumental in the formation of the Security Cadres Training 
Centres in the summer of 1946. After the Security Cadres Training 
Corps was founded in August 1946, their activities became more 
organised. The number of Soviet advisers per Korean unit was varied 
from time to time. At the end of 1947 there were about 150 Soviet 
officers assigned to a division. At the General Headquarters, Major- 
General Smirnov was chief military adviser. He was to continue the 
job until April 1950. A Soviet Colonel assisted each divisional 
commander of the people's army. Soviet advisers were seldom assigned 
below battalion level except in special cases such as independent 
companies or technical troops. Together with the Soviet-Koreans 
assigned to the people's army, the Soviet military advisers were
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substantially functioning as staff officers and instructors of the
11people's army in this period.
With the development of the people's army under the support and 
direction of Soviet military advisers more emphasis was laid in the 
ideological orientation of the people's army on Marxism-Leninism and 
proletarian internationalism, in addition to the revolutionary and 
nationalistic tradition of the anti-Japanese armed struggle. A 
symbolic manifestation of this new trend was the fact that under Kim 
II, Chief of the Cultural Department, another Kim II, a Soviet Korean 
from Tashkent, was made deputy to the senior Kim II. A distinction is 
easily found between the two Kim Ils' emphasis on ideological 
orientation of the people's army in this period.
The writings of senior Kim II were plain in logic and style and 
had almost the same contents as Kim IlSung's. The main clauses were 
the following: (1) the people's army is the successor of the
anti-Japanese Korean People's Revolutionary Army; (2) the people's 
army should be the genuine defender of the people, serving the people, 
living with the people, and learning from the people; and (3) the 
discipline of the people's army should be that of a revolutionary, 
self-conscious discipline, not that of a bourgeoisie, blind 
discipline. The writings of junior Kim II were much more complicated 
and sophisticated in its logic and expression than the senior Kim 
II's. He emphasised the following: (1) the liberation of Korea from 
the yoke of the Japanese colonial rule was absolutely indebted to the 
Soviet Union; (2) the people's army should be faithful to proletarian 
internationalism and should serve the interest of fraternal countries 
as well as the interests of the Korean people; and (3) the people's
army should be eager to learn the advanced military science of the
24Soviet Union and should develop into a modern, regular army.
The political education and training in the people's army was 
based on a combination of these two lines. Soldiers of the people's 
army were taught 'History of the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle', 
together with 'History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union'.
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They read 'Biography of Stalin1 as well as 'Biography of General Kim 
IlSung'. Especially political education curricula for senior officers 
was almost a duplication of the curricula for Soviet officers. Since 
there were not many even among senior officers of the people's army 
who could well understood the esoteric philosophy and social sciences 
of Marxism-Leninism, the value of such stereotypical indoctrination 
was doubtful. In terms of effect, the simple and emotional message of 
senior Kim II seemed to be much more effective to the soldiers of the
IS
people's army. J
Strengthening the Security Forces
Along with the growth of the people's army the security forces 
were also steadily expanding in this period. In February 1947, with 
the inauguration of the North Korean People's Committee (NKPC), the 
Security Bureau was renamed the Interior Bureau. Pak Il-u remained as 
Director of the Interior Bureau. The Interior Bureau had three 
divisions and eight offices under its control. The three divisions of 
the Interior Bureau were the main working body of the bureau. Amongst 
them the Constabulary Division was responsible for all sorts of 
security forces: the Police Constabulary, the Railway Constabulary,
the Border Constabulary, and the Coast Guard.
The Police Constabulary was the group seen most often in North
Korea at the time. It was charged with assisting provincial and local
police, functioning as a sort of mobile police force. These
provincial and local police at that time were a staff organisation 
rather than an operating agency, with a small forces - about forty men 
at county level and less than one hundred men at provincial
headquarters level. Detachments of the Police Constabulary were often 
used in maintaining order in railway stations and their immediate 
vicinity, which was mainly the job of the Railway Constabulary. 
Except for South P'yongan Province, in which the seat of the North 
Korean regime was located, a police constabulary of battalion-size of
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about 1,000 men was deployed in each province. In South P'yongan
17
Province three battalions of police constabulary were deployed.
As of early 1947, the Railway Constabulary was, in addition to its 
normal guard duties on railway lines, also functioning as a reserve 
force for the people's army. This unique function of the Railway 
Constabulary had already been exhibited when the Railway Constabulary 
Command was transformed in June 1946 into the 3rd Security Cadres 
Training Centre, the parent body of the 3rd Independent Mixed Brigade. 
The Railway Constabulary battalions were deployed in such important 
areas as P'yongyang, Sariwon, Wonsan, and Chongjin. (These Railway 
Constabulary battalions were to form the 4th Independent Mixed Brigade
70
in October 1948, the parent body of the 4th Infantry Division.)
From July 1947 the Border Constabulary battalions were deployed 
along the 38th parallel. There were two battalions of this kind. The 
7th Battalion, with a strength of 1,200 men was deployed in Kyongki 
Province area and the 9th Battalion of the same size was deployed in 
Kangwon Province area. These two battalions were under the direct 
command of the Director of the Interior Bureau, and maintained close 
liaison relations with the provincial Interior Departments and the 
Soviet forces deployed along the 38th parallel. For security reasons, 
a five kilometre-width area along the 38th parallel was practically 
blocked to ordinary north Koreans. The Border Constabulary battalions 
were responsible for the security of this area. These battalions were 
to develop into Security Brigades in late 1948. (It was these 38 
Security Brigades which became engaged in border conflicts with the 
troops of the ROK Army from early 1949.^
The Coast Guard consisted of three regional coast guards. The 1st 
Cost Guard based in Wonsan and the 2nd Coast Guard based in Chongjin 
guarded the east coast of north Korea and the 3rd Coast Guard based in 
Chinnampo was in charge of the security of the west coast. In June 
1947, a Coast Guard Cadres School was founded in Wonsan with Kim 
Kwang-yon, a Soviet-Korean, as its head. Each regional coast guard 
consisted of several detachments of about fifty personnel each. These
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detachments guarded the coast against smugglers and possible espionage 
infiltration from the south. They were also in charge of apprehending 
refugees who attempted to escape from the north. The Coast Guard was 
equipped with vintage motor boats which the Japanese left behind in 
1945. This meagre supply to the Coast Guard of personnel and 
equipment was to remain almost unchanged for a couple of years. So 
the Coast Guard was, despite that it was the parent body of the North 
Korean Navy, remained literally a 'rudimentary' coast guard for some 
years.^
In February 1948, an Independent Security Brigade was organised in 
Chinnampo. This brigade was the first of its kind whose main function 
was to support the regular army in combat-orientated activities rather 
than internal security activities. The main function of the 
Independent Security Brigade was to assist the regular army by making 
sure that 'the people's army has sufficient time to move to the front 
and that the entire people rally to the front, so that the people's
11
army is in a position to win battles.'J So, while the people's army 
was concentrating on education and training, the Security Brigades 
should be at alert at all times. The Independent Security Brigade was 
the nucleus around which other armed forces of the Interior Bureau
(the Ministry of the Interior from September 1948) would grow in
19
strength in the future.
In August 1948 the 3rd Security Brigade was organised to further 
strengthen the security of the 38th parallel. Up to that time two 
Border Constabulary battalions, the 7th in Kyongki Province and the 
9th in Kangwon Province, had guarded the 38th parallel. Two more 
battalions were deployed along the 38th parallel with the activation 
of the 3rd Security Brigade. The mission of the 3rd Security Brigade 
was, with these four battalions, to defend the border area against 
possible infringements from the south, and to tighten control over 
north Koreans who attempted to cross the 38th parallel into the south. 
The 3rd Security Brigade was, like the Independent Security Brigade, 
expected 'to train a large number of officers for itself and keep them 
in reserve so as to supplement the officers in time when the units are
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expanded or new units [are] formed.'^ (The 3rd Security Brigade was 
transformed into the 9th Infantry Division of the KPA in July 1950.)
By the time the Interior Bureau was transformed into the Ministry
of the Interior in September 1948, the Security forces comprising the
Police Constabulary, the Railway Constabulary, the Security Brigades,
and the Coast Guard, amounted to about 40,000 men. These security
forces were estimated to be sufficiently effective to maintain the
internal security of North Korea. Furthermore through the defence of
the 38th parallel, in which tension was increasingly growing between
the north and south from late 1947, security forces under the Interior
Bureau were effectively gaining valuable time for the steady
udevelopment of the people's army in this period.
The Founding of the Korean People's Army
On 8 February 1948 the founding of a Korean People's Army was
officially proclaimed. At the ceremony held in P'yongyang Kim IlSung 
declared that 'the Korean people, who had been subjected to all manner 
of persecution and suppression under the bayonets of the Japanese
imperialists came to have their own fully-fledged regular army to
•K
defend the country and the nation'. J He pointed out the significance 
of having one's own army as follows:
No independent state is without its own army. Naturally no 
state can attain complete independence without its army. Our
people was occupied by the Japanese imperialists because our
people at that time had no army of their own strong enough to
it
defeat the Japanese imperialist aggressor.
Having stressed the significance of the founding of the KPA, Kim
IlSung remarked on the reasons why the founding of the KPA needed to
be officially proclaimed at that stage. He insisted that the founding 
of the people's army would give mighty encouragement to the people in
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south Korea 'in their struggle for the reunification and independence
17
of the country along democratic lines'. He emphasised that the 
founding of the KPA was necessary 'to prevent US imperialism and the
IQ
reactionaries in south Korea from starting a civil war' and 'to 
prevent any reactionary forces and subversive elements from spoiling 
in the slightest degree all the precious results gained by the north 
Korean people.' Here Kim IlSung was already implying a possibility 
of a civil war between north and south Korea. In examining the 
origins of the Korean War, such a remark of Kim IlSung in February 
1948 deserves a cautious attention.
The founding of the KPA in February 1948 was especially 
significant in that the occasion was not only an epoch in the history 
of the KPA but also a major initiative taken by the North Korean 
leadership on the Korean unification issue. Up to late 1947, the 
North Korean regime had mainly focused its efforts on building 'a 
democratic base' in North Korea. On the Korean independence and 
unification issue they had been insisting upon the Provisional Korean 
Democratic Government formula through the US-USSR Joint Commission. 
The eventual failure of the US-USSR Joint Commission in October 1947 
and presentation of the Korea issue before the United Nations where 
the United States was overwhelmingly dominating at that time meant for 
the North Korean regime that the possibility of forging a unified 
government over all Korea which North Korea could, sooner or later, 
transform into a communist-dominated government was all but gone. 
Among the North Korean leaders, a strong sense of impetuosity was 
suddenly emerging from late 1947. From the beginning of 1948, the 
North Korean leaders upgraded efforts for the unification issue taking 
two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, they intensified manoeuvres to 
sabotage the UNTCOK and general election in south Korea. On the other 
hand, they were busy making justifications for the future DPRK as the 
legitimate government over all Korea. The founding of the KPA in 
February 1948 was intended and timed to meet this two-pronged 
strategy; namely, encouraging the south Korean people in struggles
against the UNTCOK; and demonstrating North Korean resolve to pursue
40their own scheme to build a separate government in north Korea.
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Kim IlSung stipulated the characteristics of the KPA as follows. 
First of all, the KPA was the people's army, 'made of the sons and 
daughters of the workers, peasants and other sections of the Korean 
working people, which fights for the liberation and independence of 
the Korean nation and for the happiness of the masses against the
imperialist aggressive forces from abroad and the reactionary forces
41at home.' So, the most important feature of the people's army was, 
Kim IlSung emphasised, that the people and the People's Army are 
closely connected with each other and can never be separated. Another 
important feature of the KPA was 'that its backbone was composed of 
true patriots of Korea who devoted their all in the past to the 
anti-Japanese armed struggle for the liberation of the country and the
n
people in the face of brutal Japanese imperialistic suppression'. As 
such Kim IlSung stressed that the KPA was to be the successor to the 
spirit and the tradition of the anti-Japanese armed struggle.
Kim IlSung's address at the founding of the KPA became a manifesto 
for the KPA. All the political training and education of the KPA was 
based on this manifesto. The Cultural Training Department of the KPA 
added some other points to this manifesto, reflecting the influence of 
Soviet military advisers. The following are the main points which 
were added to Kim IlSung's manifesto. First, the Korean People's Army 
was established and strengthened by the constant aid of the Soviet 
Union as well as by the able direction of Kim IlSung. Secondly, the 
Korean People's Army assimilated Soviet progressive military ideas, 
and benefited from numerous experiences of the Soviet army. Thirdly, 
the characteristics of the Korean People's Army and the source of its 
strength were based on the idea that all nations protecting freedom in 
the world strengthen their international friendship under the 
leadership of the Soviet Union. Fourthly, the regulation of the 
Korean People's Army, which is the foundation of victory, should be 
founded on the political and self-conscious ideas all military 
personnel hold for their fatherland and for the people. Fifthly,
soldiers of the Korean People's Army should take part in international
n
political movements.
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With the official founding of the KPA some organisational changes 
were made in the people's army. On 4 February 1948, a National 
Defence Bureau was established. Kim Ch'aek, Vice-Chairman of the 
North Korean People's Committee, was named Director of the National 
Defence Bureau. It is open to further inquiry whether the 
establishment of the National Defence Bureau was only an official 
confirmation of the same bureau which was thought to have functioned 
since February 1947 under Kim Ch'aek's control. An article of 
condolence on Kim Ch'aek's death on 31 January 1951, which appeared in 
Nodonq Shinmum on 2 February 1951, reported explicitly that Kim Ch'aek 
was named as Director of the National Defence Bureau in February 
1947.44 Though, other evidence has yet to be forwarded to second the 
evidence. An official almanac of North Korea put on record the 
statement that the establishment of the National Defence Bureau with 
Kim Ch'aek as its director was decided at the 58th session of the
At
North Korea People's Committee on 4 February, 1948.
The Security Cadres Training Corps Headquarters, which had been 
informally referred to as General Headquarters, the People's Army, 
since early 1947, was officially designated General Headquarters, the 
Korean People's Army. Ch'oe Yong-gon was to remain as
Commander-in-Chief of the KPA. Exact relations between the National 
Defence Bureau headed by Kim Ch'aek and the General Headquarters 
headed by Ch'oe Yong-gon is open to further inquiry. A probable 
explanation of this relationship, deduced from overall understanding 
of the North Korean leadership structure at that time, would be; that 
the relationship between Kim Ch'aek and Ch'oe Yong-gon was a division 
of labour rather than a hierarchical structure. It seems that Kim 
Ch'aek was in charge of defence policy and administration while Ch'oe 
Yong-gon was responsible for organising and training of the KPA^
Interestingly, at the founding of the KPA in February 1948, Kim 
IlSung was not referred to as Supreme Commander of the KPA. He
addressed the people's army in the capacity of Chairman of the North 
Korean People's Committee. As head of government, Kim IlSung was
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entitled to be Supreme Commander of the people's army; however, he was 
not named so. One possible explanation for this question would be the 
fact that in communist countries, often, a supreme commander is not 
explicitly named in peacetime. For example, Stalin was named Supreme 
Commander of the Red Army in late 1941 only after the Red Army 
recovered from the first catastrophic defeat by the German Army. 
There is a possibility that in accordance with this precedent Kim 
IlSung was not named Supreme Commander of the KPA in February 1948.^
(Kim IlSung was appointed Supreme Commander of the KPA in July 1950).
That the KPA was officially founded in February 1948 prior to the 
founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 
September 1948 has been an issue of controversy, especially in South 
Korea. In South Korea, a Korean Constabulary had existed and
developed since December 1945 under the control of the US occupation
authorities. The development of the Korean Constabulary into the ROK 
Army was made only after the Republic of Korea (ROK) government was 
established in August 1948. Why, then, did the North Korean regime 
make the existence of the people's army formal even before the 
establishment of the DPRK? Wasn't the KPA an illegitimate body which 
was given birth even before the advent of its parent body - the DPRK? 
What was the legal status of the KPA? A possible answer to this 
question can be found in the understanding of the legal status of the 
North Korean regime since 1945 as claimed by the Soviet occupation 
authorities and their North Korean proteges.^
Unlike South Korea, in which the US Army Military Government in 
Korea (USAMGIK) was imposed upon the Korean people as the sole 
government during the period from September 1945 to August 1948, in 
North Korea, a 'claim' was maintained throughout the Soviet occupation 
that the Korean people restored its sovereignty after the collapse of 
the Japanese colonial rule in August 1945. The provincial and local 
people's committees which emerged in North Korea just after the defeat 
of Japan were recognised by the Soviet occupation authorities as 
legitimate governing bodies. A central government in North Korea 
developed from these provincial and local people's committees. The
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North Korean Administration of November 1945 was the first central 
government in North Korea. The North Korean Provisional People's 
Committee (NKPPC) of February 1946 was 'a people's dictatorial power 
committed to the tasks of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and 
democratic revolution.^ The North Korean People's Committee (NKPC) 
of February 1947 was 'geared to carrying out the socialist revolution 
based on the results of the democratic reforms performed by the North 
Korean Provisional People's Committee.'^ These various forms of 
governing bodies in North Korea had been proclaimed as legitimate as 
they were based on people's power.
So, when the KPA was founded in February 1948, a legitimate 
government which was entitled to have armed forces had already existed 
in the form of the North Korean People's Committee, according to the 
claim of the North Korean regime. It is noteworthy that in February 
1948, the KPA was proclaimed as 'the people's army' under the control 
of the people's committee. At this stage, the KPA was not yet 
proclaimed as the national armed forces of the 'State of Korea'. The 
founding of the KPA was, according to Kim IlSung, 'only the first step
towards building up a powerful, modern armed force of the Democratic
siPeople's Republic of Korea which will be established in the future'.
With the establishment of the DPRK in September 1948, a Ministry 
of National Defence was organised. Ch'oe Yong-gon was appointed 
Minister of National Defence. The line-up of the headquarters of the 
Ministry of National Defence was as follows: Kang Gon, Chief of the 
General Staff and Deputy Defence Minister; Kim II, Chief of the 
Cultural Training Bureau and Deputy Defence Minister; Mu Chong, Chief 
of the Artillery Command Bureau and Deputy Defence Minister; Ch'oe 
Hong-guk, Chief of the Rear Services Bureau; Ch'oe In, Deputy Chief of 
the General Staff; Kim Ung, Chief of the Combat Training Bureau; and 
Kim Kwang-hyop, Chief of the Operations Bureau. Kim Pa was also 
reinstated as Chief of the Political Defence Bureau. This line-up of 
the North Korean high command was to remain almost unchanged until the 
beginning of the Korean War. Kim Ch'aek who had fostered the people's 
army since November 1945, and had been Director of the National
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Defence Bureau just before the establishment of the Ministry of 
National Defence, was officially relieved of his duty. Though, as 
Minister of Industry, he was also responsible for defence industry, 
and maintained close connections with the Defence Ministry more than 
any other minister in the cabinet.
Along with these formal arrangements the KPA was expanding 
steadily throughout 1948. On 13 October 1948, the 3rd Infantry 
Division was activated in P'yongyang. The bulk of the division's 
strength was drawn from three main sources; the 3rd Independent Mixed 
Brigade; the 2nd Division from which an entire regiment was 
transferred; and from recruits in training centres. The 3rd Division 
deployed its regiments at Hungnam, Tokwon, and P'yonggang. On 15 
October 1948, the 4th Independent Mixed Brigade was activated. The 
brigade consisted of three infantry battalions and six independent 
detachments. The headquarters of the brigade was located at Taedong, 
South P'yongan Province and its subunits were deployed at Sinuiju, 
Chinnampo, and P'yongyang. Earlier in 1948, with the founding of the 
Korean People's Army, the P'yongyang Institute was renamed the 2nd
Central Political Officers School and the Central Security Officers
siSchool was renamed the 1st Central Officers School.
In December 1948, the 105th Tank Regiment was activated at Sadong, 
near P'yongyang. The origin of the 105th Tank Regiment was from a 
Soviet tank regiment stationed in P'yongyang until early 1948. From 
May 1947, the Soviet military advisers began to train Korean soldiers 
in the operation of the tank regiment. When the Soviet tank division 
withdrew from North Korea in early 1948, the division left 50 tanks 
and 300 troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Pyotor, a Soviet-Korean. With 
the founding of the KPA in February 1948, the training of Korean tank 
troops proceeded rapidly. By November 1948, the Korean troops were 
able to manage the tank regiment for themselves. In early December 
1948, Lt. Col. Pyotor and the Soviet instructors withdrew from North 
Korea leaving 60 tanks, 30 self-propelled artillery pieces and 40 
vehicles. With this equipment and trained Korean tank troops, the 
105th Tank Regiment was activated in December 1948. The tank regiment
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consisted of two tank battalions, one self-propelled artillery
battalion, one engineer company, one reconnaissance company, one
transportation company, and a medical detachment. Lt. Col. Yu
Kyong-su, from the Kim IlSung group and formerly Commander of the 4th
Regiment, 2nd Division, was appointed Commander of the 105th Tank 
S4regiment.
As of December 1948, the KPA consisted of three infantry
divisions, one mixed brigade, one tank regiment, rear service troops,
and various military academies, totalling 50,000 men. In addition to 
these regular forces, the security forces under the Ministry of the 
Interior added ready-reserve forces to the regular forces. The total 
strength of these security forces, consisting of two Security
Brigades, the Railway Constabulary battalions, the Police Constabulary 
battalions, and the Coast Guard, was approximately 40,000 men. In 
all, the North Korea had 90,000 military and para-military troops at 
the end of 1948^
At the same period, the ROK Army had around 50,000 troops, 
consisting of six brigades. In terms of troop strength, the ROK Army 
and the KPA were nearly equal. But in terms of equipment, 
organisation, and training, the KPA was estimated to be ahead of the 
ROK Army. The ROK Army was, in this period, remaining as a 
constabulary mainly engaged in domestic security missions, while the
KPA was developing into a full-fledged combat force. The National
Police of South Korea, with 45,000 men, was mainly a public safety 
police. Compared with the security forces of North Korea, The 
National Police of South Korea was hardly counted to be equal to a 
para-military force. In this regard, the ROK Army was in an adverse 
condition than the KPA. Moreover, from October 1948 on, the ROK Army 
became engaged in quelling mutinies agitated by south Korean 
communists. Even if the ROK Army troops gained some combat
experiences through these operations, regular training programmes on
large-unit or combined forces level were inevitably suspended for 
those small-unit punitive operations. In this regard, the ROK Army 
was also behind the KPA.^
By the end of 1948, the People's Army of North Korea became well 
established. The KPA came to have a semblance of a modern, regular 
army. The fact that as early as September 1947, the Soviet government 
proposed withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea signified the
confidence of the Soviet occupation authorities and their North Korean 
protdg6s in the progress of the KPA. By the time the founding of the 
Korean People's Army was declared in February 1948, the people's army 
had, though still modest in size, become a well organised army. With 
the founding of the DPRK in September 1948, the KPA became a national 
armed force with all formalities. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces 
from North Korea in December 1948 was therefore a vindication of the 
development of the KPA.
The characteristic feature of the growth of the people's army of 
North Korea during this period is that it was developing very 
methodically, compared with its opponent in the south. In fostering 
the South Korean Constabulary, the forerunner of the ROK Army, the US 
military government's methods were marked by expediency. A company 
size unit was first raised in each of the eight provinces. The 
companies were expanded into battalions, regiments and brigades in 
turn, by recruiting local youths. Contrastingly, the organisers of
the KPA raised division size units from the beginning. The cadres of
these divisions, who were seasoned veterans through the anti-Japanese 
struggle or the Chinese Civil War, first constituted the backbone of 
the divisions and transformed these rudimentary divisions into trained 
fighting forces. The difference between the north and south in
building armies was not simply a matter of differing methods and 
procedures. It reflected significant differences in US and Soviet 
policies. While the US military government was busy policing the 
vortex in South Korea, the Soviet occupation authorities were pursuing 
a well conceived programme of fostering a self-reliant North Korean 
regime. That the KPA was well established by late 1948 was mainly due 
to such sound Soviet policy.
CHAPTER FIVE
TOWARDS A WAR, 1948.12-1950.6
From late 1948 to June 1950 the KPA proceeded rapidly with the 
preparations for a war with South Korea. During this period the North 
Korean leadership upgraded their efforts to weaken the south, together 
with strengthening the north. The decision to launch a war against 
the south was based on the North Korean leaders' confidence in their 
strengthened position, contrasted with the weakened situation in South 
Korea (in their estimate.) It is estimated that North Korean leaders 
made the Korean War decision possibly by the end of 1949 and later 
Soviet and Chinese leaders approved the adventure in early 1950. 
During this period the expansion of the KPA was remarkable: it almost 
tripled in strength and armament within less than a year and a half. 
The influx of the Korean veterans in the Chinese Communist Forces 
contributed greatly to the upgrading of the KPA as a seasoned army. 
Vast Soviet aid in building mechanised troops and an air force and in 
upgrading KPA armament transformed the KPA from modestly equipped 
light infantry divisions into a balanced modern army. With the 
intensifying of the south-north rivalry from early 1948, a kind of 
pseudo-warfare continued between the north and south in the form of 
border conflicts and guerilla provocations in the rear of South Korea, 
until a couple of months before the outbreak of the war in June 1950. 
The ominous lull of some months was coupled with a resumed peace 
offensive from the north. For the KPA, this pause was, in effect, the 
time for the last preparations for the war.
Political Setting
In the new year address of 1949 Kim II Sung called for 'the whole 
Korean people's grand save-the-nation struggle' to bring about
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'territorial integrity and complete national independence and 
sovereignty in the near future'.* In this address Kim IlSung recalled 
the year 1948 as the one 'in which the most brilliant achievements
were attained in the annals of our nation's struggle for reunification
2
and independence.' He affirmed that, through these achievements 
'bases and conditions for achieving national reunification and 
building of a completely independent and sovereign state in the not- 
too-distant future (emphasis by author) were prepared.'^
On what is to be done to further these bases and conditions 
prepared so far, Kim IlSung remarked as follows:
The people in the northern half of the Republic must 
channelize all manpower and material forces to further 
consolidate and promote the successes achieved in the 
democratic reforms over the past three years since
liberation, to strengthen the political and economic 
foundations of the Republic and to cement the democratic base
4
in the Republic:
Our fellow countrymen in the southern half of the Republic 
must fight more fiercely for the withdrawal of US troops from 
our soil, and expose the true colours of the "UNTCOK" which 
lends validity to the US imperialist policy of colonial 
enslavement. They must bring to light all the country-
selling agreements concluded by the puppet government, reject 
and obliterate all its "laws" and traitorous "administrative
policies". Our compatriots in the south, in coordination
with the patriotic mutinies of the "National Defence Army" 
must wage the save-the-nation struggle more vigorously to 
overthrow the treacherous puppet government and achieve 
territorial integrity and the country's complete independence 
and sovereignty?
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The above urge of Kim IlSung was an express manifestation of the 
'strengthen the north, weaken the south' policy, in other words, the 
Democratic Base Line and the United Front Line.
It is significant to note that while Kim IlSung was repeatedly 
appealing in the address for 'a fierce save-the-nation struggle for 
territorial integrity' his emphasis was, at that stage, on 
strengthening the political and economic foundations of North Korea 
rather than initiating radical actions for the liberation of South 
Korea. His position on the liberation of South Korea was still that 
of encouraging south Koreans in their struggle for the reunification. 
Kim IlSung raised the Two-Year National Economic Plan as a prime task 
to be fulfilled by the north Korean people for the following two 
years. The economic plan was the first genuine economic development 
plan in North Korea. It's objective was to attain or surpass the 
highest level of production before liberation (1945) in all spheres of 
the North Korean economy. The North Korean leadership regarded the 
success of the economic plan as a prerequisite for taking a more 
vigorous initiative in the reunification issue of Korea. So, as of 
early 1949, while raising the banner of the save-the-nation struggle 
for reunification, the North Korean leadership was, in practice, more 
concerned about the Two-Year National Economic Plan^ .
In March 1949, Kim IlSung made an official visit to Moscow. Kim's 
entourage included the following ministers: Pak Hon-yong, Deputy
Premier and Foreign Minister; Hong Myong-hui, Deputy Premier; Chong 
Ch'un-taek, Chairman of the State Planning Commission; Chang Si-u, 
Commerce Minister; Baek Nam-un, Education Minister; and Kim Chong-ju, 
Communication Minister. Neither Defence Minister nor the senior 
service chief was included in this delegation. T.P. Shtykov, Soviet 
ambassador to North Korea, accompanied the North Korean delegation. 
On 17 March 1949, the North Korean delegation concluded 'an agreement 
on economic and cultural cooperation' with the Soviet government. The 
major clauses of the agreement were as follows: (1) to increase trade 
relations between two countries; (2) to confer most-favoured-nation
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treatment on each other in matters regarding trade, navigation, and 
individual and corporate bodies' activities; (3) to facilitate 
cultural cooperation; and (4) to increase exchange of know-how on 
industry and agriculture. The agreement was to hold ten years.
Based on this agreement, six protocols were signed between
relevant ministers of the two countries on such items as the
following; (1) a three-year, 212 million rouble loan to North Korea;
(2) Soviet technical assistance to North Korea; (3) treatment of
Soviet experts working in North Korea; (4) trade between the two
countries during 1949 and 1950; (5) exchange of scholars and students;
and (6) coordination in communications area. North Korea was to
receive the 212 million roubles from July 1949, in instalments,
ranging over three years up to June 1952. The loan was for settling
'an excess of imports' from the Soviet Union. Thus Kim IlSung's
Moscow visit of March 1949 was mainly related to the economic and
0
technical development of North Korea.
With regard to this North Korean-Soviet agreement, there has been 
some speculation on the possibility of secret dealing on security 
matters such as a military alliance between the two countries or a 
Korean war decision in the near future. So far no primary source 
materials are available to back up this speculation convincingly, 
except for some euphemistic hints which could possibly be interpreted 
as such. On the conclusion of the North Korean-Soviet agreement on 17 
March 1949, a Soviet press comment noted that North Korea could expect
Q
'all-round' assistance from the Soviet Union. Another hint was from
Stalin. At the celebration party on 17 March, Stalin introduced three
high-ranking Soviet officers to the North Korean delegation. These 
officers were; General S.M. Stemenko, Chief of the General Staff;
Admiral I.S. Yermashev, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; and Marshal of
Aviation, K.A. Vershinin, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. This
gesture by Stalin was received by the North Korean delegation,
according to Baek Nam-un, Education Minister, as implying that North
Korea could expect military assistance from the Soviet Union, if
needed.^ These two episodes are, in fact, too ambivalent to be
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considered hard evidence on this question. Even if this issue is
still open to controversy in the absence of primary source materials
to refute such a speculation, it is the contention of this author that
there must be strong doubts as to the possibility of such secret
dealing on security matters between the two countries at this stage. 
At least, it is unlikely that the Korean War decision was made during 
Kim IlSung's Moscow visit of March 1949. This will be discussed in 
detail later.
There has also been speculation that the North Korean delegation 
concluded a mutual defence treaty with the Chinese communists during 
this Moscow visit. The Central News Agency of the Chinese Nationalist 
Government reported on 5 May 1949 that the two sides concluded a 
mutual defence treaty to the effect that : (1) common defence against
aggression of whatever nature; (2) supply to North Korea of arms, 
materiel and manpower from Manchuria from June 1949 to August 1949;
(3) North Korea's preferential right over utilising Japanese 
technicians and employees and war materiel in Manchuria and (4) an 
economic barter system.^ So far no primary source materials are 
available to back up this claim. However, some relevant evidence and 
circumstantial reasoning indicates that such a claim is very doubtful. 
Baek Nam-un left a detailed record of this Moscow visit. According to 
him there was no encounter between the North Korean delegation and the 
Chinese communist dignitaries, let alone a mutual defence treaty 
between North Korea and the CCP. As of March 1949, the Chinese 
communists were in the last phase of the Chinese Civil War. The 
founding of the People's Republic of China was declared on 1 October 
1949. It is unnatural to claim that a formal defence treaty was 
signed between the DPRK (a state) and the CCP ( a party) in March 
1949. At the time of early 1949, nearly all the Japanese soldiers and 
civilians captured in Manchuria had already been repatriated to Japan 
or sent to Siberia. In the absence of hard evidence, the existence of
a formal defence pact between North Korean and the Chinese communists
12from as early as March 1949 is not convincing.
From the late spring of 1949 the North Korean leadership upgraded 
its efforts for the reunification issue. On 12 May, a proposal was
raised to form a Democratic Front for the Reunification of the 
Fatherland (DFRF) by the Democratic National United Front of South
Korea (DNUFSK), the umbrella organisation for all the left-wing
parties and social organisations in South Korea. On 16 May, the 
Democratic National United Front of North Korea (DNUFNK), the opposite 
party in North Korea, accepted the DNUFSK's proposal. At the 39th 
Session of the Central Committee of the DNUFNK on 16 May, Kim IlSung 
stated that forming this front [DFRF] 'to rally around it the entire 
patriotic and democratic forces in north and south Korea will mark an 
epoch making advance (emphasis by author) in our people's struggle for 
the country's reunification and territorial integrity'.^ He urged 
that 'all the political parties and social organisations affiliated 
with DNUFNK must do everything in their power to make sure that the 
Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland is 
successfully established1.^
On 25 June 1949 (coincidentally, just one year before the outbreak 
of the Korean War) a conference was held to form the DFRF, attended by 
704 delegates representing 71 political parties and social 
organisations in north and south Korea. A seven-member presidium of 
the central committee was elected. Interestingly, Kim IlSung was not 
elected as member of the presidium. Instead he was elected as member 
of the Central Standing Committee of the Democratic Front, most 
probably to give the impression that DFRF was literally the highest, 
national united front of which the North Korean Workers' Party was 
only a part. In fact the DFRF was 'an apparatus of the [North Korean]
regime for mobilising all non-communist democratic forces in north and
15south Korea' to lead 'southern strategy.'
The roles and character of the DFRF was well expressed in the 
programme and manifesto of its inaugural conference. Major points of 
the programme were as follows: (1) to struggle for the withdrawal of 
the American troops and the UN Commission; (2) to mobilise all forces 
of the Korean people for the speedy reunification of the country; (3)
to struggle for the realisation in South Korea of democratic reforms 
consistent with the lines carried out in North Korea; and (4) to 
struggle for blocking the revival of imperial Japanl^
In the manifesto, 'the Measures for the Peaceful Reunification of 
the Country' were proposed. Their major points were as follows^
(1) The US troops and the UN commission must be withdrawn 
immediately so that Korea's peaceful reunification could 
be effected by the Korean people themselves.
(2) A general election should be held in September 1949 
throughout the whole of Korea to establish a single 
supreme legislature for all Korea, under the supervision 
of an election committee appointed by representatives of 
democratic parties and social organisations in north and 
south Korea.
(3) The election supervisory committee should be given the
following power, in addition to the preparation for and 
conduct of the general election: (1) to monitor the
withdrawal of foreign troops; (2) to control all the
police and security forces of north and south Korea; and 
(3) to expel from these police and security forces pro- 
Japanese elements and those who were instrumental in the 
oppression of people's struggle in south Korea.
(4) The legislature so elected shall adopt a constitution of 
the Korean republic and form a government based on that
constitution. The government shall dissolve the
existing governments in north and south Korea after 
taking over their functions.
(5) The armed forces in north and south Korea shall be 
merged according to the democratic principles. Those in 
the south Korean army who took part in the oppression of
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people's struggle shall be discharged from the army and 
prime figures shall be punished.
The DFRF's programme and manifesto of June 1949 was the embodiment 
of cardinal points and strategy of the North Korean regime toward the 
reunification issue and its stance against the South Korean 
government. The North Korean proposal was, in effect, to order a 
virtual surrender of sovereignty of the ROK government to the North 
Korean regime. The programme and manifesto of the DFRF was, in fact, 
meant to instigate 'the people' in south Korea rather than to propose 
a possible deal to 'the government' of south Korea. It was an open 
exhibition of the core of the United Front Line which aimed to 
disintegrate 'the government' in south Korea, whether the US Army 
Military Government in Korea or the ROK government, by instigating and 
mobilising the 'people around it'. It has been a customary practice 
for the North Korean regime to offer a hardly acceptable proposal to 
the South Korean government and blame the South Korean government for 
failing to respond to the proposal positively and appeal directly to 
the people in the south to rally around 'the constructive initiative'
of the north. The central theme of this 'southern strategy' has
10
remained unaltered for the last forty years.
The forming of the DFRF in June 1949 was surely 'an epoch-making
advance' in North Korea's initiative towards the reunification issue.
Until early 1949 the North Korean regime took the position that the 
liberation of south Korea was, in the first place, the task of the 
people in the south while affirming its responsibility for moral and, 
if possible, material support of such struggle in the south. In 
connection with the forming of the DFRF, the North Korean regime
revealed an important change in its position on this issue. At the
Sixth Meeting of the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers' 
Party on 11 June 1949 Kim IlSung declared, after detailing the 
situation of south Korea 'under the barbarous rule of the US
IQ
imperialists and the Syngman Rhee puppet clique , as follows:
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We can never remain indifferent to the miseries and 
sufferings of our compatriots in south Korea. We must rescue 
them from these grave calamities as soon as possibl^P 
(emphasis by author)
Now the liberation of south Korea had become an urgent task which, 
according to Kim IlSung, should not be left merely in the hands of the 
people in the south but be realised as soon as possible with the 
rescue of the people in the north. In order to carry out this task
successfully, 'all patriotic forces must rally together and the whole
91nation must rise in unison as one body', said Kim IlSung. The 
forming of the DFRF was to respond to this imperative calling. The 
significance of the forming of the DFRF was that the North Korean 
leadership made the resolve to assume the role of prime mover rather 
than an aid donator in the liberation of south Korea. This meant that
the issue of the liberation of south Korea became, for the North
Korean leadership, 'a policy objective' rather than 'a declaratory 
goal'
No less significant was the fact that with the forming of the DFRF 
all the progressive political parties and social organisations of 
north and south Korea was placed under the control of the North Korean 
leadership. The identity of the south Korean communists, whether they 
remained in south Korea, or escaped to north Korea, had hitherto been 
maintained, in spite of their declining position vis-a-vis north 
Korean communists, especially since two separate governments were 
established in north and south Korea in 1948. The forming of the DFRF 
implied that the North Korean leadership wanted no longer such a loose 
federation of south and north Korean communists but resolved to take 
firm control of all available resources in their hands with a view to 
pursuing the 'southern strategy' more actively.
The merger of the North and South Korean Workers' Parties into the 
Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) on 30 June 1949 was to finalise for 
organisational arrangements strengthening 'the unity of the working 
class in north and south Korea, the unity of all democratic forces and
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unity of true patriots.'^ Since August 1948, a joint central leading 
body of two parties had been functioning under the name of the 'Joint 
Central Committee of the North and South Korean Workers' Parties'. 
Upon the merging of the two parties, this joint central leading body 
was reorganised into a Political Committee of the Central Committee of 
the Workers' Party of Korea. The two existing party central 
committees were unified into a single central committee. The 
Political Committee was the presidium of the unified Central 
Committee. Kim IlSung was named Chairman of the Political Committee. 
Pak Hon-yong was named Vice-Chairman. Other members of the Political 
Committee were: Kim Ch'aek, the faithful lieutenant of Kim IlSung; Pak 
Il-u, Kim Tu-bong, both from the Yenan group; Ho Ka-i, a Soviet-
Korean; and Yi Sung-yop, Kim Sam-ryong, and Ho Hon, all from the South 
Korean Workers' Party. Ostensibly a balance of power among competing
factions was maintained. However, there was no doubt that Kim IlSung
25was the paramount leader.
At the occasion of the establishment of the WPK, Kim IlSung hinted 
at an extraordinary measure for the reunification of the country, in
case approaches calling for the peaceful reunification failed to
materialise. While still emphasising the programme of the DFRF of 28
June 1948 as the party's 'action programme for the country's
26reunification and independence and for establishing democracy,' Kim 
IlSung cautioned the party to prepare for another line of action for 
the reunification issue as follows:
We are not proposing a peaceful reunification of the country 
because we are weak. Our people who have gained their
freedom and independence through harsh struggle will never
27yield to anybody the happiness and rights they enjoy.
If the Syngman Rhee puppet regime refuses our proposal as set 
out in the declaration of the Inaugural Conference of the 
DFRF, for the peaceful reunification of the country, we will 
not confine ourselves to it. Instead, we will seek various 
ways and means for the solution of this question and set up a
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unified, independent and sovereign democratic state without 
00
fail. (emphasis by author)
It is natural to suppose that the 'various ways and means' could
include an all-out attack against South Korea.
It is open to controversy how and when the Korean War decision was
made. A tentative summary of my arguments on this questions is as
follows:
* The all-out attack the KPA launched against the south in June 
1950 was only the final phase of North Korea's reunification 
policy since 1945.
* The idea of a Korean war was first raised by the North Korean 
leadership and, by the end of 1949, they made the final 
decision to launch the war.
* The invasion plan was approved by Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, no 
later than the end of February 1950.
* The communist leaders viewed a Korean war principally as a 
domestic conflict and barely anticipated that the Americans 
would intervene in the Korean civil conflict en masse.
It is suggestive to begin a discussion of this question with 
Khrushchev Remembers which provides a good summation of the decision­
making process regarding the Korean War. According to Khrushchev:
At the end of 1949, Kim IlSung arrived in Moscow to see 
Stalin. He wanted to prod south Korea with the point of a 
bayonet. Naturally Stalin could not oppose this idea. But 
Stalin was worried that the Americans would jump in, [yet] we 
were inclined to think that if the war were won swiftly, then 
intervention by the USA could be avoided. Mao approved Kim's 
suggestion and put forward the opinion that the USA would not 
intervene since the war would be an internal matter... We had
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already been giving arms to North Korea for sometime. The
designated hour had arrived and the war began.^
Khrushchev's remarks contain almost all of the major points on the 
timing and rationales behind the communist leaders' decision on the 
Korean War. First, the idea of a Korean war was initiated by Kim 
IlSung and later approved by Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. Secondly, the 
decision was made during the winter of 1949-50. Thirdly, the 
probability of US intervention was the prime consideration in 
assessing the possibility for the success of the invasion. Fourthly, 
the communist leaders justified a Korean war as an internal affair and 
they expected that such reasoning would also be accepted by the 
Americans.
Whereas there are few objections to the theory that in the Korean 
War decision Kim IlSung, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung were involved more 
or less, it has been open to discussion as to whom the prime mover of 
the decision was. Traditional views on the origins of the Korea War 
have pointed to Stalin as the real mastermind behind the Korean War, 
as well summarised in a brief statement by David. J. Dallin that 'the 
Korean War was planned, prepared, and initiated by Stalin.'^ For 
another example of this kind, Adam B. Ulam asserted that 'everything 
then would point to the conclusion that the Korean affairs were 
undertaken at the Soviet initiative. That North Korea would have 
attacked on its own is inconceivable.'^ Then, why did Stalin initiate 
a war in Korea? The following hypothetical explanations have been 
raised: (1) the diversionary move theory which holds that the Korean 
War was intended to divert the mounting American build-up in Europe to 
the Far East; (2) the soft-spot probing theory which suspects the 
'expansionist-minded' Stalin eager to obtain (seemingly) unclaimed 
property, such as south Korea after the withdrawal of US forces; (3) 
the will-test theory refers to Stalin's possible attempt to test the 
resolve or capacity of American resistance against the Soviet 
challenge. While the above theories are mainly concerned with the 
Soviet policy vis-a-vis the United States, the following theories 
emphasise the reasoning behind Soviet policy towards China and Japan;
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(1) the attrition theory which suspects Moscow's calculated design to 
bring China into irreconcilable conflict with the United States; 
and(2) the Japan factor theory which points to the Soviet move to 
thwart a US-Japan alliance.
The weak point of these various theories on Stalin's motivation to 
initiate a war in Korea is that there are few archival or other 
primary sources to back them. These theories are in most cases 
deduced from pre-shaped frame of reference regarding the foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union in this period. As one of the forerunners 
of these traditionalists acknowledges, 'the most accepted explanation
it
of Soviet motivation is still the most logical one. Many
Sovietologists are agreed that Stalin was very cautious in his foreign 
policy and the Soviet government was sidestepping direct military 
confrontation with the United States in this period. Seen from 
hindsight and owing to a more advanced Sovietology than that on which 
such traditionalists had depended, a more reasonable explanation of 
Stalin's involvement in the decision making of the Korean War would be 
that he would not have wanted to incur a direct confrontation with the 
United States in a Korean war. On the other hand, the attrition 
theory which supposed on the part of Stalin such a far-reaching 
insight and adroit stratagem as anticipating irreconcilable US-Chinese 
relations brought out by the Korean conflict is too speculative to be 
seriously considered. The Chinese intervention in the Korean War was 
to counter the massive US intervention. In early 1950, such a
possibility of US intervention in a Korean 'civil' conflict had hardly 
been considered to be great among Kim IlSung, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung.
The Japan factor theory needs some notice; however, not as the prime
34motive of the Korean War, but as a side effect from the Korean War.
Whereas there is no conclusive evidence to establish the Stalin's
initiative theory, there is strong evidence to advocate the position
that the Korean War issue was first raised by Kim IlSung and later was 
approved and supported by Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. Khrushchev's
remarks on this matter is one such fragment of evidence though there 
is some reservation on the trustworthiness of the Remembers and his
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recollection of this matter. However, more tangible evidence on this 
question is the actual proceedings of North Korean preparation for the 
Korean War. During the period from late 1948 to early 1950, the 
strength of the KPA virtually tripled. The interesting thing is the 
process of this rapid expansion. The KPA expanded tangentially on two 
occasions. The first leap, which doubled the strength of the KPA as 
of late 1948 came in July to August 1949, mostly owing to the influx 
of about 20,000 Korean veterans who had served in the CCF. The second 
leap which increased by 50% the strength of the KPA as of late 1949 
came in March to May 1950. While the first leap was make up for the 
withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the second leap was wholly devoted to 
getting the KPA ready for the Korean War in the immediate future. It 
was during this period that large quantities of war materiel arrived 
in North Korea from the Soviet Union.
Through these events, there is no refuting that Soviet assistance 
and Chinese cooperation was enormous. However, the Soviet Union and 
PRC were, no matter how much they contributed to the expansion of the 
KPA, basically third parties. If main considerations are given to the 
substantial size of Soviet and Chinese cooperation and assistance, the 
North Korean initiative theory could be seen as too superficial. 
Thus, that Kim IlSung raised the idea of a Korean War first could be 
translated into the argument that Stalin got Kim IlSung to raise the 
idea f i r s t T h e  following sections of this chapter are devoted to 
refuting this kind of frame of reference and to showing that a strict 
conceptual distinction between North Korean initiative and Soviet and 
Chinese assistance is necessary and possible.
The crucial question raised by the communist leaders regarding the 
possibility of the success of the Korean adventure was the probability 
of US intervention in such a Korean war. Khrushchev quoted the remark 
that if the war should be a civil war and if it were won swiftly the 
United States would not intervene in the war. To examine this 
judgement of the communist leaders is an inquiry into the 
international causes of the Korean War. That the United States and 
the Soviet Union had not the same degree of commitment to Korea was
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one of the root causes of the Korean War. The basic position of the 
Russians was to extend their sphere of influence in Korea as far as 
possible. Whereas the Americans wanted to thwart such a Russian 
expansion towards Korea as early as possible. These different basic 
attitudes of the two powers influenced their Korean policy and 
strategy before the coming of the Korean War.^
Doubts about US firm stance in Korea began in late 1947 with the 
US bringing the Korean issue before the United Nations. In October 
1947 a United Nations Temporary Committee on Korea (UNTCOK) was set up 
to deal with the Korean issue. By the spring of 1948, the UNTCOK 
failed, as might have been anticipated, to settle the reunification 
and independence problems of all Korea. By September 1948, two 
governments appeared on each side of the 38th parallel. With the 
establishment of two separate governments in Korea, all foreign troops 
were to withdraw by the end of the year. There arose intense debates 
within the US government about the US responsibility for the security 
of South Korea. Concerned State Department officials maintained that 
the United States should consider the containment value of South Korea 
in the light of the China setback and Japan's security. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, however, had held since September 1947 that the 
United States had 'little strategic interest' in Korea. The eventual 
withdrawal of US troops from South Korea in June 1949 was the express 
conclusion regarding the ends-means relationship in the US security 
policy regarding South Korea. The withdrawal of US troops could,
understandably, be interpreted by the communist leaders as indicating
37that the United States would not intervene in a Korean war.
The changing atmosphere among US security planners from late 1949, 
to be embodied in the NSC-68 of April 1950, was not yet fully 
channelled into US foreign and defence policies as of early 1950. At 
that time, the NSC-68 was being conceived only among the highest 
political and military leaders of the US government. As a matter of 
fact, if the Korean war had not broken out in June 1950, the policy 
initiatives conceived in the NSC-68 would not have been put in 
practice in US foreign and defence policies so quickly. In this
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sense, the coming of the Korean war was, to US security planners, a
38'blessing'.0 It is understandable that under such circumstances, the 
communist leaders did not take seriously US intentions to intervene in 
a Korean war. Although Stalin reserved a condition that the war 
should be won swiftly lest the United States had any intention and 
chance of intervening, the reservation was overshadowed by the general 
mood and impression among the communist leaders of the Korean policy
of the US government in this period. That Mao Tse-tung saw a Korean
war as an internal matter and anticipated that the US government would
think in the same context is a reflection of such an understanding of
the US Korean policy by the communist leaders.
In the new year address of 1950, Kim IlSung declared:
The entire Korean people who are ushering in the New Year 
today, are confronted with the sublime task of materialising 
territorial integrity and national reunification as soon as 
possible through a year of fiercer struggle against US 
imperialists and the treacherous Syngman Rheeitesl^
They [the servicemen of the People's Army, the Security 
Forces and the Public Security Corps] will then be fully 
prepared, at all times, to dependably safeguard the 
victorious results of democratic reforms and annihilate the
enemy at any moment, in response to the call of the country
40and the people.
Victory is in store for the Korean people who have risen in 
their just struggle for the reunification and independence of 
the country, freedom and democracy. Let us march forward 
vigorously in this new year of 1950 to achieve new victories 
in the struggle for territorial integrity and national 
reunification. Long live the reunified Korean peopled
Following Kim IlSung's declaration, the KPA leadership, headed by
Ch'oe Yong-gon, Defence Minister, and Kim II, Chief of the Cultural
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Training Bureau, began to issue orders to the KPA troops to be 
prepared to sweep the enemy 'at any time'.^ So from the beginning of 
1950, an all-out war between the north and the south in the immediate 
future was becoming an open secret in North Korea. Intelligence 
sources in South Korea were also anticipating as much. But, to have 
information and to take necessary measures to correspond to that 
information are different things. The political and military 
leadership of South Korea was, while crying wolf repeatedly, not 
taking measures at their disposal to prepare for such an eventuality. 
Thus, a catastrophe was approaching to South Korea just with the 
beginning of the year 1950.^
The Expansion of the KPA
The expansion of the KPA started along with the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops in North Korea in December 1948. In late 1945, the 
Soviet occupation forces totalled an army of seven rifle divisions 
plus one motor-rifle division, one air force division, and some 
elements of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. By the time the Soviet 
government proposed to the US government the withdrawal of all foreign 
troops from Korea, in September 1947, the Soviet occupation forces in 
North Korea had already been reduced to an army corps of two divisions 
and some elements of air force.^ With the founding of the DPRK in 
September 1948, the Soviet government announced that it would withdraw 
its troops from North Korea by the end of 1948. On 26 December 1948, 
the Soviet government declared that its forces had withdrawn entirely 
from North Korea, (except for some scores of military advisers). The 
US government also scheduled to withdraw its forces from South Korea 
by the end of 1948. But, due to the worsening situation in South 
Korea at around the end of the 1948, especially due to the outbreak of 
a large-scale mutiny in the ROK army, the US withdrawal plan was 
altered to some extent. A regimental combat team of 7,500 men 
strength remained in South Korea until June 1949. In June 1949, the 
remaining US troops were also evacuated, leaving a Military Advisory 
Group to Korea (KMAG) of 500 men.
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Along with the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces, the 
Soviet government developed programmes for strengthening the KPA. In 
a working level meeting in early December 1948, chaired by N.A. 
Bulganin, Defence Minister, the Soviet government hammered out a plan 
as follows:
1. The KPA shall be strengthened to six shock divisions level. 
(As of December 1948, the KPA had three infantry divisions 
and one independent mixed brigade.)
2. For the organisation of more KPA divisions the Chinese 
Communist Force shall release 20,000 to 25,000 Korean troops 
in the CCF to North Korea.
3. Two tank divisions shall be organised with 500 tanks. The 
expansion of the air force was to be reserved for the time 
being, taking into consideration international problems it 
might evoke, (especially US apprehension to the security of 
Japan.)
4. All these programmes were to be implemented within 18 
months.
In late December 1948, a special Soviet military mission was sent 
to North Korea to work out this KPA expansion programme. The Soviet 
special military mission consisted of about forty high and middle 
ranking officers. T.P. Shtykov, the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea 
led the military mission. On its way to North Korea, the Soviet 
military mission convened a working-level conference in Harbin, 
northern Manchuria, to sort out the details of the repatriation of 
Korean troops in the CCF. From the Chinese side Zhou Bao-zhong 
represented the North-East Democratic Government (a provisional 
government in Manchuria established by Chinese communists.) (Zhou 
Bao-zhong was formerly Commander of the 88th Special Brigade under the 
command of Soviet Far East Military District, in the early 1940s.) 
Ch'oe Yong-gon, Defence Minister of North Korea, and Mu Chong, Deputy 
Defence Minister and the leader of the Chinese-affiliated Yenan group, 
represented the North Korean government. At this three-party
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conference, it was agreed that the Korean troops in the CCF should be 
sent to North Korea by September 1949 in two echelons. After making 
this settlement, the Soviet mission arrived in P'yongyang in mid- 
January 1949.^
The main function of the Soviet special military mission was two­
fold: first, to examine the soundness of the Moscow-made KPA expansion 
programme, based on their first hand estimate of the KPA and the
Korean troops in the CCF, and the situation of the North Korean 
economy to support the KPA; secondly, to augment the existing Soviet 
military advisers headed by Major-General Smirnov. The high-ranking 
officers of the military mission were mainly to fulfill the first
function and soon returned to Moscow after they acquired needed 
answers. For instance, Lieutenant-General Kubanov, armour specialist, 
altered the original plan of two tank divisions, taking into
consideration the rugged mountainous terrain of Korea. Instead, the 
KPA was to have one tank division, receiving 150 tanks first, and 100 
tanks later. The mid-ranking officers of the military mission were 
mainly specialists in armoured units and air force and they remained 
in North Korea until April 1950. (In April 1950, an operation team of 
a dozen Soviet officers, headed by Lieutenant-General Vasiliev, 
arrived in North Korea to work out the war plan for the Korean war.)
Before the arrival of the armour and air force specialists, the Soviet 
military advisory group, headed by Major-General Smirnov, had been 
mainly engaged in organising and training the basic units of the KPA. 
Augmented by the special military mission, the Soviet military 
advisory group was, from early 1949, geared to transforming the 
rudimentary light infantry divisions of the KPA into heavily-equipped 
'shock divisions’.^
On the significance of the Moscow decision of December 1948 on the 
expansion of the KPA and the role of the Soviet special military 
mission there have been some theories. For instance, there is a claim 
that the Moscow meeting of December 1948 (or the Moscow special 
strategic conference, according to this claim) was the very time and 
place in which the Korean war decision was made among the Soviet
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government and representatives of North Korea and Chinese 
communists.4® Even though it is acceptable that the Soviet government 
was intent on building up of the KPA for 'a possible Korean war', it 
is not likely that it made the Korean war decision at this stage. 
(Discussion on the timing and process of the Korean War decision among 
the communist leaders is produced in the preceding section.)
There is also a speculation that North Korean and Chinese
communist delegates attended the Moscow meeting of December 1948,
which is very doubtful. At the Harbin conference held in early
January 1949, just weeks after the Moscow meeting, North Korean and
Chinese communists were represented by Ch’oe Yong-gon and Zhou Bao-
zhong, perhaps the highest officials, except for Kim IlSung and Mao
Tse-tung, for this kind of occasion. If they had attended the 'Moscow
special strategic conference' they did not have to attend the Harbin
conference again. Lesser men would have been enough to sort out
details. Conversely speaking, it seems more reasonable to assume that
the Harbin conference of January 1949 was the first session in which
the Soviet special military mission conferred with representatives of
North Korea and Chinese communists on the expansion programme of the
KPA, especially on the repatriation of Korean troops in the CCF. It
leads to a conclusion that the Moscow meeting of December 1948 was
basically a working level meeting among high officials in the Soviet
Ministry of Defence. It is possible to assume that some North Korean
or Chinese officers were invited to the meeting for consultation
40
purpose; however, no more than that.
Another susceptible theory on the Moscow decision of December 1948 
was that the Soviet government decided to increase the size of the KPA 
to a total of 22 divisions in the future. The 22 divisions the KPA 
was to have, according to this theory, comprised the following; six 
shock divisions, manoeuvre troops composed of eight first line 
divisions, and a reserve force of eight divisions.®® The absurdity of 
this claim is evident when one thinks of the actual strength of the 
KPA at the beginning of the Korean War. On 25 January 1950, the KPA 
had seven infantry divisions (the so-called shock divisions) plus
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armoured troops equivalent to one tank division (interestingly, the 
total of which is eight first line divisions). Three under-strength 
infantry divisions were to follow the first line divisions. In
addition to these KPA troops, three security brigades under the
Ministry of the Interior could expand into infantry divisions in some 
weeks. By any standards the KPA had no more than 14 divisions, eighth 
first line divisions and six half-strength divisions (in average.) 
So, at least the 22 division KPA (if any), was not the one which the 
Soviet government envisioned in December 1948, to be built within 18 
months.
Then, what was the reasoning of the Soviet government behind the
Moscow decision of December 1948? It is noteworthy that the KPA
strength at the beginning of the Korean War was at least one and a 
half times larger than the KPA strength planned in Moscow in December
1948. Added forces compared to the Moscow plan were the following: 
one infantry division manned by Korean veterans in the CCF; three 
reserve divisions; one air force division; and a small size, coast 
guard-type navy. Notably, most of these reinforcements were made 
during the spring of 1950, that is after the Korean War decision had 
supposedly been made among the communist leaders of North Korea, the 
Soviet Union, and the PRC. So it is important to see the Moscow plan 
of December 1948 per se, not to be confused with the invasion force- 
level of the KPA in June 1950.^
Evidently, the Moscow plan intended, at least for the time being, 
to build a KPA of six infantry divisions and one tank division. At 
the end of 1948, the KPA had three infantry divisions, one mixed 
brigade, and one tank regiment. Interestingly, Soviet troops which 
were to withdraw from North Korea by the end of 1948 were two division 
forces. It is understandable that security planners in the Soviet 
Union and North Korea might have felt a strong need to raise the 
proper size of KPA troops to make up for the two Soviet divisions. 
Opportunely, there were about 25,000 Korean troops - two division size 
- in the CCF, who were soon to be available for this purpose with the 
closing of the Chinese Civil War. As mentor of the North Korean
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regime, the Soviet government should have felt obliged to get its 
client to have the semblance of a sizable modern, regular army. Six 
divisions augmented by a sizable armoured unit would rather fit that 
purpose. In conclusion, as of late 1948, the major concerns of the 
Soviet government was to upgrade the KPA to some normal standard first
Cl
rather than to rush preparations for a Korean war. 4
The build-up of the mechanised unit in the KPA was made visible in
May 1949 with the formation of the 105th Tank Brigade. The 105th Tank
Regiment formed in December 1948 was the nucleus of the newly
activated 105th Tank Brigade. After the Soviet special military 
mission arrived in January 1949, the 105th Tank Regiment had been 
undergoing rapid expansion and intensive training. The 105th Tank 
Brigade had three tank regiments, each with 40 tanks. The 1st Tank 
Regiment was called the 107th Tank Regiment in code name; likewise the 
2nd, 109th; and the 3rd, 203rd. In addition, the brigade consisted of 
the following units: the 208th Tank Training Regiment; the 206th 
Motorized Infantry Regiment; one artillery group with 64 piece SU-76 
self-propelled guns; the 303rd Motorcycle Cavalry; one engineer 
battalion; one maintenance company; and a medical unit. The table of 
organisation strength of the brigade was 6,000 men. In August 1949, 
the 603rd Motorcycle Training Cavalry was added to the brigade. By 
the end of August 1949, the 105th Tank Brigade reached a tank division 
in all but name having 150 tanks and 8,800 men.
During July to August 1949, about 20,000 Korean troops in the CCF 
arrived in North Korea. In late July 1949, the all-Korean 166th 
Division arrived in Sinuiju under the command of Bang Ho-san, 
political commissar of the division. The division was reorganised 
into the 6th Division of the KPA. Bang Ho-san was appointed Commander 
of the 6th Division. In early August 1949 the 164th Division arrived 
in Nanam under the command of Kim Ch'ang-dok, vice commander of the 
division. The 164th Division was reorganised into the 5th Division of 
the KPA. Kim Ch'ang-dok was appointed Commander of the 5th Division. 
In addition, another 2,000 Korean troops in the CCF arrived in North
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Korea in August 1949. They were organised into the 603rd Motorcycle 
Regiment.
The Korean troops in the CCF divisions were seasoned soldiers 
through the anti-Japanese war and the Chinese Civil War. The origin 
of the 166th Division was Yi Hong-kwang unit, which was originated 
from the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA). The advance column of the KVA 
which failed to enter North Korea in November 1945, due to the denial 
of the Soviet occupation authorities in North Korea, moved to Tunhwa, 
southern Manchuria. By February 1946, the KVA column reached a 
strength of 8,000 men by recruiting Korean youths around there. From 
the spring of 1946 many cadre members of this unit were sent to North 
Korea by an agreement among the Soviet occupation authorities in North 
Korea, their North Korean prot6g6s and Chinese communist leaders, to
form the cadres of the Security Cadres Training Centres. The 
remaining members of the unit were organised into a Yi Hong-kwang unit 
named after a legendary hero in the anti-Japanese struggle in 
Manchuria in the early 1930s. (Yi Hong-kwang was one of the
organisers of the North East People's Revolutionary Army (NEPRA), a 
forerunner of the North East Anti-Japanese United Army (NEAJUA). He 
was killed in action in May 1935 at the age of 26 years.) In February 
1947, the Yi Hong-kwang unit was reorganised into the Independent 4th 
Division of the North East Democratic United Army, which was then 
under the command of Lin Piao. In June 1948 the Independent 4th 
Division was redesignated the 166th Division of the 56th Army Corps of 
the CCF. As of July 1949 when the division was about to move to North 
Korea, it was stationed in the Mukden area, southern Manchuria. (By 
that time the Chinese Civil War was almost at an end.)
The origin of the 164th Division was different from the 166th 
Division. The 164th Division was originally the product of the CCF. 
Some of the Korean troops in the division were veterans in the anti- 
Japanese war; though, the majority of the Korean troops in the 
division were veterans of the Chinese Civil War. In July 1949 all 
non-Korean soldiers of the division were transferred to other CCF
units and in their place the division received Korean soldiers from
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other CCF units. When the division was transferred to North Korea in 
early August, the Korean soldiers of the division totalled 7,500 men. 
In addition to these veterans from the CCF, the 5th Division received 
an additional 3,500 KPA troops to conform to the force-level of the 
standard KPA division.^
With the activation of the 5th and 6th Divisions, three existing
divisions of the KPA, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions, moved
southwards. In June 1949, the 3rd Division in Wonsan area moved to
P'yonggang area, Kwangwon Province. In July 1949 the 2nd Division 
stationed in Nanam area moved to Hamhumg area, South Hamkyong
Province. In September 1949 the 1st Division in Kaech'on moved to
Namch'on area, Hwanghae Province. Thus, by late 1949, KPA divisions
were deployed throughout North Korea as the following: the 1st
Division in Hwanghae Province; the 2nd, in Kangwon Province; the 3rd, 
in South Hamkyong Province; the 5th, in North Hamkyong Province; and 
the 6th, in North P'yongan Province. In South P'yongan Province, the 
4th Independent Mixed Brigade, which was to be elevated to the 4th 
Division in April 1950, was stationed. In October 1949, two tank 
regiments of the 105th Tank Brigade moved south; the 109th Tank 
Regiment to Namch'on, Hwanghae Province; and the 203rd Tank Regiment 
to Ch'orwon, Kangwon Province. (Until the 1st and 3rd Divisions and 
109th and 203rd Tank Regiments were deployed the border area along the 
38th parallel, covering Kangwon Province and Hwanghae Province, had
been guarded by the 1st and 3rd Security Brigades under the Ministry
of the Interior.) Thus, the arrival of the Korean troops in the CCF
in mid-1949 served a moment for the overall adjustment of the
S7deployment of the KPA divisions.
Kim IlSung and the KPA leadership, which was predominantly manned 
by Kim IlSung's faithful lieutenants and some Soviet-Koreans, took 
some ambivalent attitudes towards these Korean veterans from the CCF. 
The incorporation of these veterans into the KPA was a very effective 
and economic way of strengthening the KPA in a short time. However, 
the veterans had been developing their own identity in terms of 
origins, composition, combat skills and tactics, discipline, and
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esprit de corps. Kim IlSung was seriously concerned over this matter. 
In a speech delivered to the officers of the 6th Division on 29 July 
1949, Kim IlSung told them as follows:
You must not feel complacent just because you have a little 
combat experience nor should you relax in a peaceful mood, as
GQ
you are back home.
You are hardened and experienced through battles. But you 
have no experience of regular army life. This you must learn 
from those comrades who have large service records in the 
People's Army. The soldiers who have served in the People's 
Army since its found-ation can be regarded as worthy of the 
name of a regular army in the main. So you had better learn 
humbly from them what you do not know^
The tone of Kim IlSung's speech was hardly considered to be free of 
some enmity towards the veterans who had not been fostered by him.
Owing to this attitude of the North Korean leadership, the influx 
of the Korean veterans from the CCF into the KPA did not alter the 
make-up of the high command of the KPA. Bang Ho-san and Kim Ch'ang- 
dok were to remain divisional commanders by September 1950. The 
political and military leaders of the Yenan group such as Kim Tu-bong 
(the symbolic president of the 'republic'), Mu Chong (Deputy Defence 
Minister), or Kim Ung (Chief of the Combat Training Bureau), felt much 
affection for the Korean veterans from China. However, they were 
being circumscribed themselves by Kim IlSung and his followers at that 
time. So they could barely help the veterans but for moral support.^ 
In short, the Chinese-affiliated Korean veterans were treated by Kim 
IlSung and his followers not as partners but as subsidiaries. Unlike 
the situation in late 1945 when the Soviet occupation authorities and 
its Korean protdges were under the apprehension that the influx of 
Chinese affiliated-Korean Volunteer Army troops into North Korea would 
hamper their dominance in North Korea, in late 1949, Kim IlSung and 
his followers were in firm control of the North Korean regime to the
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extent of being able to manage a sizeable, seasoned force which was, 
in many points, alien to them.
The Pseudo-Warfare Between North and South Korea
From late 1948 to early 1950 tensions between North and South 
Korea were rapidly intensifying and frequently ruptured into open 
hostilities, precipitating a large-scale collision between the two 
sides in the not-so-distant future. These armed conflicts in this 
period can be grouped into two categories: first, guerrilla
provocations inside South Korea conducted by south Korean communists; 
and secondly, collisions along the 38th parallel between North Korean 
security forces and South Korean army troops. In both categories the 
involvement of the (regular) KPA troops was cautiously limited to the 
minimal level, while the ROK army divisions were almost 
single-handedly engaged in meeting these challenges from both inside 
and outside. By late November 1949, conflicts along the 38th parallel 
reached a temporary lull, which lasted in an ominous mood, until June 
1950. Guerrilla provocations by south Korean communists continued 
intermittently until March 1950. By that time most of the communist 
guerrillas were wiped out by ROK Army troops and in March 1950 the 
south Korean communists leadership staying in North Korea suddenly 
discontinued dispatching more guerrillas to South Korea. This move 
was received by South Korean officials as something very suspicious.^1
Guerrilla provocations by south Korean communists against South 
Korean authorities (before August 1948, the USAMGIK) started after the 
'October People's Strife' in October 1946 (according to the USAMGIK, 
the 'October Riot'). Some communists or left-wingers who escaped from 
the police of the military government infiltrated into mountainous 
areas of North Kyongsang Province and Kangwon Province and organised 
some 'field units.' After the '2.7 Save-the-Nation Struggle' in 
February 1948 which was intended to sabotage the UNTCOK, the South 
Korean Workers' Party (SKWP) set up a military department. Large 
scale armed struggle by south Korean communists started from the '4.3
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Riot' which broke out in Cheju Island in April 1948. Under the 
instruction of the provincial party leadership of the SKWP, about 500 
armed communists and 3,000 left-wing youths attacked police stations 
and government buildings all over the island on 3 April 1948. 
Fighting between rebels and government troops was to continue 
intermittently until May 1949.^
In October 1948, just two months after the establishment of the 
ROK government, a large-scale mutiny broke out among ROK Army troops, 
agitated by south Korean communists. On 19 October 1948, some 40 
communists in the 14th Regiment, which was about to embark for Cheju 
Island to reinforce the punitive force there, staged a coup and turned 
the regiment into a 'People's Liberation Army'. Officers who resisted 
were executed on the spot. Lieutenant Kim Chi-hoe, member of the 
Military Department of the SKWP, took command of the mutiny. (Kim 
Chi-hoe was a graduate of the 3rd class of the Korean Military Academy 
in 1947.) Altogether 3,000 troops joined or were forced into the 
mutiny. It was astonishing that so many ROK Army troops became at any 
rate involved in the mutiny. The fact was that during this period the 
ROK Army had become a sort of hotbed for south Korean communists. The 
USAMGIK which had fostered the Korean Constabulary, the forerunner of 
the ROK Army, failed to give due attention to the ideological 
backgrounds of the incoming recruits to the constabulary. As a bad 
result, many south Korean communists succeeded in infiltrating into 
the constabulary during 1946 to 1947. The mutiny of October 1948 was 
a drastic exposure of this communist infiltration into the ROK Army.^
The mutiny soon spread to Yosu-Sunch'on area, southeastern part of 
South Cholla Province. The ROK government dispatched a punitive force 
of two brigades to quell the mutiny. The punitive force was commanded 
by Brigadier General Song Ho-song, Commander-in-Chief of the ROK Army. 
The great concern of the South Korean political and military 
leadership was on whether the mutiny would spread to other regiments 
of the army. Such a worst scenario did not materialise at that time. 
(However, such a worry was not ungrounded. In early November 1948, in 
the 6th Regiment stationed in Taegu, North Kyongsang Province, a
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communist-led mutiny broke out although the mutiny did not develop on
such a large scale as Yosu-Sunch'on Mutiny. Even a regimental
commander of the punitive forces participating in the Yosu-Sunch’on 
operation was later found to be guilty of collaborating with the
leadership of the mutiny.) The government troops recovered
Yosu-Sunch'on area by 27 October 1949, ten days after the mutiny broke 
out. According to the account of the ROK government, about 1,200 
civilians and government officials were killed, 400 rebels were killed 
and 2,300 rebels were captured. About 1,000 rebels retreated to the 
Chiri Mountain area, which was to be the principal stronghold of the 
south Korean communist guerrillas for the following four years.^
Alarmed by the Yosu-Sunch'on Mutiny and the subsequent mutiny in 
the 6th Regiment, the ROK government set out to thoroughly purge 
communist and pro-communist elements in the ROK Army. By July 1949 
altogether 4,800 officers and soldiers were purged from the army. 
Considering that the total strength of the ROK Army as of May 1949 was 
about 70,000 men, the scale of the purge and its impacts upon the 
whole structure of the army were beyond description. Ironically, 
owing to this thorough purge of communist-affiliated elements from its 
rank-and-file, when the genuine war broke out in June 1950, the ROK 
Army leadership could have confidence in the loyalty of its troops. 
So, in a sense, for the ROK government and its army, the Yosu-Sunch'on 
Mutiny was a 'misfortune turned into a blessing'.^
On the part of the SKWP leadership, the Yosu-Sunch'on Mutiny was 
an unwise adventure in terms of its overall consequence. It is true 
that the mutiny was a serious embarrassment to the ROK government. 
However, the ROK government was able to crush the mutiny within a 
short time. On the other hand, the mutiny came to expose secret 
organisations of the SKWP in the ROK Army, abruptly and absurdly. In 
fact, the mutiny was an isolated incident initiated by local members 
of the SKWP. It was not one which was centrally planned and 
coordinated by the highest leadership of the SKWP. (At the initial 
stage, the leader of the mutiny was Master Sergeant Chi Ch'ang-su, a 
local SKWP member. It was only after a while that Lt. Kim Chi-hoe
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took the command of the mutiny after revealing his membership in the 
Military Department of the SKWP.) North Korean communists were even 
less affiliated with this mutiny. This is because Kim IlSung called 
the incident 'the Mutiny of the National Defence Army Unit,' unlike 
the 2.7 Save-the-Nation Struggle or the 4.3 People's Strife.^
Encouraged by the unrest in the ROK Army, from November 1948 the 
communist leaders in North Korea stepped up guerrilla provocations in 
South Korea. The south Korean communist leadership was made the main 
agent of this new 'southern strategy'. The guerrilla provocations in 
South Korea from November 1948 to early 1950, led by the SKWP 
leadership, can be grouped into two categories in terms of the origins 
of these guerrilla fighters. One group was made of those who became 
'mountain men' after such occasions as the 'October People's Strife' 
in 1946 or the '2.7 Save-the-Nation Struggle' and the '4.3 Cheju 
People's Strife', in early 1948, plus fugitives from the ROK Army 
after the Yosu-Sunch'on Mutiny and the 6th Regiment Mutiny. Among 
them elite communists were small in number. Many of them were simple 
dissidents agitated by communist ringleaders. Another group was made 
of those who were dispatched from North Korea to lead and augment the 
former group. Most of them were ardent, professional communists who 
defected to North Korea since late 1946. They received political and 
military training in the Kangdong Political Institute. (The Kangdong 
Political Institute was founded in Kangdong, near P'yongyang in 
mid-1947 to accommodate defectors from South Korea. The political 
institute was under direct control of Yi Sung-yop, a faithful 
lieutenant of Pak Hon-yong and, in fact, the power base of the SKWP
leadership.) Thus, the composition of the guerilla fighters in South
hiKorea before the Korean War was rather a mixed one.
By September 1949 three corps of the 'People's Guerrilla Forces' 
were organised. The 1st Corps, with a strength of 360 men, was 
operating in Odae Mountain area, Kangwon Province. Yi Ho-je was 
commander of the corps. He was once Superintendent of the Kangdong 
Political Institute. The 2nd Corps, with a strength of 500 men, was 
operating in Chiri Mountain area, South Choila Province. The 2nd
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Corps was commanded by Yi Hyon-sang, a veteran communist who had 
participated in communist activities from the early 1920s together 
with Pak Hon-yong. The 2nd Corps included most of the remaining 
rebels in the Yosu-Sunch'on Mutiny. The 3rd Corps, with 300 men, was 
commanded by Kim Dal-sam, leader of the '4.3 People's Strife' in 
Ch'eju Island in April 1948. The 3rd Corps was operating in Bohyon 
Mountain area, North Kyongsang Province^ .®
The high tide of the guerrilla activities was the 'September
Offensive' staged from July to September 1949. Responding to the
Manifesto of the DFRF, produced on 28 June 1949, which called for 
nation-wide general elections to be held in September 1949 to form a 
unified Korean government, underground organisations and guerrilla 
units under the control of the SKWP leadership began to intensify 
armed struggle over all South Korea. During this offensive, more than
2600 encounters between communist guerrillas and ROK police and armed
forces were reported, according to the claims of the SKWP leadership. 
About 4,000 South Korean armed persons were reportedly killed 
according to the claim.^ The ROK government stepped up punitive 
operations against these guerrillas from late September 1949. The 
punitive operations lasted almost six months until March 1950. The 
guerrillas suffered unbearable defeat during this period. By March 
1950 all but 300 survivors were wiped out by the ROK punitive forces. 
(The total strength of dispatched guerrillas from North Korea during 
November 1948 to March 1950 amounted to about 2,400 men in ten 
echelons). The loss of more than 2,000 crack communists in the armed 
struggle in South Korea from late 1948 to early 1950 was a severe blow 
to the SKWP leadership, considering their ever weakening position in
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the North Korean regime in this period.
The causes of the collapse of the guerrilla provocations were as 
follows. First of all, the communist guerrillas failed to gain the 
support of the people in the south. The bloodshed incurred by the 
Yosu-Sunch'on Mutiny in October 1948 alarmed most of the south Korean 
people on possible consequences of 'liberation' by communists. On the 
other hand the ROK government staged successful political and military
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campaigns to wipe out the guerrillas. Many of ROK Army officers had
experienced punitive operations against Korean and Chinese communist
guerrillas in Manchuria before 1945 when they served in the Japanese
Army or the Manchukuo Army. They were well aware of the principal
rule in counter-insurgency operations - to cut off the rebels from the
people. Chased by South Korean punitive troops, from October 1949,
the guerrillas were forced to retreat to deep mountains. In terms of
terrain such areas as could serve guerrillas sanctuary were not many
in south Korea. The South Korean punitive troops encircled these
guerillas with overwhelming strength and launched attacks repeatedly
until the guerrillas were wiped out. As of March 1950, some surviving
guerrillas, no more than 300 men in all, almost ceased their
activities and were to remain latent, mostly in Chiri Mountain area,
71until they re-emerged in the summer of 1950.
Another major cause of the failure was the SKWP leadership 
stationed in the north. They were not well informed of the real state
of guerrilla activities in the south. Communication between the
leadership and guerrilla fighters in the south was poor and the 
leaders tended to exaggerate the 'achievements' of the guerrillas, 
partly out of wishful thinking, and partly out of their need to prove 
their usefulness in the North Korean regime. So the leadership often 
gave improper instructions to the guerrillas in the south, which 
eventually precipitated the collapse of the guerrilla activities. On 
the other hand North Korean communist leadership took an ambivalent 
position towards the guerrillas in the south. While taking the 
position that the armed struggle in the south was mainly the 
responsibility of the SKWP leadership, the North Korean communist
leadership remained, somehow, impassive to the elimination of south 
Korean communist guerrillas. When the guerrillas were on the verge of 
extinction in the winter of 1949-50, the North Korean leadership 
neither altered their original Korean war plan to rescue the 
guerrillas nor gave substantial support to the SKWP leadership. The
guerrillas were, in a sense, a victim of the enmity between the North
72and South Korean communist leadership.
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Border conflicts along the 38th parallel started from early 1949. 
In January 1949, ROK Army troops were deployed along the border area 
in place of withdrawing US troops. Until this time, the 38th parallel 
was a demarcation line rather than a front-line between the north and 
south. The US troops had not established fortified positions along 
the parallel. They had installed only some sentry boxes and military 
barracks in the border area. North of the parallel, two security 
brigades under the Ministry of the Interior were deployed by February
1949. The North Korean security forces first assumed security 
missions from July 1947 in place of the withdrawing Soviet troops. 
The strength of these security forces remained rather modest at 
two-battalion level until mid-1948P
In August 1948, the 3rd Security Brigade was organised with four 
battalions and assumed security duty along the 38th parallel 
exclusively. In September 1948 the 3rd Security Brigade received two 
more battalions. In February 1949, the 1st Security Brigade moved to
Kansong, Kangwon Province, and assumed the security mission of the
eastern half of the border area along the 38th parallel. The 3rd
Security Brigade was to take charge of the rest, the western half of
the border area. From late 1948 the security forces began to fortify 
their positions. By the time the ROK Army troops were deployed along 
the parallel in January 1949, the North Korean security forces had 
already established much more favourable defence positions than the 
ROK Army troops. Newly deployed ROK Army troops felt an urgent need 
to strengthen their positions to counter the North Korean security
forces. Clashes between the two sides started, in most cases, from a
competition to gain topographical superiority. And once started, the
74clashes were to develop often into reciprocal clashes.
Large scale clashes between the two sides started from May 1949. 
The clashes continued intermittently until November 1949. Major 
clashes during this period were as follows: the Kaesong area conflict
in early May; the Ongjin area conflict from late May to late June, and
in early August; the Yangyang area conflict in early July: and the
Ill
Ch1unchon area conflict in early August; the Ongjin area conflict in 
mid-October to mid-November. According to the account of the ROK 
Army, 874 clashes and conflicts involving squads and larger units
7 c
broke out between the two sides in 1949. On the other hand, North 
Korea claimed that the South Korean army and police forces made '2617
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incursions' north of the 38th parallel. By any account the scale of 
the 'small war' between North and South Korea in 1949 was obviously 
predicting a head-on collision between the two sides in the not-so- 
distant future.
It has been open to controversy which side was more to blame for 
the border conflicts in 1949. North Korea has claimed, since the 
Korean War, that the border conflicts were a prelude to the 'Northward 
Expedition' by the South Korean rulers - 'for occupation of North 
Korea by force of arms.' According to their claim:
The "US Military Advisory Group" and the South Korean rulers 
pursued the following aims in herding out the puppet army and 
police for armed intrusions into the areas north of the 38th 
parallel!7
The first aim was to confirm whether the puppet army and
police were "ready for action" and to increase their "combat 
18capabilities."
The second aim was to cause social disorder and unrest in 
North Korea by setting fire to farm villages and houses and 
killing and kidnapping the innocent people in the areas north 
of the 38th parallel!^
The third aim sought by the United States and the South 
Korean rulers in the armed intrusion was to reconnoitre the 
defence positions of the DPRK People's Security Forces and
capture the tactical vantage points for their full-scale
80invasion in the future.
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Geared to such aims, the armed intrusions of the US 
imperialists and the South Korean rulers were not mere 
limited conflicts of local character from the outset. They
often developed into large-scale actions fraught with the
01
danger of expanding into a total war.
The core of the North Korean claim is that in early 1949, the 
South Korean government and its American supporters were preparing a 
'northward expedition.' The following are the examples of such 
'evidence' to establish this theory, produced by the official history 
of North Korea:
Referring to the tasks of the "ROK army" for 1949, Chae Byong 
Dok, Chief of the General Staff of the "ROK army", blared
out: "In the New Year we will take practical action to
87restore the lost territory and unify the homeland. [In 
fact, Chae Byong-dok was not Chief of Staff of the ROK army 
at that time, but Brigadier Yi Ung-jun was.]
Chang Taek Sang, Foreign Minister of the puppet government,
..., said: "The ROK government will not hesitate to take
military action against the north in order to recover the
in
usurped territory.
... On 9 March, 1945, Yun Chi Yong, Home Minister of the 
puppet government, remarked: "The only way of reunifying
North and South Korea is for the ROK to restore the lost 
territory, North Korea, by force." He openly disclosed that 
they regarded the "march-north unification" as one and the 
only way of reunification and had the intention to realize
These remarks by South Korean leaders were real. However, how to 
interpret this 'evidence' in the context of the then domestic and 
international situation of the ROK government requires great caution. 
In spite of frequent appeals of the South Korean political and
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military leaders for 'Northward Expedition1, it is very doubtful 
whether they were seriously contemplating a 'northward expedition' at 
that stage. Rather it seems that the cry for 'northward expedition' 
was in fact intended to serve certain political needs of South Korean 
leaders in this period. In the aftermath of the Yosu-Sunch'on Mutiny 
and subsequent great purge in the army, there was, understandably, a 
strong need for building up the shaken morale and prestige of the 
army. There was also a strong mood among the military leaders that 
the North Korean regime was the prime mover of such a vortex and 
therefore should be punished. It is most likely that the 'northward 
expedition' campaign was reflecting such a need and mood among the 
South Korean political and military leaders.
As tangible evidence to establish the theory that the 'northward 
expedition' campaign was in nature a 'policy of bluff', it is helpful 
to examine the financial situation of the ROK government and its 
military capability at that time. Financially, in early 1949, the 
subsistence of the ROK government itself was at stake. The national 
budget for the year 1949 contained a deficit of 40.5 per cent of the 
total amount of settlement. Expenditure for defence and security
Q£
accounted for 47 per cent of the total expenditure. A North Korean
account claimed that 'this clearly shows that the South Korean rulers
87went to extremes in armament expansion. The fact was that, the ROK 
government could barely sustain its defence and police forces, even 
with such a high portion allotted for defence and security. As of 
March 1949, the 65,000 men ROK Army had the weaponry and equipment 
prepared for a 50,000 man army, since another 15,000 men exceeded the
DQ
ceiling agreed upon between the ROK and US governments. As such, 
South Korea at that time was not in a position to plan an expedition.
It is suggestive that at that time the North Korean leadership, in 
fact, minimised the 'northward expedition' campaign and did not take 
the 'threat' from the south seriously, saying:
Some of the South Korean quislings call for a fratricidal
war, clamouring for a 'northern expedition' like a puppy who
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is not afraid of a tiger (emphasis by author, a Korean
00
proverb).
It seems they do not comprehend what the 'northern 
expedition' would bring them. ... If the pro-Japanese 
elements, traitors to the nation and other reactionaries dare 
to conduct a 'northern expedition' they will be completely 
annihilated by the united and awakened Korean people and
on
their armed forces.
During 22 February 1949 to 7 April 1949, Kim IlSung and six other 
members of the North Korean cabinet were visiting the Soviet Union 
while the 'northward expedition' campaign was allegedly intensifying 
in the south. The security forces along the 38th parallel were not 
exchanged for or augmented by KPA divisions. Two KPA divisions and 
two tank regiments were placed behind the security brigades but they 
were not involved in the fighting with ROK divisions throughout the 
whole border conflicts period. It is noteworthy that the North Korean 
claim, that the border conflicts in 1949, 'challenged by South Korea' 
was a part of the well-mapped out war plan by South Korea and the 
United States, was put forward mainly after the situation of the 
Korean War deteriorated. As of early 1949 the North Korean leadership
Q1
did not take the northward expedition campaign seriously.
Due to the fact that the South Korean leadership had not genuinely 
considered a northward expedition in those days and the North Korean 
leadership was actually ignoring the South Korean campaign as a 
'policy of bluff,' border conflicts had remained limited throughout 
1949 though they often ruptured into conflicts involving regimental 
size units on both sides. Certainly as of early 1949 neither side 
anticipated an all-out war between the north and the south in the 
immediate future (say, in a couple of months) and until late 1949 
neither of them was prepared to launch such a war, or had confidence 
in its preparation for such an adventure. But enmity between the two 
sides, especially among troops deployed along the 38th parallel was so 
deep that open hostilities were almost inevitable. The small war
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along the 38th parallel during 1949 was a kind of limited war in these
circumstances. It would be an exaggeration to say that either or both
the North and South Korean leadership pursued a well-conceived limited 
war strategy or they had developed a good mechanism of crisis
management between them. However, in terms of consequence, the border
Q?conflicts remained limited until the lull at the end of 1949.
Within the context of a limited war, the border conflicts in 1949 
were conducted mainly by local commanders on both sides. The 
political leaderships or higher military leaderships of both sides 
were not often directly involved in the conduct of this 'small' war. 
In these circumstances, local commanders of both sides along the 38th 
parallel were given wide range of freedom of action, Many of the ROK 
Army commanders were ex-officers in the Japanese Army or the Manchukuo 
Army which emphasised bold initiative of local commanders. They had 
the inclination to underestimate North Korean troops, recollecting 
their experiences in the punitive operations against 'communist bands' 
in Manchuria. The famous vouching by Brigadier General Kim Sok-won,
an ex-colonel in the Japanese Army renowned for his bravery, was a 
typical example of this kind. He said that 'If order is given to us, 
we can have lunch in P'yongyang and dinner in Sinuiju, (a border city 
between North Korea and Manchuria.^ On the other hand, North Korean 
commanders of the Security Brigades were no lesser men than ROK 
commanders. Ch'oe Hyon's toughness had been legendary since the early 
1930's. The small war between the north and the south in 1949 should 
be understood in the context of taking into consideration this 
unusually wide range of freedom of action given to local commanders of 
both sides and the bitter enmity between them.
From late 1948 to early 1950 a state of pseudo-war between North 
Korea and South Korea continued, in the form of guerrilla provocations 
inside South Korea and border conflicts along the 38th parallel. 
Through this pseudo- war, the ROK Army was much shaken and attrited
while the KPA was left to remain intact. It affected the ROK army in 
two ways: first, it reduced the readiness of the ROK Army by cutting
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down on training and using up scarce supplies; and secondly and no 
less significantly, the South Korean political and military leaders 
got conceited, to some extent, by the successes they brought in 
quelling the guerrilla provocations and in confining the border 
conflicts. The latter point is worthy of more consideration in 
analysing the poor performance of the ROK Army in the initial phase of 
the Korean War.
The Last Preparations for the War
Another expansion of the KPA which was to strengthen it to a war 
footing began from December 1949. In December 1949, a Naval 
Headquarters was established. Han Il-mu, a Soviet-Korean was 
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the North Korean Navy. The North 
Korean Navy was not an independent service and the commander-in-chief 
of the navy was equivalent to an army corps commander in rank. (North 
Korea has not adopted a tri-service system since.) Under its command, 
the Naval Headquarters had three regional garrison commands, the Naval 
Academy, and the Naval Training Centre. The North Korean Navy had a 
small flotilla of 35 vessels, totalling 5,500 tonnage. All but 4 
torpedo boats were small patrol crafts and transportation ships. The 
four torpedo boats introduced from the Soviet Union in December 1949 
were, in effect, the main attack force of the North Korean Navy.
Therefore the North Korean Navy could hardly be called a 'navy' in the
q;
accepted use of the word.
The bulk of the North Korean Navy in this period were infantry 
battalions deployed along the coast line. The total strength of the 
navy in December 1949 was about 15,000 men, out of which more than 80 
per cent were infantry or coast artillery troops. The 1st Garrison 
Command in Ch'ongjin had about 4,000 men; the 2nd, in Wonsan had about 
4,800 men and the 3rd, in Chinnampo, about 5,000 men. Those 13,000 
men were, in fact, soldiers or marines rather than sailors. They were 
formerly in the coast guard battalions under the Ministry of the 
Interior. Their equipment and mission were almost identical with
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those of other security forces under the Ministry of the Interior, 
such as the 38th Parallel Security Brigades, or the Railway Security 
Brigade. With the beginning of the Korean War the small 'fleet' of 
the North Korean Navy was soon wiped out by the UN naval forces.
Following this development, the naval forces under Han I1-mu were
transformed into KPA divisions and brigades. This extraordinary 
arrangement shows clearly the limited nature of the North Korean Navy 
in this period. However, when the Naval Headquarters was established 
in December 1949, it was intended to be a step forward in the 
preparation for the war.^
At the same time (December 1949) an air division was organised, by
enlarging the Air Regiment which had been in training state since
January 1949. (The origin of the Air Regiment was the Air Company
which was organised in June 1946 under the P'yongyang Institute.)
Wang Yon, formerly Commander of the Air Regiment, was appointed
commander of the division. The Air Division comprised a fighter
regiment; a ground-attack regiment, a training regiment, and a
logistics group. The strength of the Air Division totalled about
2,000 men. Despite the impressive title, the Air Division was, as of
December 1949, still a ground-bound air force, with about 40 aircraft.
The Air Division was to be fully-operational only just before the
beginning of the war. In April 1950, the Soviet Union supplied about
60 aircraft. In mid-June 1950, an additional 60 aircraft arrived in
North Korea by Soviet pilots. On the day the war began the North
Korean Air Division possessed 62 11-10 aircraft, 70 Yak-3 and Yak-7B
fighters, 22 Yak-16 transports, and 8 PO-2 trainers. The Ilyushin and
Yakovlev aircraft were obsolete in a jet air age, but they were good
conventional aircraft. Most of the 132 combat planes were based at
the two airfields near P'yongyang and the airfield at Yonpo near
Hungnam. In addition, the airfield at Wonsan was available. Advanced
airstrips near the 38th parallel at Sinmak, P'yonggang, Kumchon, and
97Kansong also became operational by the time the war began.
It is worthwhile to note that while the Air Division was organised 
in December 1949, it was only in April 1950 that the Soviet government
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supplied aircraft for operational use to the Air Division. There is, 
of course, no doubt that the Air Division was organised with the 
prospect of receiving such aircraft soon. Also there could have been 
some need for further improving the capability of the Air Division 
until it could operate the aircraft for themselves. However, the late 
supply of Soviet aircraft could also be interpreted in another context 
in that the Soviet government was very cautious in building a sizable 
North Korean air force. In the Moscow meeting of December 1948 for 
preparing a KPA expansion programme, the Soviet Defence Ministry 
officials had decided that 'a (North Korean) air force shall not be
established for the time being, taking into consideration
00
international problems.' Conceding that the building of an air force 
is more time-taking than training infantry troops, the development of 
the North Korean Air Force had been considerably slow until December 
1949, or more strictly speaking, until the spring of 1950. It is an 
evidence indicating some reservation in the Soviet policy and 
programmes in expanding the KPA before the Korean War.
Unlike the Naval Headquarters which had the status equivalent to 
an army corps, the Air Division was equivalent to an army division. 
(The North Korean Air Force was elevated to the Air Force Headquarters 
status in 1951.) When the war began, the Air Division was expected to 
destroy the meager ROK Air Force easily and then materially assist the 
KPA divisions as they moved into South Korea. In reality, the Air 
Division was swiftly wiped out by the US Air Force in just two weeks. 
So in terms of consequence the Air Division contributed little to the 
course of the war. However, as in the case of the establishment of
the Naval Headquarters, the forming of the Air Division in December
1949 was, from North Korean leaders' standpoint, a big step forward in
the preparation for the war. The significance of the organisation of
the Air Division should be considered in this context rather than its
00
actual effect on the war.
In mid-March 1950 three Democratic Youth Training Centres were 
organised with the recruits from the Democratic Youth Training Camps 
which had been organised since October 1949.*^ The 1st training
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centre was organised in Sinuiju with the personnel of the 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd Democratic Youth Training Camps deployed in North P'yongan
Province. Yi Yik-song, a Yenan Korean, was appointed commander of the 
training centre. The 2nd training centre was activated in Sukch'on 
from the 4th, 5th and 6th Democratic Youth Training Camps scattered in 
South P'yongan Province. Ch'oe Yong-jin, a member of the Kim IlSung 
group, was appointed commander of the training centre. The 3rd 
training centre was formed in Hoeryong around the personnel from the
7th, 8th and 9th Democratic Youth Training Camp stationed in North
Hamkyong Province. Pak Song-ch'ol, from the Kim IlSung group, was
appointed commander of the training centre. These three Democratic 
Youth Training Centres were, in all but name, reserve divisions of the 
KPA. Each training centre was composed of three infantry regiments 
plus its own artillery and support troops.
The combat capability and missions of these three reserve 
divisions, at the beginning of the Korean war, has been largely 
misunderstood and, in many cases exaggerated. One controversy is over 
their designation itself. Many official histories produced in the 
West maintained that the three training centres were designated 
divisions of the KPA as early as March 1950. This is not true. 
According to convincing evidence, these training centres were not 
designated 'divisions' at least until 13 June 1950. An instruction 
issued by Mu Chong, Deputy Defence Minister and Chief of Artillery, to 
the KPA divisions on that date (13 June) clearly referred to these
training centres as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Democratic Youth Training
in?Centres. These training centres were designated divisions of the 
KPA at around 18 June 1950, just a week before the war. Thus, the 1st 
training centre was designated the 13th Division. The 2nd training 
centre became the 10th Division. And the 3rd training centre was 
renamed the 15th Division.^
The fact that the three training centres were designated 
'divisions' only in late June 1950 suggests meaningful implications on 
the training standard, combat capability and missions of these troops. 
An indication is that the newly elevated divisions were not earmarked
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to form the first-line shock divisions in the invasion. They were 
mainly to perform security missions in the liberated areas, following 
the shock divisions. In other words, they were a kind of 'national 
guard' divisions rather than regular divisions. According to training 
programmes issued in late-march 1950 to subordinate units in each 
training centre, they were to finish basic training by the end of 
August 1950. The five-month training programme was divided into two 
stages: the first stage ranging from 1 April to 15 June 1950; and the 
second stage ranging from 16 June to 31 August 1950. Judging from the 
subjects and standards of the training programme the training centres 
were, as of late March 1950, in the initial stage of unit formation. 
They were in the same stage at that time as the 1st and 2nd Divisions 
during the latter half of 1946 when the Security Cadres Training 
Centres were being transformed into divisions of the people's army.^
In late May 1950, the KPA divisions were ordered to prepare for 
coming 'summer combat training' which was to begin from 1 June and to
i nc
end by 15 July 1950. (It is noteworthy that 15 July was in just
twenty days after the invasion date of 25 June. This is a crucial 
hint implying how the North Korean leaders and the Soviet operation
team were contemplating the prospect of the Korean War.) However,
according to another training programme issued to the three training 
centres in late May 1950, the same time, the training centres were to 
finish the 'summer combat training' during the period from 1 June to 
15 August 1950. Compared with the one issued to these training 
centres in late March 1950, the programme of late May made little
alteration. The point is that the training centres were to continue 
the summer training until mid-August 1950, one month after the 
existing divisions were to accomplish the 'summer combat training' 
scheme, a code name for the invasion in June 1950. Thus, the training 
centres turned divisions were not anticipated to be urgently needed in 
the conduct of the invasion!^
In mid-July 1950 with the situation of the invasion worsening due 
to the intervention of the UN Forces and the surprisingly good 
performance of the ROK divisions after they had recovered from the
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initial setback, the 13th and the 15th Divisions of the KPA were put 
forward as first line divisions. But their performance was generally 
poor. On 21 July 1950 an entire regiment of the 15th Division was 
annihilated by the 17th ROK Regiment. Due to this defeat Pak Song- 
ch'ol, Commander of the 15th Division was fired. The 10th Division 
left for the front on 27 July 1950, a month after the war began, and
took part in the August Offensive from 12 August 1950. The late
participation and generally poor performance of these three divisions 
were, in a sense, natural when one thinks of the origins and missions 
initially expected of them. In short, those three divisions were not 
seriously considered a core requirement for the Korean War, to the 
same extent as the seven crack infantry divisions. This is a good 
clue to the proper understanding of the initial war plan of North 
Korea.107
Together with the activation of the three Democratic Youth 
Training Centres, in mid-March 1950, some changes in the organisation 
and deployment of the existing divisions were made. The 1st Regiment 
of the 1st Division in Namch’on area was exchanged for the 14th
Regiment, the 6th Division, in order to provide the 1st Division with
combat experienced soldiers from the Chinese Civil War. The 4th 
Independent Mixed Brigade in Chinnampo, near P'yongyang, was elevated 
to the 4th Division. Lee Kwon-mu, a Yenan Korean, was appointed 
commander of the division. The 6th Division moved to Chaeryong area, 
Hwanghae Province. So by the end of March 1950, three KPA divisions 
were deployed about 30kms north of the 38th parallel; the 1st Division
in Namch'on, the 3rd Division in P'yonggang, and the 6th Division in
108Chaeryong area.
Along the 38th parallel, three Security Brigades under the 
Ministry of the Interior were deployed; the 1st Security Brigade in 
eastern sector headquartered in Kansong; the 7th Security Brigade in 
central sector headquartered in Sibyonri; and the 3rd Security Brigade 
in western sector, with its headquarters in Chukch'on. The total 
strength of the security brigades along the 38th parallel was 13,000 
men. Along the Korean-Manchuria border the 2nd Border Security
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Brigade was deployed with about 2,600 men in six battalions. The 5th 
Railroad Security Brigade, with a strength of about 3,000 men, had 
headquarters in P'yongyang. In addition to its own responsibility for 
railroad security, it also functioned as a general reserve force for 
the KPA and security brigades. Along the east and west coasts troops, 
around 13,000 men, under the Naval Headquarters, were deployed to 
guard important naval installations and the coast line.*^
In mid-April 1950 a division strength of Korean veterans from the 
PLA arrived in North Korea to form the 7th Division of the KPA. (The 
Chinese Communist forces were designated the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) in October 1949 with the founding of the People's Republic of 
China.) The repatriation of these Korean veterans in April 1950 needs 
to be differentiated from that of the 164th and 166th CCF Divisions in 
July to August 1949. The repatriation of mid-1949 was part of the KPA 
expansion programme agreed upon among the Soviet Union, North Korea, 
and the CCP in January 1949. The release of those Korean soldiers in 
the 164th and 166th Divisions was made possible since, in Manchuria 
where the two divisions had been fighting, the Chinese Civil War was 
already over by early 1949. So, for the CCP leadership, there was no 
more urgent need to keep those all-Korean divisions. Anticipating an 
easy victory over the Kuomintang in the near future, they did not have 
to use the all-Korean divisions in battles in China proper. But the 
case of the Korean veterans who arrived in North Korea in April 1950 
was different. By the time they were ordered to move to North Korea 
in March 1950, most of them had been engaged in the clearing 
operations in south China. (The PLA occupied Hainan Island in April 
1950.) So the repatriation of these Korean troops who were scattered 
in the PLA divisions was not without problems. Therefore, it is 
possible to assume that North Korea wanted the Korean troops, an 
estimated strength of 12,000 men, more than the PRC in early 1950.
Throughout February and March 1950 Korean soldiers in the PLA 
divisions streamed into Chongchou, Honan Province in southern China. 
Those Korean soldiers were drawn largely from the 139th, 140th, 141st
and 156th PLA Divisions. On 6 April 1950 the Korean soldiers were
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organised into the 15th Independent Division and began to move to 
North Korea. On 18 April, the division under the command of Chon U 
arrived in Wonsan, South Hamkyong Province. On 25 April the 15th 
Division was reconstituted as the 7th Division of the KPA. Chon U was 
appointed commander of the division. (The 7th Division was 
redesignated the 12th Division just before the beginning of the Korean 
War.) With the activation of the 7th Division, the crack soldiers 
hardened through the Chinese Civil War amounted to three divisions in 
the KPA, the 5th, 6th and 7th Divisions!**
In mid-April 1950, a large shipment of war materiel arrived in 
North Korea from Vladivostock. The war materiel included the 
following: 100 tanks, 60 self-propelled-guns,; fire arms, mortars,
howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, and anti-tank guns; ammunition, spare 
parts, medicines, signal and engineer equipment, and oil. Out of 100 
tanks, 30 tanks were to form an independent tank regiment for use on 
the eastern front. (In the western front the 105th Tank Brigade with 
three tank regiments were to support shock divisions.) Another 70 
tanks were to make up for the loss of tanks in the war. The 60 self- 
propelled guns were to be assigned to infantry divisions. Each KPA 
division was to have 12 self-propelled guns. Fire arms and other fire 
support armaments were mainly to equip the veteran troops from the 
CCP, the 5th Division and the 7th (later 12th) Divisions. (The 6th 
Division turned in its vintage equipment in September 1949 and was 
equipped with Soviet arms at the same time.) Other materiel such as 
ammunition and oil were for all the KPA divisions in the conduct of 
the invasion. The influx of this war materiel in April 1950 from the 
Soviet Union was unprecedented in its scale and, more than anything 
else, vivid evidence of the coming of a war in Korea in the near 
future.**2
It is important in the context of the Korean War question to 
establish whether the war materiel poured into North Korea in April 
1950 was Soviet aid or North Korean purchase. Primary source 
materials to solve this question are yet to be found. However, 
judging from some circumstantial evidence, it is almost certain that
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this Soviet war materiel was not without charge, whether credit or 
cash or barter. Throughout the year 1949, Kim IlSung was repeatedly 
emphasising that 'the execution of the Two-Year National Economic Plan 
is material guarantee for national reunification'11^ and he repeatedly 
reminded the KPA soldiers of the fact that the arms and equipment were
not gained for free but bought at the expense of the people, as
follows:
All the equipment and material including the aeroplanes which 
are at your disposal now, have been obtained at the cost of 
precious blood shed by the anti-Japanese revolutionary
fighters and at the expense of our people's sweat and
blood }**
Circumstantial evidence implying that the Soviet war materiel was 
not free of charge is a North Korean charge against the Soviet 
leadership during the hostile relations between the two sides in the 
period 1963 to 1964. In September 1964 the North Korean leadership 
openly charged the Soviet Union with economic imperialism as follows;
You furnished us with equipment.... and other materials at 
prices much higher than the world market prices and took away 
from us scores of tons of gold and quantities of valuable 
non-ferrous metals and raw materials at prices much lower 
than the world-market prices. Would it not be a reasonable
attitude, when you talk about your 'aid' to us, to mention
also that you took valuable materials produced by our people
through arduous labour in the most difficult days of our
life?115
A case study prepared by US State Department in 1951, on the Soviet 
control of North Korea in the occupation period also presents 
suggestive information. According to that information:
In accordance with a Soviet North-Korean agreement of April 
1947, the management and operation of the Wonsan oil refinery
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and the sale of its petroleum output in Korea and abroad were 
turned over to the Wonsan Petroleum Company, a joint company 
owned in equal share by Soviet and North Korean government
agencies According to the articles of agreement, the USSR
received a half interest in the company... in payment "for 
the expense incurred in the development of North Korean 
industries and transportation facilities and as repayment of 
credits extended by the Soviet Army up to August 15, 1946."
Since any repairs made or credits extended by the Soviet Army 
were financed with North Korean currency issued by the Soviet 
Army, the USSR in fact paid nothing for its share in the 
company. Crude oil processed by the refinery was to be 
imported from Sakhalin "at world market prices" and the North 
Korean government, not the company, guaranteed payment for 
those oil imports through deliveries of Korean commodities of 
equal value.
It is hardly imaginable that, considering such practices of the Soviet 
Union in dealings with North Korea in these years, Stalin was generous 
enough to offer the huge war materiel of April 1950 as 'aid'.
That North Korea acquired the war material by its 'sweat and 
blood' is also suggested by the prodigious campaign in late 1949 
through a Fatherland Defense Support Association (FDSA) to solicit 
contributions to purchase arms. The FDSA was organised in July 1949 
with a view to performing two functions. On the one hand, the FDSA 
was a DOSAAF organisation patterned after the (Soviet) Voluntary 
Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet. Under the 
aegis of the FDSA part-time military training was made compulsory for 
all men between the ages of 17 and 40. By the end of August 1949 the 
FDSA had a membership strength of 2.7 million. (The populace of North 
Korea in 1949 was about 10 million.) On the other hand, the FDSA 
staged a wide campaign to support the KPA morally and materially. The 
campaign to raise the money necessary to buy 'aeroplanes, tanks, and 
naval crafts' was rapidly upgraded by Kim IlSung's instruction on 12 
October 1949. By the end of December 1949, a total 280 million won
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117was raised 'voluntarily' for this purpose. (The basic salary for a
Colonel in the KPA was, in 1949, 3500 won. So that 280 million won
approximates to 100 million US dollars at late 1980s rate.) Though it
is admissible that the donated sum was not merely a token, it was not
a big money either. (The total government expenditure of North Korea
in 1950 was planned at a level of 26.9 billion won. So the size of
the donated money equalled about one percent of the total government 
1 10
expenditure.)
Then, where did the bulk of the money for buying the war materiel
come from? Some suggestion can be attained from examining the 1950
government budget of North Korea. As in other communist countries,
the government expenditure of North Korea consisted mainly of three
big items; expenditure on the economy; expenditure for cultural and
social services; and defence expenditure. On the whole these three
items account for about 98 per cent of the total. Some portion of
defence expenditure in communist countries is concealed in other items
out of need for secrecy or due to characteristic features of socialist
economies. However, this does not necessarily bar a grasp of general
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'trends' in defence spending in communist countries. During the 
years 1947-1950 the estimated defence expenditure of North Korea was 
as follows^
Year Expenditures (in billion won)
Total (A) Defence (B) Percent (B\A)
1947 7.1 3.3 46 %
1948 13.1 5.4 41 %
1949* 19.6 7.1 36 %
1950* 26.7 6.4 24 %
* planned or budgeted
Curiously between 1949 and 1950 the defence budget dropped sharply as 
a percentage of the total from 36 per cent to 24 per cent, a 12 per 
cent decrease, even shrinking the amount from 7.1 billion won to 6.4 
billion won. From a common sense point of view, the defence budget 
should have increased greatly in this period, reflecting the huge
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amount of money which should have been earmarked for buying war 
materiel.
Contrastingly, the portion of expenditure on the economy increased 
sharply during 1949 to 1950 as in the following table:*^
Year Expenditures (in billion won)
Total (A) Economy (B) Percent (B\A)
1947 7.1 2.7 38 %
1948 13.1 5.1 39 %
1949* 19.6 8.3 42 %
1950* 26.7 14.2 53 %
* planned or budgeted
In the 1950 budget the planned expenditure on the economy accounted 
for more than half the total government expenditure. The portion of 
this item increased sharply from 42 per cent to 53 per cent between 
1949 and 1950. The 12 per cent decrease in the defence expenditure 
and the 11 per cent increase in the expenditure on the economy between
1949 and 1950, combined, imply the following: first, during the 1949-
1950 period, the major point of the North Korean leadership in 
planning the budget was how to achieve the Two-Year National Economic 
Plan successfully; and secondly, the expense for buying the war 
material came from mainly other sources than the defence expenditure 
of North Korea.
Then what other sources could have been available for the North 
Korean government? It is already suggested that the money solicited 
from the people through the FDSA campaign could not be a major source. 
The only alternative source left was, then, aid or credit from foreign 
sources - the Soviet government in this case. The possibility of 
generous Soviet aid is all but refuted in the preceding discussion. 
Then the only possibility is 'credit' from the Soviet government. 
During Kim IlSung's Moscow visit in March 1949, the Soviet government 
consented to offer 'a three-year 212 million rouble loan' to North
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Korea in instalments from July 1949 to June 1952. The loan was for 
settling an 'excess of imports' from the Soviet Union. It is possible 
to assume that the 'excess of imports' could mean Soviet war materiel 
in case of need. Stalin's approval of Kim IlSung's initiative on a 
Korean war would have been solicited, among other things, to use the 
Soviet loan for buying war materiel. It is almost likely that the 
Soviet loan accounted for the lion's share in the expenses paid for 
the war materiel poured into North Korea in the spring of 1950. The 
commitment of the Soviet government to the preparation of the Korean 
War should be examined in this context, too. Nominally the Soviet 
government sold, not granted, the war materiel to North Korea, even 
though 'on credit'. The North Korean government bought the war 
materiel at 'world market price' with their 'sweat and blood', even 
though 'on credit'. If the Soviet government had not approved the use 
of the Soviet loan for buying the war materiel, the rapid expansion of 
the KPA in the spring of 1950 would not have been possible.
In mid-April 1949* a new team of Soviet military advisers arrived 
in P'yongyang replacing the Soviet military advisory group under 
Major-General Smirnov. The new team was composed of a dozen high 
ranking officers headed by Lieutenant-General Vasiliev, a Hero of the 
Soviet Union. If the old team was mainly for raising the KPA, the new 
team was for employing the KPA in the war. The operational planning 
of the Korean War was entrusted to them. Only a couple of high 
ranking officers in the KPA GHQ liaised with the Soviet operation
team.1^  There is a claim that the Soviet operation team was actually
the supreme command of the KPA in the planning and conduct of the war, 
vindicating the theory that the Soviet government was the prime mover 
of the Korean War.*^ A central theme of this thesis is that even 
though there is no denying that the Soviet government was deeply 
committed to the Korean War in various ways, it was not the prime 
mover of the war. From this point of view, my argument is that the 
Soviet operation team was a kind of technical assistance to the high 
command of the KPA rendered by the Soviet government. The KPA leaders 
of the time had, in fact, been captains and lieutenants in a special
force of the Soviet Army, only five years previously. Now they were
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to conduct an all-out war employing a modern army of more than 100,000 
men. Though tough and bold, they had no experience in this kind of 
huge enterprise. The Soviet operation team was to fill in this 
deficiency in the KPA leadership. (When the war situation began to 
worsen from early July 1950 the Soviet operation team was ordered to 
evacuate from North Korea immediately. This shows the limited nature 
of Soviet contribution or commitment to the Korean War).*^
By the end of May 1950, the KPA finally reached a strength 
necessary for launching a war against South Korea with convincing 
superiority. The great leap of the KPA was achieved mostly during the 
period from March to May 1950. In estimating how much the KPA was 
strengthened during this period, the following table is informative. 
For convenience's sake major ground units of the KPA are considered, 
in the first place. An infantry division is given the value of '1'. 
The crack divisions formed around the veterans from the CCF are given 
the value of '1.5'. Independent mixed brigades and tank regiments are 
given the value of '0.5'. The 105th Tank Brigade was actually a tank 
division equivalent, so it is given the value of '1.5. Three reserve 
divisions are given the value of '0.5' each.
Combat Value Cumulative
Period Unit Each Sum Aqqreqate
48.1 1st Div. 1.0
2nd Div 1.0
to 3rd Div 1.0 4.0 4.0
4th Brig. 0.5
49.4 105th Tank Regt 0.5
49.5 5th Div. 1.5
to 6th Div. 1.5 4.0 8.0
50.2 105th Tank Brig(+) 1.0
Ind. Tank Regt. 0.5
50.3 4th Div(+) 0.5
to 7th Div. 1.5 4.0 12.0
50.5 3 Reserve Divs 1.5
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To see the whole picture of the expansion of the KPA during this 
period the following other factors should be considered as well; the 
Air Division which became operational in April 1950; a regiment 
strength special force and two regiment strength marine troops 
organised in May 1950; and vast quantities of war materiel introduced 
in April 1950. Taking these factors into account, the KPA actually 
doubled its strength during March to May 1950. In other words, the 
KPA at the beginning of the Korean War was almost two times as strong 
as the force-level which had been planned by the Soviet Defence 
Ministry in December 1948. This is significant evidence indicating 
that at least as of late 1948, a Korean war project was not in its 
planning stage, even though it might have been contemplated as a 
possible option in the future. The quantum leap of the KPA, 
especially since March 1950, evidences that a major policy initiative 
had been taken among the communist leaders in the not-too-distant past 
before March 1950.
It is the contention of this author that circa February 1950 was 
the time when a 'Directive 21' (cf. Introduction p.12) was issued to 
the KPA, ordering preparations for a war with South Korea in the near 
future. This reasoning is the focal point in this thesis on the 
question of the Korean War decision, its timing and strategic 
calculation. That the Korean War decision was being made among the 
communist leaders during the winter of 1949-50 accords with much 
circumstantial evidence on this issue such as: Mao Tse-tung's Moscow 
visit during the same period; Acheson's statement on 12 January on the 
limitations of US defence commitment to South Korea; or Khruschev's 
remarks on this issue. Seen from this point of view theories 
emphasising the political turmoil of the Rhee government in May 1950 
or the South Korean failure to correspond to the North Korean 
proposals on the reunification issue, of early June, lose much ground. 
In analysing the strategic calculations of the communist leaders 
regarding the Korean War decision, the crucial point is the winter of 
1949-50.
CHAPTER SIX
TRIALS OF THE WAR: 1950.6-1950.12
North Korea started the invasion of South Korea anticipating an 
easy victory. This complacency remained in the North Korean conduct 
of the war for some weeks even after the nature of the war had been 
totally changed with the coming of the US forces into Korea. That 
complacency resulted in an incomplete breakthrough in the first days 
of the invasion, allowing the battered ROK troops time and place for 
recovery. The attrited advance of the KPA troops in July 1950 was 
another indication that the KPA leadership was not swift and flexible
enough in adapting its strategy and tactics to the new situation which
was becoming more unfavorable to them day-by-day. The complacency in 
the initial war plan and the unadaptability of the KPA leadership to 
the new situation of the war was, no less than the political 
misjudgment of not predicting the US intervention, responsible for the 
KPA failure in the initial phase of the war.
On the other hand it is noteworthy to see that the seemingly
crumbling retreat of the KPA troops in late September 1950 was not an 
abandonment of the war. As early as 27 September Kim IlSung was 
already confidently predicting that the retreat would not last long, a 
month or month and a half at the most. The various measures which the 
North Korean leadership took by mid-October 1950 should be considered 
in connection with this prospect of the war envisaged by the North 
Korean leadership. By the end of 1950 the KPA had experienced a full
cycle of ups and downs, victory and defeat, glory and misery. The six 
months' trial during June and December 1950 offered the North Korean 
leadership a stimulus for the Koreanisation of KPA strategy and 
tactics. That the KPA possesses the largest special forces in the 
world nowadays - some 100,000 men - is a reflection of this Korean War 
experience.
The Complacent War Plan
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The North Korean leadership anticipated an easy victory in the 
war. The following episode is suggestive of the atmosphere of the 
North Korean leadership in June 1950. At the meeting on 10 June, 
which gave instructions for the commencement of troop movement, Kim 
Kwang-hyop, Chief of the Operations Bureau reportedly told high- 
ranking officers as follows:
Troops of our People's Army have thus far experienced combat 
exercise up to the division level. This time, we are going 
to conduct task force operations, mobilizing all combat 
divisions. In this exercise, all the firearms held by our 
troops, not to speak of all basic units, will be mobilized.
In the past, there have been some faults found with 
commanding officers from time to time in the course of 
exercises. This time, all the officers and men are urged to 
do their best to complete the operational exercise 
successfully. This exercise may take a little longer than in 
the past. But I am sure two weeks would be more than enough 
to finish it up. (emphasis by author) No need for anyone of 
you to carry any heavy loads, and you have only to prepare a 
bag to carry necessary maps or documents during the period of 
the exercise.*
It is significant that Kim Kwang-hyop affirmed with such 
confidence that 'two weeks' would be more than enough to finish the 
invasion. Some more instances of this kind are:
A certain Lieutenant-Colonel of the communications department 
reportedly said in the course of the move that he heard 
'Seoul will fall in two days in this operation.4'
Another Major of the reconnaissance department even uttered:
"I heard that a review of troops this year will be held in 
Seoul on the 15 August anniversary of liberation. Anyway,
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this year is the year for the reunification of our
fatherland.^1
Judging from various source materials, including such primary sources 
as the file of the operation orders issued by the General Staff, it is 
possible to conclude that the North Korean leadership envisaged and 
planned a three-week war. They confidently believed that major 
operations would be over within two weeks from the commencement of the 
war.
Then, on what grounds did they anticipate such an easy victory?
To answer this question it is necessary to look into the initial war 
plan of the invasion. Judging from the mobilisation schedule of the 
KPA for the invasion, it is possible to draw a conclusion that at 
least by mid-May 1950, the Soviet operation team and the KPA 
leadership sorted out the war plan of the invasion. The Soviet
operation team arrived in North Korea in mid-April 1950. It means 
that the invasion plan was based on such estimates and considerations 
as were available as of May 1950, on the enemy (the ROK Armed Force), 
terrain and weather, and troops available (the KPA). From the war 
planners' standpoint, the probability of US intervention was beyond 
the range of their considerations. It was the job of the political 
authorities of North Korea and the Soviet Union, who had almost 
rejected the idea. For the foreseeable future, as of May 1950, there 
was no prospect of rapid expansion of the ROK Armed Force, at least 
for a couple of months. Terrain and weather in South Korea in summer 
was not considered to bring about serious impediment to KPA 
operations. By the end of April 1950, the KPA had almost reached the 
force-level which had been planned to launch the all-out attack 
against South Korea. Therefore, the examining of the military balance 
(or unbalance?) between North Korea and South Korea in the spring of 
1950 is the first step to figure out the reasoning behind the initial 
war plan of the invasion.
In May 1950, the ROK Army had a total strength of 95,000 men, out 
of which 65,000 men were divided into eight infantry divisions. The
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65,000 men could man only six divisions by ROK Army table of 
organisation. By US Army standards, that strength could man only four 
divisions. So the ROK divisions were much understrength. Five 
divisions had three regiments, whereas three divisions had only two 
regiments. The strength of the divisions ranged from 9,915 men in the 
1st Division to 6,866 men in the 8th Division. On the other hand, the 
KPA had seven infantry divisions of 11,000 men each and one tank 
brigade (in reality, an armoured division in all but name.) In 
addition to these regular divisions, three reserve divisions were to 
be available by the time the war began. Again security forces under 
the Ministry of the Interior added well trained infantry troops of 
about 15,000 men. Altogether, the total strength of the combat troops 
of the KPA was estimated to be around 135,000 men. So the KPA could 
achieve about two to one superiority over the ROK Army in combat
4
strength.
In artillery and armoured troops, the ROK Army was no match to the 
KPA. The KPA infantry divisions had their own artillery regiment, 
consisting of two 76mm gun battalions, one 122mm howitzer battalion 
and one 76mm self-propelled gun battalion. Infantry regiments had 
also organic artillery troops. Altogether, a KPA division had sixty 
artillery pieces. The ROK divisions had only an artillery battalion 
of 15 105mm howitzers. Moreover, not all of the divisions had those
artillery battalions. Only five out of eight ROK divisions had an 
artillery battalion of this kind; whereas the other three divisions 
had no divisional artillery. Both ROK Army and KPA divisions did not 
have armoured units. However, the 12 self-propelled guns in each KPA 
division could be employed as a sort of armoured unit in terms of its 
armour, shock effect and fire-power. (Actually, in the initial phase 
of the Korean War, the self-propelled guns were not employed in long- 
range fire support missions but used in close combat missions to 
support the infantry. The ROK soldiers very often mistook the self- 
propelled guns for T-34 tanks.) The main armoured unit of the KPA was 
the 105th Tank Brigade equipped with 150 T-34 tanks, which were
evaluated as top-class tanks in this period. The ROK Army had no 
tanks at all and had only an armoured cavalry battalion equipped with
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27 light armoured cars. In all, as of April 1950, the ROK Army had 89 
artillery pieces compared to 609 pieces of the KPA. The ROK Army had 
only 27 light armoured cars compared to 250 T-34 tanks (150 tanks in 
the 105th Tank Brigade plus 100 tanks to form two more tank brigades) 
and 154 SU-76 self-propelled guns of the KPA.^
The ROK Air Force had 22 aircraft - 12 liaison-type aircraft and 
10 T-6 trainers - in May 1950. (The KMAG [US military advisory group 
to Korea] had 10 old F-51 (Mustang) aircraft, which were transferred 
to the ROK Air Force on 26 June 1950.) The North Korean Air Force 
had, or were to have soon, about 180 aircraft, out of which 132 
aircraft were combat aircraft. So the ROK Air Force could hardly be 
called an air force compared to the North Korean Air Force. Both the 
ROK Navy and the North Korean Navy were not significant. Both navies 
were a coast guard rather than a navy. They had about 30 vessels 
each. Most of these vessels were patrol craft. The North Korean Navy 
had a small attack flotilla, consisting of four torpedo boats whereas 
the ROK Navy had one frigate. (Three more frigates became operational 
in the ROK Navy in mid-July 1950.)^
Since the ROK Navy and Air Force were not in a position to support 
the ROK Army in effect, let alone to perform their independent 
missions, (such as interdiction or amphibious operations), the major 
concerns of the invasion planners could well be concentrated on the 
ROK Army. As examined above, the KPA could enjoy two to one 
superiority over the ROK Army in strength and, taking into 
consideration artillery and armoured troops, the overwhelming 
superiority of the KPA was without doubt. The deployment of the ROK 
divisions was another vulnerable point which could be exploited by the 
KPA. Out of eight ROK divisions four divisions, the 1st, 7th, 6th, 
and 8th Divisions, were defending the positions from west to east 
along the 38th parallel in the spring of 1950. Beyond the 1st 
Division in the western sector, the 17th Regiment was deployed under 
the direct control of the ROK Army Headquarters. Altogether eleven 
regiments out of twenty two regiments of the ROK Army were defending 
the 38th parallel. Among the four divisions deployed along the
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border, two divisions had only two regiments deployed at that time. A 
regiment of the 7th Division, which was to receive the heaviest blow 
from the KPA when the invasion began, was stationed in Onyang, 100km
7
south of the 38th parallel.
To make matters worse, the ROK divisions were not well deployed to 
stage effective defensive and counteroffensive operations. The 8th 
Division, with two regiments of about 6,900 men was covering 54km of 
the 38th parallel. The 6th Division with 9,000 men was responsible 
for the defence of 90km coverage. The 7th Division, with two 
regiments of 7,300 men, covered 40km. The 1st Division, with 9,700 
men, covered 90km. The 17th Regiment in Ongjin area accounted for 
54km frontage. Thus, the frontline divisions were too much extended 
to perform positional defence. On the other hand it was doubtful 
whether these ROK divisions could perform effective manoeuvring 
defence. There was too little space between the 38th parallel and 
Seoul which could be exchanged for time and freedom of action. The 
other four divisions were so much scattered in the rear area, as to be 
unable to reinforce the frontline divisions in time. These defects 
and limits in the deployment of the ROK divisions could work to the
Q
KPA's great advantage.
The ROK Army troops had some combat experiences through the pseudo 
warfare from late 1948 to early 1950 - the punitive operations against 
the south Korean communist guerrillas and the border conflicts along 
the 38th parallel with the security forces of North Korea. However, 
those combat experiences were largely limited to small unit 
operations, mostly at battalion and lower level. They had little 
experience in combined arms operations at divisional and higher 
levels. So the bigger problems in education and training in the ROK 
Army were with the senior officers rather than junior officers or 
soldiers. Worst of all, its Chief of Staff, Major General Ch'ae 
Byong-dok was deemed to be not suitable for the post. An ex-ordnance 
officer in the Japanese army. General Ch'ae Byong-dok, had no 
experience of commanding combat troops. His deputy, Colonel Kim Baek- 
il, was an able tactician. But it was doubtful whether Colonel Kim
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had the ability to assume the overall control of operations, 
deputising for Ch'ae Byong-dok. General Chae's chief American 
adviser, Brigadier General Roberts was no strategist. Some divisional 
commanders were experienced commanders, but they were mostly too old. 
Major-General Yi Ung-jun, first Chief of Staff of the ROK Army and 
then Commander of the 5th Division, was at the age of 60 in 1950. 
Most of other divisional commanders were inexperienced and too young 
in their late 20s and early 30s. Some experienced and respected 
officers were outside of the mainstream of the ROK Army. For 
instance, Major-General Kim Hong-il, who was to save the army from 
total collapse at the initial phase of the war, was then serving as 
Commandant of the Staff College. Brigadier General Kim Sok-won 
renowned for his bold command in the border conflicts of 1949, was not 
in the active list at that time. So the ROK Army leadership just
Q
before the war was not the best possible line-up.
By contrast with ROK Army troops, KPA troops had developed step- 
by-step since 1946, unhampered by irritant provocations. By late 
1949, the training stage of the KPA reached army corps level. Most of 
the KPA leaders were seasoned soldiers through the anti-Japanese 
struggle or the Chinese Civil War. They were relatively young, mostly 
in their 30s. Nevertheless, most of them had been engaged in 
revolutionary activities and guerrilla fighting, from their late 
teens. So they were experienced and mature for their age. (Kang Gon, 
Chief of the General Staff, was 33 years old in 1950. But he began 
his career as an anti-Japanese fighter at the age of 15.) Since the 
Soviet operation team was actually acting as the General Staff of the 
KPA, able and experienced army corps or divisional commanders were 
thought to be enough for the successful implementation of the 
invasion.^
In June 1950, the line-up of the KPA's leadership was as follows:
Please see over for table.
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Position Name Origin
Premier (Supreme Commander) Kim IlSung K
Minister of National Defense Ch'oe Yong-gon K
Chief of the General Staff Kan Gon K
Chief of the Cultural Training Bureau Kimll K
Chief of the Artillery Command Bureau Mu Chong Y
CG I Corps Kim Ung Y
CG II Corps Kim Kwang-hyop K
CG 1st Division Ch'oe Kwang K
CG 2nd Division Yi Ch'ong-song S
CG 3rd Division Yi Yong-ho K
CG 4th Division Yi Kwon-mu Y
CG 5th Division Kim Ch'ang-dok Y
CG 6th Division Bang Ho-san Y
CG 12th Division (formerly 7th) Chon U Y
CG 105th Tank Division Yu Kyong-su K
CG 10th Division Yi Yik-song Y
CG 13th Division Ch'oe Yong-jin K
CG 15th Division Pak Song-ch'oj^ K
Key: K - the Kim IISung group 
Y - the Yenan group 
S - the Soviet-Korean group
At the highest level of the KPA leadership, the dominance of Kim 
IlSung and his followers was beyond question. However, at army corps 
and divisional commander level, the contribution of the veteran 
commanders returned from China was enormous. Out of seven crack 
divisions (1st to 6th Divisions and the 12th Division) the Yenan group 
contributed four divisional commanders. As was to be proven in the 
war, these veteran commanders from the Yenan group were valuable 
assets of the KPA.^
The Soviet operation team must have made the invasion plan based 
on the above estimates of the strength, equipment, deployment, 
training, and leadership of both sides. On the initial war plan of 
the invasion, there are controversies among military experts and 
scholars in the western countries. One of the probable scenarios runs
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as follows. The prime objective of the KPA was the occupation of
Seoul. The North Korean leaders anticipated that the seizure of Seoul 
would almost certainly lead to the end of organised resistance by the 
ROK Army. Then the south Korean communists who had been latent would 
rise and liberate the rest of south Korea. The advance of the KPA 
troops would become actually a victory march into those liberated 
areas. This scenario emphasises the political significance which the 
capture of Seoul, the seat of South Korean government, would have. 
The invasion planners assumed, according to this scenario, that by
destroying the ROK divisions defending Seoul the mission of KPA 
divisions would be almost over. This kind of scenario is suggestive
in explaining the mysterious, three days' delay in the KPA divisions'
advance to the south of the Han River, after the capture of Seoul on 
28 June 1950.12
The above scenario emphasises the civil war nature - more 
specifically speaking, the national-liberation war- of the Korean War 
and the role of the south Korean communists in the conduct of the war. 
It is alleged that Pak Hon-yong, leader of the south Korean
communists, had advocated more limited use of the KPA and assured a
mass revolt in south Korea staged by south Korean communists
coincidently with the KPA's advance. In effect the mass revolt to be 
instigated by 200,000 south Korean communists (according to Pak Hon- 
yong 's claim) did not materialise in the war. When Pak Hon-yong was 
purged at the end of the Korean War on the charge of 'espionage and
anti-party activities' it was the failure of that uprising which Kim 
IlSung, through his subordinates, used to bring about Pak Hon-yong's 
downfall. However, it is one thing that Pak Hon-yong proposed such a 
strategy and it is another whether the invasion planners actually 
acted on such a premise. Available evidence shows that the Soviet 
operation team was not allured much by such line of action which was 
thought to depend too much on political fortune rather than a decisive 
military victory. Even if the occupation of Seoul were to be a 
decisive victory, that would not have meant the decisive victory to 
end the war. For the victory to be complete, the occupation of the
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whole of south Korea was, whether aided by south Korean communists 
more or less, to be the final objective of the invasion.*2
Another possible scenario of the initial war plan runs as follows. 
The KPA planned a grand pincer movement to encircle all ROK troops 
converging on the defense of Seoul. After capturing the main body of 
the ROK Army, the KPA was to pursue ROK troops fleeing south. The 
main body of the KPA was to advance along the Seoul-Pusan route while 
both flanks at east and west coasts were to perform a great pincer 
movement towards Pusan. The main body and flank forces were to reach 
Pusan by 15 August 1950.** The central idea of this scenario was two 
fold: first, the annihilation of the enemy (ROK) field army as the 
prime objective of operation; and second, deep strike into the rear of 
the enemy. In order to capture and annihilate the ROK field army, 
according to this scenario, the KPA was to execute a daring Keil und 
Kessel tactic rather than consuming frontal attacks. This kind of war 
plan could be evaluated as a combination of Clausewitzian tradition of 
emphasising the annihilation of the enemy field army, Tuchachevski's 
operational concept of deep strike, and German Blitzkrieg tactics. 
The question is whether such a scenario was a genuine one devised by 
the Soviet operation team or a hypothetical one espoused by western 
military experts or military historians based on the actual 
development of the Korean War.
Judging from various intelligence plans, reconnaissance orders, 
operation orders, and official statements of the North Korean leaders, 
the North Korean invasion was to be finished by 15 July 1950. About 
one month, from 15 July to 15 August 1950, was assigned for 
implementing necessary reforms and arrangements in south Korea to 
establish a unified government over all Korea, on the very day that 
Korea had been liberated from Japan five years previously. Among 
those various materials, an intelligence plan issued by the Soviet 
operation team to the KPA Chief of Intelligence on 20 June 1950 is 
conclusive evidence for drawing the whole picture of the invasion
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According to the intelligence plan, which was classified as 'Most 
Important. Soviet Secret'. the invasion was to be implemented in three 
stages. Firstly, the objectives of the intelligence plan were given 
as follows:
1. To determine precise data on the defence system of the enemy.
2. Discover opportunely the enemy counteraction.
3. Discover opportunely the plans and determine the measures of 
the enemy's counteraction against our attack on the south.
4. To watch for possible reinforcements and military operations
in the ports and aerodromes of the enemy.(emphasis by author)
The first stage was for 'Break-through of the Defence Lines and 
Annihilation of the Main Enemy Forces.' The second stage was for
'Development of the Attack in South Korea and Annihilation of the
Reserves of the Enemy.' The third stage was for 'Mopping up 
operations in south Korea and Arrival on the south shore of the
peninsula'.
According to the intelligence plan, the Soviet operation team 
anticipated that the ROK Army divisions would not stage stiff, static 
defence in the front line positions. They also anticipated that the 
ROK Army Headquarters would not pour all its reserve troops into the 
defence of Seoul, making the city 'a Stalingrad'. Rather, they 
estimated that the Han River which runs the south of Seoul, would 
become the major defence line of the ROK divisions, for reorganising 
retreating troops from the north of the river and receiving 
reinforcements from the rear. It is noteworthy that the Soviet
planners did not give too much weight to Seoul. In order to break the 
anticipated ROK Army defence positions along the Han River, they 
planned to use all the KPA divisions except one division in the east 
coast sector. After accomplishing the second stage operation which 
would practically terminate the ROK Army as an organised defence 
force, in the third stage the KPA divisions were to reach major ports 
in the south coast of Korea. At this stage, the KPA divisions were to 
advance, on the whole, in parallel. The capture of Pusan was not
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specifically emphasised. So a converging movement of all the KPA 
divisions towards Pusan, which was to be the actual course of the war 
after the intervention of the UN Forces, was not conceived at the 
planning stage of the war. The capture of Yosu, Mokpo,-and Kunsan in 
the southwest shore of the peninsular was also given the same emphasis 
as Pusan. As such the Soviet operation team did not anticipate the 
seizure of Seoul to mean the virtual end of major KPA operations. Nor 
did they anticipate successful delaying operations of the ROK Army
divisions along the Seoul-Pusan route.
The formation of two army corps commands in mid-June 1950 had some 
meaningful implication in connection with the initial war plan. Until 
that time, the KPA did not have an intermediary command structure 
between the General Staff and field army divisions. In order to form 
the new command posts for the two army corps, the General Staff
released the bulk of its key staff officers. Kim Ung, Chief of the 
Combat Training Bureau, was appointed Commander of the I Corps. Hwang 
Sok-bok, a senior staff officer in the Operations Bureau, was
appointed Chief of Staff to Kim Ung. Kim Kwang-hyop, Chief of the
Operations Bureau, was appointed Commander of the II Corps. Choe In, 
Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was made Kim Kwang-hyop's Chief of 
Staff. Other major positions in the two army corps commands were also 
filled with senior staff officers in the General Staff.^ The fact 
that such key members of the General Staff were mobilised to form the 
two army corps commands implied that the Soviet operation team and the 
KPA leadership anticipated that once the war began, only exact 
implementation of the initial war plan would be enough. In other 
words, they did not anticipate that the development of the invasion 
would require considerable adjustment of the initial plan, which 
should have been sorted out by the full General Staff. Thus, the 
formation of the two army corps serves as evidence indicating the 
optimistic prospect of the invasion, envisaged by the Soviet operation 
team and the KPA leadership.
By examining the deployment of KPA divisions along the 38th 
parallel on the eve of the invasion, the initial war plan can be made
more discernible. In terms of terrain, there were (and still are) 
seven invasion routes from the north to the south in the waist area of 
the Korean peninsula. Each of seven KPA infantry divisions was made 
accountable for an invasion route. In the far western sector the 6th 
Division was deployed. Along the three invasion routes which directly 
lead to Seoul, three divisions - the 1st, 4th, and 3rd Divisions, were 
deployed. Each of these divisions was respectively supported by one 
tank regiment of the 105th Tank Brigade. So, the war planners did not 
intend to use the 105th Tank Brigade for an independent armour 
operation. In the central-eastern sector two divisions - the 2nd, and 
the 12th Divisions - were deployed. The 12th Division was supported 
by an independent tank regiment (30 tanks). In the east coast area 
the 5th Division was deployed. An independent motorcycle regiment was 
assigned to this division. One regiment strength special force - the 
766th Unit - was to precede the advance of the 5th Division. The 
front-line divisions, together with their assigned units were grouped 
into three operation groups. The four divisions in the western sector 
were to operate under the command of the I Corps. Two divisions in 
the central-eastern sector were placed under the command of the II 
Corps. The 5th Division in the east coast area was to operate 
independently. Two divisions - the 13th and the 15th Divisions - were
to remain as general reserves of the General Staff, following
17frontline divisions.
The deployment of the KPA divisions also reflected the war 
planners' low estimate of ROK divisions. Each KPA division was to 
execute a break-through attack. But seen from the overall scheme, the 
KPA divisions were to execute a frontal attack along the entire 
frontline. Nominally the I Corps was designated as the main body of 
the attack with four infantry divisions plus one tank brigade. The II 
Corps was designated the subsidiary body, with two infantry divisions 
and one tank regiment. But, in terms of missions accorded to the two 
corps, that distinction was obscure. The mission of the subsidiary 
body is to check the enemy and absorb the enemy strength so that the 
main body can breakthrough the enemy with ease. However, in the 
invasion plan, the II corps was to perform a big pincer movement
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southwestward to entrap ROK Army divisions which were assumed to be 
holding defence positions along the Han River perimeter. To perform 
this kind of grand envelopment operation, the II Corps should have 
been strengthened with considerable mechanised units. "That such an 
appropriate allotment of combat strength among the operation groups
was not made meant that the operation planners anticipated a steam
rolling, parallel advance along the entire frontage, each division 
destroying whatsoever ROK troops it should encounter. Even if the KPA 
enjoyed overwhelming superiority over the ROK Army in the spring of 
1950, such a complacency in the deployment of force could bring about 
unexpected setback if met by well-organised defence of the ROK Army 
troops. Some setback to the KPA in the initial weeks of the war, even 
before the massive influx of the US forces in mid-July 1950, revealed 
this complacency in the initial war plan. In conclusion, the initial
war plan of the invasion devised by the Soviet operation team was a
complacent, mediocre one.
THE INCOMPLETE BREAKTHROUGH
The mobilisation of the KPA for the invasion of June 1950 began in 
mid-May 1950. On 19 May 1950 divisional commanders were given
preparation orders for the mobilisation. By the end of May 1950, the 
KPA troops were ready to carry out the 'summer combat training' to be
held from 1 June 1950 to 15 July 1950'. On 10 June 1950, commanders
of major KPA units were given orders for troop movement towards the 
front line area. On 11 June two army corps commands were organised to 
streamline command relationship between the General Staff and
operating divisions. On 18 June the General Staff issued 
reconnaissance orders to divisional commanders in the frontline. On 
23 June the General Staff issued operation orders for the invasion. 
Troops occupied the line of departure (LD) on that day. At 0400 am 25 
June 1950, 30 minutes' artillery volley for the preparation of
infantry assault began along the whole front.... Thus, the war began.
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With the commencement of the invasion the North Korean leadership 
took measures to place North Korea on a war footing. First of all, 
Kim IlSung tried to justify the military action of the KPA as a 
defence against South Korean provocation. On 25 June-1950, at the 
extraordinary cabinet meeting, he declared:
Our war against the aggressive act of the traitors Syngman
Rhee clique is a just war to safeguard democracy and the
1 0
freedom and independence of the country.
In support of his stand that the war was a just war, Kim IlSung 
insisted that it was the South Korean army that first launched a 
surprise attack against North Korea. Kim IlSung emphasised that North 
Korea had made every effort to solve the Korean question peacefully, 
through the efforts of the Korean people themselves, rather than by 
war
It is noteworthy at this stage that Kim IlSung did not indict the 
United States as the main culprit of the 'aggression'. Kim IlSung's 
denunciation of the United States was confined to the claim that it 
was instrumental in establishing and maintaining the Rhee government 
and in equipping and training the South Korean army. This point is 
significant in connection with North Korea's justification of the war. 
With the progress of the Korean War, North Korea shifted its main 
target from the Rhee government to the US government, claiming that it 
was the Americans who masterminded the war, while downgrading the Rhee 
government as a mere agent of the aggressive policy of the US 
government. Presently, the North Korean version of the Korean War 
stands on this 'US conspiracy' theory. However, as of 25 June 1950, 
the North Korean leadership pointed at the Rhee government as the main 
culprit. In the correct understanding of the Korean War it is 
necessary to distinguish between the original version of North Korean 
justification of the Korean War, made in June 1950, and the later 
version of North Korean historiography on the Korean War, 'supported' 
by 'vast evidence' which points to the US government as the mastermind 
of the war.^
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In his speech on 25 June 1950, Kim IlSung expressed a belief in an 
easy victory in the war. As grounds for this belief he stressed the 
following: first, this war is a just war; secondly; the.party and the
government will lead the war with superb leadership; thirdly, the 
People's Army is incomparably stronger than the enemy; fourthly, we 
have a solid home front capable of ensuring victory; and fifthly, the 
international situation favours us. Kim IlSung expressed especially 
strong confidence in the superiority of the KPA. He affirmed that the 
KPA could expand within a short time since the party and the
government trained the KPA on the principle of making them the elite
army. In the estimate of the international situation, Kim IlSung 
specifically pointed to the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. 
He said that the triumph of the Chinese revolution greatly changed the 
relationship among world political forces. It was, said Kim IlSung,
also a heavy blow to the Syngman Rhee government since 'at present
Jian Jiesu [Chiang Kai-shek] and his ilk are not in a position to help 
the Syngman Rhee government. In contrast we are enjoying the active 
support and encouragement from the peoples of many countries including 
the Soviet Union and China'. That the victory of the Chinese 
communists had a considerable encouragement on the making of Korean 
War decision by the North Korean leadership is vividly revealed in 
this speech.
On 26 June 1950, Kim IlSung made a radio address to the whole 
Korean people, appealing to go all out for victory in the war. The 
overall contents and tone of this address was almost the same as the 
one delivered at the cabinet meeting of 25 June. The significance of 
this address is that it was a declaration of war against the ROK 
government. His theme of justifying of the war was, as declared at 
the cabinet meeting, that 'the war we are fighting against the 
fratricide provoked by the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique is a just 
one - a war for the country's reunification, independence, freedom, 
and democracy.'^ On the possibility of US intervention Kim IlSung did 
not express a serious worry. He briefly touched on this matter, 
saying that ' all the Korean people must heighten their vigilance and
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keep sharp watch on every movement of the US imperialists who stand 
behind the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique'.^ Except for this 
statement, Kim II Sung did not further refer to a possibility of US 
intervention.
. Following Kim IlSung's formal declaration of a state of war, on 26 
June 1950, a Military Commission was set up to conduct the war 
efforts. The Military Commission was modelled after the State Defence 
Committee (GKO) of the Soviet Union. Just as the GKO , the Military 
Commission, was vested with ’all power in the country, with a view to 
mobilising all national efforts for the war, reorganising all work on
1C
a war footing and achieving the final victory1. The Military 
Commission comprised the following members: Premier Kim IlSung; Pak
Hon-yong, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister; Hong Myong-Hui, Deputy 
Premier; Kim Ch'aek, Deputy Premier and Industry Minister; Chong 
Ch'un-taek, Chairman of the State Planning Commission; Ch'oe Yong-gon, 
Defence Minister; Pak Il-u, Interior Minister.
Among the seven members Kim Ch'aek and Ch'oe Young-gon were 
faithful lieutenants of Kim IlSung. Pak Hon-yong was still being 
regarded as the leader of south Korean communists. Pak Il-u was a 
crown prince among the Yenan group, with the backing of Kim Tu-bong 
and Mu Chong. Hong Myong-hui represented a broad range of left-wing 
and nationalistic intellectuals. Chong Ch'un-taek was the key 
architect of North Korean economy. The composition of the Military 
Commission indicated that, as of June 1950, the Kim IlSung group was 
not mature enough to run the country by themselves. However, it is 
not accurate to estimate the North Korean leadership in this period as 
a collective leadership. There was no doubt that Kim IlSung's 
paramount position was taken for granted. It is necessary to 
distinguish a share of power among competing power groups from a 
division of labour among subordinates. During the war period, the
Military Commission was to function as the supreme national and
26military authority of North Korea.
148
Within three days of the invasion the KPA troops succeeded in 
capturing Seoul. The ROK Army divisions around Seoul in effect
disintegrated by mid-night of 27 June. The ROK government and Army 
Headquarters were evacuated from Seoul by 02.00am 28 June. It was 
declared that at 11.30am 28 June, Seoul was 'liberated' by the KPA. 
The KPA succeeded in a surprise although it had been an open secret 
among the ROK Army leadership from early 1950 that a North Korean 
invasion was imminent. The success of the KPA was largely owing to 
this 'surprise' factor, which was, mostly, the making of the ROK
political and military leaders.
The most vulnerable point for the ROK Army in the conduct of the 
war was the ineptitude of its political and military leadership at the 
highest level. President Rhee Syngman was an old patriot who had 
fought the Japanese for almost forty years. But his method of 
struggle was mainly through bulletins rather than bullets. Though a 
master of power politics and diplomacy, he had little experience and 
concerns in strategic matters. Defence Minister Shin Song-mo was ex­
captain of a British merchant ship. He was not suitable for that 
position either. (When the war broke out at dawn of 25 June, the duty 
officer in the Defence Ministry could not contact his minister, 
because 'captain' Shin had a practice of having telephone lines
disconnected on holidays - 25 June 1950 was Sunday - so that he could 
enjoy holidays without being hampered by telephone calls, which
practice, he said, he had learned from English gentlemen.) On the day 
of the North Korean invasion the ROK government convened an 
extraordinary cabinet meeting. But in the meeting no substantial 
measure to meet the extraordinary situation was taken but a wait-and- 
see policy. The ROK government promised that Seoul would be defended 
to the last. While the Korean Broadcasting Service was repeatedly 
broadcasting that message, Rhee Syngman and his closest assistants 
were leaving Seoul at mid-night of 27 June, without warning the people 
to prepare for the eventual fall of Seoul into the hands of the enemy 
or establishing an effective system for conducting the war effort.
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In the absence of firm political leadership, the conduct of war 
was to rest upon Major-General Ch'ae Byong-dok, Army Chief of Staff, a 
thirty-six year old, ex-ordnance officer. Before the war broke out, 
the ROK Army Headquarters had developed a make-shift defence plan. 
The defence plan assumed the Ch'orwon-Yonch'on-Uijongbu-Seoul route as 
the most probable invasion route from the north. The main body of the 
ROK Army troops were to be used to defend this route. In case this 
defence line collapsed, the remaining troops were to conduct a 
strategic retreat to the south of the Han River. The ROK Army 
leadership was vaguely thinking of depending on US aid in case of 
further worsening of the situation. The weak point in this defence 
plan was that it did not specify the decisive line of defence where 
all the main efforts were concentrated. The defence of Seoul was 
important politically. But militarily, that mission was hardly 
possible. In terms of military considerations the Han River Line was 
the best defence line. The Han River was a very effective barrier and 
the area south of the Han River was optimal for the concentration of 
reinforcements from the rear area divisions. Even though the defence 
of Seoul was important, reinforcing divisions should have been
deployed to build the Han River Defence Line rather than consumed
71north of the Han River.
In terms of consequence General Ch'ae acted upon the worst 
scenario by throwing reserve divisions north of Seoul. He deployed 
altogether three divisions to augment the defence of Seoul. Even 
cadets of the Korean Military Academy were put in for this operation. 
To make matters worse, he threw these troops in piecemeal. As a 
result the ROK defence positions were overwhelmed by the KPA divisions
in turn. And while these troops were still fighting in the north of
Seoul, General Ch'ae himself retreated to the south of Seoul, blowing 
up the Han River bridge, the only route for retreat for the ROK troops 
north of the river. So the Han River Defence Line, conceived in the
defence plan, was on the brink of collapse with more than 30,000
fleeing soldiers locked north of the river. Only the heroic command 
of Major-General Kim Hong-il saved the ROK Army from this catastrophe. 
General Kim Hong-il, then Commandant of the Staff College, personally
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assumed the task of preparing the Han River Defence Line, assembling 
soldiers individually retreating from north of the Han River by 
swimming or small craft. If it had not been for General Kim Hong-il's 
timely and determined command, the fiasco which General eh'ae brought 
about in the first three days of the war would have resulted in the 
total destruction of the main body of the ROK Army.2®
The fiasco of the ROK Army in the initial days of the war was 
exacerbated by some improper measures that General Ch'ae Byong-dok had 
taken before the war broke out. On 10 June 1950, just 15 days before 
the outbreak of the war, General Ch'ae conducted a large-scale 
reshuffle of the top-ranking officers. (On that day, 10 June, KPA 
divisional commanders were ordered to move troops to the frontline.) 
Out of eight divisional commanders, five were changed. Among four 
divisional commanders accountable for the defence of the frontline, 
three commanders were changed for new ones. Two of them were elevated 
rightly from regimental commanders. At Army Headquarters, Colonel 
Kang Mun-bong, Chief of the Operations Bureau, was ordered to wait for 
study in the US Staff College. When the war broke out in two weeks' 
time, the newly appointed frontline divisional commanders had to fight 
the KPA divisions without fully grasping the situation of their 
subordinate units, terrain, and opposite KPA troops. Colonel Kang's 
case was another serious problem. He had been serving as chief of 
operations since September 1947. Most of the defence plans were 
hammered out through him. In the circumstance that Ch'ae Byong-dok, 
Army Chief of Staff, was not thought to be a proper selection for that 
position, Colonel Kang's presence and contribution in time of war was 
urgently needed more than ever. The untimely and unwise reshuffle of 
ROK Army leadership in such a volatile situation of mid-June 1950 was
jo
hardly understandable.
There were more mysterious, even suspicious, measures taken by 
Ch'ae Byong-dok just before the outbreak of the war. On 11 June an 
emergency warning was issued to ROK troops. It was lifted as of 24.00 
hours on 23 June. By virtue of the lifting of this emergency warning, 
leaves and passes, which had been suspended for two weeks, were
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granted to officers and soldiers. As a result, on the day of the KPA 
invasion most of ROK frontline divisions had only one-third of the 
total troops in barracks, let alone in defending positions. High 
ranking officers in Seoul were attending a social party until late at 
night on 24 June in celebration of the opening of the officers' club 
of the Army Headquarters. A third of total vehicles possessed by the 
ROK Army had been sent for repair to logistic depots when the war
began. As for firearms an average of 15 per cent of all kinds of
id
firearms in the frontline divisions were sent for repair.
Not all of the KPA divisions succeeded in breaking through the ROK 
Army positions on the invasion day. In the central-eastern front the 
6th ROK Division under Colonel Kim Chong-o successfully halted the 
advance of the II KPA Corps for three days. The 6th Division was 
accountable for the defense of the central-eastern front of 90km 
coverage. Colonel Kim Chong-o decided to concentrate the main efforts 
of the division for the defence of Ch!unchon, south of the Soyang 
River. By making use of the natural barrier, the Soyang River, and 
superbly organising defence efforts, Colonel Kim Chong-o delayed the 
advance of two KPA divisions - the 2nd and the 12th Divisions - for 
three days. Due to this delay, the II KPA Corps could not reach the 
southeastern area of the Han River in time, thus, allowing the fleeing 
ROK troops in the western front time for reorganisation and 
strengthening defence against advancing troops of the I KPA Corps. As 
a result, the initial KPA war plan which aimed to capture the whole 
remaining ROK field army troops in the Han River Perimeter did not
materialise. It was a grave strategic setback for the KPA. The
battle of Ch'unch'on also revealed the weak points of KPA tactics. 
Their attack was too much stereotyped, repeating fruitless frontal 
assaults against well organised defence positions. Largely owing to 
this defect in the KPA attacks, the 6th ROK Division could inflict 
heavy casualties upon the II KPA Corps. With the fall of Seoul on 28 
June, the 6th ROK Division made a retrograde movement to link with the 
western front. The 8th ROK Division in the east coast area also 
successfully halted the advance of the 5th KPA Division for three 
days.^1
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While divisions in the central-eastern and eastern sectors - 
especially the 6th Division - were successfully delaying the advance 
of KPA divisions towards the Han River Perimeter, ROK -troops in the 
western sector were rapidly recovering from the first defeats and 
began to stage successful defence and delaying operations. From 28 
June to 4 July ROK troops deployed along the southern bank of the Han 
River successfully halted further advance of the I KPA Corps across 
the river. The KPA divisions could not cross the Han River for six 
days, confronted by this stiff resistance of the ROK troops. The six 
days' delay of the KPA advance at the Han River Crossing Operation 
earned the ROK Army and reinforcing US troops invaluable time. As a 
hypothesis, if the KPA had succeeded in breaking quickly through the 
ROK Han River Defence Line and in capturing the defending troops, the 
course of the war would have developed very differently.
The ROK Army's success of the Han River Line defence was largely 
owing to three factors. The first was the superb command of General 
Kim Hong-il. At his own initiative he began to regroup fleeing 
soldiers into battalions and deployed them for the defence of the Han 
River Line. Under his command, remaining troops of the badly battered 
four divisions - the 2nd, 5th, 7th and Capital Divisions - were 
regrouped into the Sihung Area Defence Command. An old patriot, who 
had fought for the independence of Korea for forty years, in China, 
General Kim Hong-il was highly respected by ROK Army officers and 
soldiers. His patriotism, indomitable spirit and combat experience 
awoke demoralised ROK officers and soldiers to a sense of sacrifice 
for the nation. Under General Kim Hong-il ROK soldiers began to 
regain confidence.
The second factor was the appearance of US military support. The 
bombers and fighters of the US Far East Air Force (FEAF) were 
especially effective in proving the promise that the United States 
would not abandon South Korea. General MacArthur's tour of inspection 
along the Han River Defence Line on 29 June was received by ROK 
leaders and troops as another visible evidence of US support. Though
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the appearance of US support was still symbolic at that stage, the 
morale-boosting effect to the ROK troops who had been stunned by the 
KPA offensive was great.
The third factor was the incomprehensible delay of the KPA attack 
against the Han River Defence Line after it occupied Seoul on 28 June. 
The Han River is a great obstacle against attacking forces which are 
not well prepared for cross-river operation. The KPA lacked in 
engineer equipment for this kind of operation at that time. Admitting 
this kind of excuse, there is no denying that the KPA troops north of 
the Han River, which totalled four divisions, did not give full weight 
for the attack for a couple of days. This delay in the KPA attack 
against the Han River Defence Line has been open to question. A 
plausible explanation would be found in the over-optimistic attitude 
to the war of the North Korean political and military leadership,
overjoyed by the capture of Seoul within three days of the invasion. 
Another explanation is that the KPA commanders and the Soviet 
operation team had an over methodical concept of cross-river
operations. For them a hasty assault operation would have been 
thought to be too costly and unnecessary at that time. Consequently, 
the ROK troops under General Kim Hong-il could benefit from this easy­
going mood of the KPA.
The fall of Seoul on 28 June 1950 was the highlight of the North 
Korean invasion. By that time, the situation of the war seemed on the 
whole favourable to the KPA, with the exception of the unexpected 
setback in the Ch'unch'on area. The reason for this easy victory of
the KPA in the initial days of the war was clear. The KPA assault
divisions overwhelmed ROK frontline divisions in strength. They were 
supported by sizable armoured troops. The ineptitude in the conduct 
of the war by the ROK political and military leaders at the highest 
level was a great advantage to the KPA. The defects in deployment and 
combat readiness of the ROK Army troops exacerbated the situation of 
the ROK Army which was already far inferior in quantitative military 
balance to the KPA.
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But the KPA victory was not a complete one. However
psychologically battered and deprived of heavy equipment, the bulk of 
the ROK Army troops were not captured. They were disorganised, but 
managed to escape from being captives of the KPA. If boosted by 
determined commanders and foreign aid, these fleeing ROK soldiers 
could transform themselves into a reconstructed army, as was proven so 
later. So, in conclusion, in spite of seemingly splendid success of 
the KPA breakthrough in the first days of the invasion, it was, seen 
from hindsight, not wholly successful. The KPA leadership does not 
seem to have noticed this grave mistake at that time.
In examining the course of the Korean War in the initial phase it 
is not enough simply to compare the military balance (in fact,
imbalance,) between the north and south. It is a superficial 
observation to conclude that, considering the military imbalance, the 
collapse of the ROK Army troops along the frontline was inevitable. 
Certain ROK units led by vigilant and experienced commanders proved 
that even the ROK troops inferior in strength and arms could 
effectively delay the advance of KPA troops. Even defeated troops 
later turned into robust soldiers,after having recovered from the 
first shock and led by respected, experienced commanders, and boosted 
by the US Air Force squadrons. So it is not proper to estimate that
the fiasco of the ROK troops in the initial phase of the war was
inevitable due to its inferior strength and arms.
In the strategic context it was the political misjudgment of the 
North Korean leadership (and its mentors) rather than tactical 
complacency which eventually broke down the North Korean invasion. 
The US reaction to the invasion was swift and resolute. There is no 
convincing evidence indicating that such measures had been 
premeditated as some revisionist scholars and North Korean organs have 
claimed. Upon receiving the report of the North Korean invasion 
President Truman ordered immediate military measures deemed necessary 
to help the Republic of Korea, along with diplomatic efforts to get 
the United Nations sanction and support. On 27 June 1950 Truman
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ordered US naval and air support of South Korea. From mid-day of 27 
June the fighters of the US FEAF were being engaged in fighting with 
North Korean aircraft. From 28 June, the fighters and bombers of the 
US FEAF launched attacks against North Korean ground force. The 
primary objective of these attacks was, first of all, to boost morale 
of the retreating ROK troops.^
On 29 June 1950, 18 B-26s of the US FEAF bombed P'yongyang. This 
bombing, the first against a target in North Korea, expressly awoke 
the North Korean leadership to the fact that something was going badly 
with the 'fatherland liberation war.' The effect of the bombing 
against P'yongyang, the heart of North Korea, was much more direct and 
physical than the United Nations resolution days before. There is 
good evidence showing that, until hours before the bombing, the North 
Korean leadership was not seriously worried about the progress of the 
invasion. In the morning of that day (29 June) Pak Hon-yong, Deputy 
Premier and Foreign Minister, made a broadcast speech appealing to the 
south Korean communists latent in south Korea and the people in the 
south. In this speech, Pak Hon-yong pointed to the South Korean 
government, not the US government, as the main 'culprit' of the war. 
Pak's denunciation of the Americans was still confined to the claim 
that the United States was instrumental in establishing and 
maintaining the Rhee government.
On the probability of massive US intervention into the war, he 
expressed an optimistic view, saying that 'the American imperialists
have begun to retreat from the south and their instrument of
isaggression, the UN Korean Commission, fled to Tokyo. He declared 
that 'the complete extermination of the south Korean government and 
the complete emancipation of south Korea was only a matter of time. 
(emphasis by author) Pak Hon-yong's speech revealed the jubilant mood 
of the North Korean leadership on the course of the invasion by that 
time. The US bombing of P'yongyang poured cold water on this North 
Korean leaders' optimism. It is apparent through examining subsequent 
measures which the North Korean leadership took after 29 June 1950, 
that they came to understand that they were in a new phase of the war.
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(The North Korean history of the Korean War affirms that the war
87entered a new phase from 30 June 1950.)
On 1 July, a major reshuffle in the KPA leadership was made. 
Major-General Kim Kwang-hyop, Commander of the II Corps, was replaced 
by Lieutenant-General Mu Chong, Deputy Defence Minister and Chief of
Artillery. Kim Kwang-hyop was demoted to Mu Chong's Chief of Staff.
Major General Ch'oe In, formerly Chief of Staff to Kim Kwang-hyop, was 
summoned to P'yongyang. Major-General Yi Ch'ong-song, Commander of 
the 2nd Division was replaced by Major-General Ch'oe Hyon, Commander
of the 3rd Security Brigade. Yi Ch'ong-song was instead appointed
Commander of the Nam Hae Brigade. Major-General Chon U, Commander of 
the 12th Division, was replaced by Major-General Ch'oe Ch'ung-guk. 
Thus, the high commanders in the II Corps were wholly replaced. The 
reorganisation of the II Corps leadership reflected the discomfort and 
worry of the KPA leadership on the unsatisfactory performance of the 
II Corps in the Ch'unch'on operation. Newly appointed commanders in 
the II Corps, especially Mu Chong and Ch'oe Hyon, were probably the 
best field commanders Kim IlSung could choose at that time. The fact 
that such celebrities were ordered to assume the battlefield was an 
indication that the North Korean leadership had become more serious 
about the prospect of the war.
On 4 July, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly 
appointed Kim IlSung Supreme Commander of the KPA. It is significant 
that Kim IlSung assumed this office at this point, ten days after the 
war began. While becoming Chairman of the Military Commission on 26 
June he was not yet named Supreme Commander. In communist countries, 
the office of supreme commander is not a ceremonial one. The practice 
is that, in peace time, party leader or head of state is not 
explicitly named Supreme Commander. Only when the party leader or 
head of state becomes involved in the day-to-day business of the armed 
forces is he officially nominated Supreme Commander. The fact that 
Kim IlSung was named Supreme Commander on 4 July meant that Kim IlSung 
decided to take 'upon himself the destiny of his country and people',
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rising 'in new determination to carry out the great historic mission 
entrusted to him by the people at this stern and dangerous time.1^
On 5 July a Front Command was formed to increase' activity and 
mobility of battle command at the front. Kim Ch'aek, Deputy Premier, 
was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Front Command. Kang Gon, 
Chief of the General Staff, was appointed Chief of Staff to Kim 
Ch'aek. Kim Ch'aek was given the rank of General, as was Ch'oe Yong- 
gon, Minister of National Defence. Kim Ch'aek's appointment to the 
commander-in-chief of all the KPA troops in the front was another 
evidence indicating how seriously the North Korean leadership became 
worried about the new phase of the war. Kang Gon retained his 
position as Chief of the General Staff. However, in reality, Kang Gon 
could not concurrently perform two roles - Chief of the General Staff 
and Chief of Staff of the Front Command. So, Nam II, a Soviet Korean 
and later chief North Korean delegate to the Armistice Talks, was 
appointed acting Chief of the General Staff. With this arrangement, 
the Ministry of National Defence in P'yongyang under Ch'oe Yong-gon 
and Nam II, was to function mainly as a logistics command and a 
replacement command. The responsibility for conducting operations in 
the front was to be placed mainly upon the shoulders of Kim Ch'aek and 
Kang Gon. By that time the Soviet operation team had allegedly left
the front because a cautious Stalin became worried about the
40possibility of these Soviet officers being captured by US troops.
Along with the formation of the Front Command, military commissars 
were assigned to major commands. Lieutenant-General Kim II, Chief of 
the Cultural Training Bureau, was assigned to the Front Command. Kim 
Yol, a Soviet-Korean and Chief of the Organisations Department of the 
party (WPK), was appointed Military Commissar of the I Corps. Kim 
Ch'an, also a Soviet-Korean and Vice-Minister of Finance, was assigned 
to the II Army Corps. As indicated in the selection, those military 
commissars were expected to assist field commanders mainly in 
politico-military matters. They were selected for these positions for 
their administrative skills and experiences in propaganda works. At 
this stage they were assistants rather than watchmen to the field
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commanders. Their main function and responsibility was to help the
field commanders concentrate all their nerves and efforts on
41operations.
Along with the reorganisation of command structure, more units 
were organised from security forces under the Ministry of the 
Interior. The 7th Division was activated in Haeju on 3 July from the 
7th Security Brigade. Major-General Baek Nak-ch'il was appointed 
commander of the division. The 8th Division was formed from the 1st 
Security Brigade in Kangnung on 1 July. Major-General 0 Baeng-ryong, 
Commander of the 1st Security Brigade was elevated to be the commander 
of the division. The 9th Division was organised from the 3rd Security 
Brigade on 5 July. Major-General Kim Tae-hong was appointed commander 
of the division. By activating these three divisions the KPA came to 
have 13 infantry divisions and one tank division. (The 105th Tank 
Brigade was formally elevated to the 105th Tank Division on 5 July 
1950. )42
In terms of training standards and combat experience those 14 
Divisions were, as of early July 1950, divided sharply into two 
categories. The first category divisions included the following: the 
1st to 6th, 12th Infantry Divisions and the 105th Tank Division. The 
second category divisions were those which had become operational 
since late June 1950. The second category divisions could in turn be 
divided into two groups. Two divisions organised from the Democratic 
Youth Training Centres - the 13th and 15th Divisions - and one 
division originated from the security forces - the 8th Division - were 
relatively well trained compared to the other three divisions of this 
kind - the 7th, 9th and 10th Divisions. The former group divisions 
were able to take part in operations from early July 1950. However, 
the latter group divisions were to be operational only in early August 
1950.
It is not a usual practice in communist countries to transfer 
security forces under the Ministry of Interior or the State Security 
Commission to the Ministry of Defence. That is because the mission,
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organisation, and equipment of security forces are different in many 
ways from those of defence forces. That North Korean leaders made the 
decision to reinforce the KPA with those security forces is good
evidence that the North Korean leadership felt that a serious
situation had developed in the war. On the other had, it is very
doubtful that these three security brigades had already been earmarked 
to the KPA before the war. One possible way of establishing the facts 
on this question is to examine the KPA practice of forming divisions 
before the Korean War. In elevating brigades to divisions, the KPA
leadership first expanded and strengthened brigades to almost 
division-level units, in all but name. After evaluating whether or 
not those brigades had grown enough to be called divisions the KPA 
leadership elevated the brigades to division. The elevation of the 
3rd Independent Mixed Brigade to the 3rd Division in October 1948 was 
such a case. The other cases are: the elevation of the 4th
Independent Mixed Brigade to the 4th Division in March 1950; and the 
elevation of the 105th Tank Brigade to the 105th Tank Division in July 
1950. Unlike these cases, before the elevation to KPA divisions 
status, the three Security Brigades remained much closer to regiments 
than divisions. In this regard, the formation of the three divisions 
from the security forces in early July 1950 was unusual, precipitated 
by the worsening situation of the war.
On 8 July Kim IlSung made a radio address titled, "Repel the US 
Imperialist Invasion!". Kim IlSung's anger and frustration at the US 
intervention in the war were well expressed in this address.
The Koreans have never encroached upon an inch of the 
territory of the United States of America, nor have they even 
infringed upon its sovereignty in the slightest degree. Our 
people never committed any hostile act against the American
people, nor have they ever harmed the life and property of
the United States of America. Why, then do the US 
imperialist send their troops into our territory, interfere
militarily in the internal affairs of our country, wantonly
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slaughter our people and soak our beautiful land with 
blood?^
Had it not been for the their direct armed intervention, the 
fratricidal war ignited by their underdogs would have ended, 
our country would clearly have been unified and the people in 
the southern half completely liberated from the police terror 
of US imperialism and the Syngman Rhee clique.^
Kim IlSung appealed to the entire Korean people to rise up to meet 
this new challenge. He flatly ruled out any intention to settle the 
war with other measures than direct confrontation against the US 
forces. Thus, he formally declared that North Korea had entered an 
unexpected, new war against the United States.
Advance by Attrition
While the North Korean leadership was taking measures for meeting 
the new development of the war, troops of the US Army began to arrive 
in Korea. The decision to introduce US ground forces into the Korean 
theatre was taken by Truman on 30 June. General MacArthur was given 
on that day the following orders: (1) to send two divisions to Korea
from Japan; and (2) to establish a naval blockade of North Korea. The 
first combat unit of the US Army to arrive in Korea was Task Force 
Smith, from the 24th Division stationed in Kyushu, Japan. Task Force 
Smith arrived in Pusan, on 1 July. On 5 July, the first American 
ground unit collided with a regiment of the 4th KPA Division. The 
first American battle at Osan ended in a disaster for Task Force 
Smith. The main force of the 24th Division completed its movement to 
Korea between 2 and 6 July. The 24th Division under the command of 
Major-General William F. Dean, fought successive holding actions along 
the Seoul-Pusan route, at Pyongtaek, Ansong, Chonan, Chonui, 
Choch'iwon, and south across the Kum River to the strategically 
important city of Taejon until 20 July.
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The 25th Division, the second US Division to be committed in the 
war, arrived in Korea between 10 and 15 July, under the command of 
Major-General William B. Kean. The third large American unit to reach 
Korea was the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Major-General Hobart 
R.Gray. The division arrived on 18 July at Pohang, on the east coast. 
There followed two battalions of the 29th Independent Regiment 
arriving in Pusan on 24 July from Okinawa. The 9th Regimental Combat 
Team of the 2nd Infantry Division arrived in Korea on 31 July. The 
5th Regimental Combat Team stationed in Hawaii arrived in Korea on 31 
July. The rest of the 2nd Infantry Division and the 1st Provisional 
Marine Brigade were to arrive by mid-August 1950. Thus, the US ground 
forces in Korea rapidly expanded from early July to mid-August 1950.
From 17 July 1950, all the UN ground forces in Korea were placed 
under the command of Lieutenant-General Walton H. Walker, Commander of 
the Eighth US Army. Before that, on 8 July, General MacArthur was 
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the UN Forces. On 14 July President 
Rhee Syngman assigned command authority over all the ROK Armed forces 
to General MacArthur. On 17 July General MacArthur assigned command 
authority over all the UN ground dorces in Korea, including the ROK 
Army, to General Walker. General Walker was to direct the ROK Army 
through Major-General Chong Il-Kwon, newly appointed Army Chief of 
Staff.
Under General Walker the US and ROK ground forces were deployed as 
follows; the US divisions were accountable for the defence of the 
western sector including the Seoul-Pusan route. East of the US
divisions, ROK divisions were deployed. Until 20 July only the 24th 
Division was available for the defence of the western sector. In late 
July the 25th and 1st Cavalry Divisions were to defend this sector 
together with the 24th Division. The problem was that after Taejon 
had fallen to the KPA divisions on 20 July, the left flank of the UN 
Forces became increasingly exposed. (Until the 24th Division reached 
Taejon, the left of this division had effectively been flanked by the 
coast. With the 24th division being pushed further than Taejon, to
the southeast, the left flank of the UN Forces became exposed to KPA
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attack.) Until late July 1950 this vulnerability in the UN defence 
was not fully noticed by either side. At the end of July, the 6th KPA 
division which had been advancing southward suddenly turned eastward 
and staged a dagger-attack aiming at Pusan, the operations base of the 
UN Forces. This KPA initiative almost caused a panic in the UN 
Command. General Walker overcame this crisis by dispatching the 25th 
US Division from the central front to the left front. The crisis in 
Masan area in late July, which was directly linked with the destiny of 
Pusan, manifestly revealed the weak point in the UN Forces deployment.
The penetration of the 6th KPA Division into the western flank of
the UN Forces was once praised as a masterpiece of KPA operations.
For example, the official history of the US Army in the Korean War 
describes the manoeuvre as follows, 'Its manoeuvre was one of the most 
successful of either army in the Korean War. It compelled the
redisposition of Eighth Army at the end of July and caused Tokyo and
AC
Washington to alter their plans for the conduct of the war.' J
However, it is open to discussion whether the manoeuvre of the 6th
Division was the best and most timely one. The 6th Division spent at 
least ten days in occupying major cities and ports in southwestern 
provinces of south Korea, in which it met little organised resistance 
by ROK army troops. If the KPA leadership had noticed the 
vulnerability of the UN Forces deployment in the left flank earlier 
and fully enough, it should have hurried the 6th Division to the
assault of Pusan more swiftly and resolutely. That the 6th Division
had spent invaluable days in virtually administrative occupation of 
southern cities and ports meant that the KPA leadership was idle in 
exploiting the vulnerability in the UN Forces deployment. In terms of 
consequence the 6th KPA division succeeded in producing a panic in the 
UN Command and pinned down more than 25,000 US troops for a couple of 
weeks. But it does not necessarily mean that the KPA leadership 
exhibited a strategic masterpiece. To be a real masterpiece the 
manoeuvre of the 6th Division should have been executed earlier.
In the battles against US divisions deployed along the Seoul-Pusan 
route, the KPA divisions exhibited a relatively good performance.
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Especially the battle of Taejon around 20 July 1950 was a great 
success. The 24th Division which fought two KPA divisions - the 3rd 
and 4th Divisions - suffered a humiliating defeat in the battle. Even 
the divisional commander, Major-General Dean, went" missing in 
action.^ (General Dean was later captured by KPA soldiers and spent 
three years in North Korea as a POW.) Subsequently the 3rd KPA 
Division defeated the 1st Cavalry Division on 24 July. The 2nd KPA 
Division broke through the defence positions of the 25th US Division 
during 23-28 July. On 31 July the 3rd KPA Division pushed the 1st 
Cavalry Division from Kimch'on area. The 25th Division pulled out of 
Sangju area by 31 July pressed by the 15th KPA Division.
Through these attacks the KPA divisions used essentially the same
tactics they had employed against the 24th US Division at Taejon - a
holding frontal attack, with the bulk of its force enveloping the
American flanks and establishing strongly held roadblocks behind the
defence positions. Until the end of July, the US divisions were not
able to form a tightly linked front. Frontage for the US divisions
was too wide to effectively cover flanks and secure the rear behind
the frontline. The KPA troops easily infiltrated these gaps and
succeeded in enveloping the US troops. Road-bound US troops were
especially apprehensive about the possibility of being cut off by KPA
infiltration into the rear of the defence positions. Once they began
to feel that the rear seemed insecure the US soldiers almost panicked
and withdrew hurriedly. After their five year occupation of Japan,
the newly arriving US troops were no longer seasoned soldiers. They
became embarrassed to know that the 'invincibility' of the US Army did
not discourage the KPA troops. The KPA divisions exploited these
weaknesses in US troops - in deployment, tactical doctrine, and morale
- to the full extent. Even though General Walker and his subordinate
commanders were seasoned, Second World War veterans, their ability to
47control the untrained soldiers had its limitations.
To the east of the US divisions five ROK divisions were performing 
delaying actions during July 1950, while covering the central and 
eastern fronts. Against these ROK divisions, the Front Command of the
KPA allotted six divisions under the II Corps. Throughout July 1950, 
the KPA divisions were steadily pushing the ROK divisions southward. 
The 5th Division in the east coast area, the 12th Division to the west 
of the 5th Division, were performing well compared to other divisions. 
(Both these two divisions were organised with the veterans from the 
Chinese Civil War.) Other divisions especially the 13th and 15th 
Divisions were not performing well. The ROK divisions were staging 
effective delaying operations, inflicting heavey casualities upon the 
KPA divisions and earning time for the arriving US divisions. Of all 
the KPA casualties by the end of July, which totalled 58,000, about
50,000 casualties were incurred by ROK troops. Battles between the 
KPA and ROK divisions in central and eastern fronts were on the whole 
neck and neck. But in many cases, the ROK divisions had to withdraw, 
even after blocking the KPA attacks, to maintain the link with the US 
divisions in the left flank which were being pushed back by divisions 
of the I KPA Corps.
On the whole, the advance of the KPA divisions during July 1950 
was steady. But it failed to effect a decisive victory over the 
retreating UN Forces. It was an advance by attrition. If the KPA 
leadership had concentrated available resources on the occupation of 
Pusan more daringly from early July rather than pushing the ROK and US 
forces along the whole front their chance of a victory would have been 
greater. It is noteworthy to remember that the sudden appearance of 
the 6th KPA Division in late July to the west flank of the Naktong 
River, within 60km of Pusan, was once described as the most critical 
moment in the UN Forces defence operation stage in the summer of 1950. 
If the 6th Division had reached the front a week earlier, or the 6,000 
men strong division had been strengthened by sizable troops, the 
course of the war would have been changed. The case of the 6th 
Division is only a notable one. Having failed to execute a Blitzkrieg 
in early July, the KPA was being dragged into a war of attrition from 
late July which it had no prospect of winning over the UN Forces.
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On 1 August 1950 General Walker issued an operational order to all 
UN ground forces in Korea for their planned withdrawal behind the 
Naktong River. The Naktong River Defense Line, (the Walker Line, or 
the Pusan Perimeter), was the vital position where General Walker 
intended to make his stand. As General MacArthur stoutly declared on
27 July, 'a repetition of Dunkirk should not happen in any case.'*® By
4 August UN Forces established defense positions along the Walker 
Line. The Pusan Perimeter was a rectangular area about 160km from 
north to south and 80km from west to east. The Naktong River formed 
the western barrier except for a 25km sector from south of Yongsan to 
the South Sea. To the north an irregular curved line through 
mountains from Waegan to Yongdok formed the northern front. Waegan 
was the connecting point between the northern front and the western 
front. South of Waegan three US divisions were deployed along the
Naktong River. East of Waegan the perimeter was held by five ROK
divisions. General Walker's headquarters was located in Taegu, some 
20km southeast of Waegan. The KPA deployed four divisions under the 
I Corps along the western boundary opposite the US divisions. Six KPA 
divisions of the II Corps were to attack the ROK divisions. The Front 
Command of the KPA was located in Suanbo, about 100km northwest of
40
Waegan. 7
As of 4 August 1950, the estimated strength of the KPA was 70,000 
men. Since the war began, it had suffered about 58,000 casualties. 
The crack divisions which spearheaded the invasion suffered especially 
heavy casualties. The 105th Tank Division was actually reduced to a 
Tank Regiment. (In fact the 40 remaining tanks in the division could
form only two tank companies, according to US Army standards.) The
50estimated strength of major KPA units as of 4 August was as follows:
Please see over for table.
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Unit Strength
1st Division 5,000
2nd Division 7,500
3rd Division 6,000
4th Division 7,000
5th Division 6,000
6th Division 6,000
8th Division 8,000
12th Division 6,000
13th Division 9,500
15th Division 5,000
105th Tank Division 3,000
603rd Motorcycle Regt. 1,500
766th Unit 1,500
Out of three newly organised divisions from the Security Brigades, two 
divisions - the 7th and the 9th Divisions - were not available for the 
August offensive. The 10th Division, organised from the 2nd 
Democratic Youth Training Centre just before the war, was to arrive on 
8th August.
As of 4 August 1950 the total strength of UN ground forces under
the command of General Walker was 142,000 men, comprising 83,000
Korean troops and 59,000 American troops. Among the total strength of
142,000 men, combat troops numbered 92,000 men. So the UN ground 
forces alone outnumbered the KPA by 22,000 men (even without counting 
the absolute control of sea and air by UN naval and air forces).
Major combat units of the UN ground forces and their strengths were as
follows:^
Please see over for table.
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Unit Strength
ROK Army
1st Division 7,600
3rd Division 8,800
6th Division 5,900
8th Division 8,700
Capital Division 6,600
US Army
1st Infantry Division 10,300
2nd Infantry Division 5,000
24th Infantry Division 14,500
25th Infantry Division 12,100
1st Marine Brigade 4,900
With the passing of time the gulf in strength between the KPA and 
the UN Forces became ever greater in the Naktong River campaign. As 
of 1 September 1950, the KPA deployed 13 infantry divisions, one tank 
division, and two tank brigades, totalling 98,000 men. In examining 
the strength of the KPA divisions, a simple bean-counting is not 
enough. The KPA maintained the identity of its divisions even after 
the divisions were reduced to a regiment, or even a battalion force 
level. (Contrastingly, some ROK divisions which were badly hit in the 
initial stage of the war were absorbed into other divisions.) So, in 
order to grasp the real situation of KPA divisions, it is necessary to 
check the real (remaining) strength of those divisions employed in the
battlefield. As of 1 September 1950 major KPA units and their
52strengths were as follows:
Please see over for table.
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Unit Strength
I Corps
6th Division 10,000
7th Division 9,000
105th Tank Div. (20 tanks) 1,000
16th Tank Brig. (43 tanks) 500
9th Division 9,400
104th Security Brigade 2,000
4th Division 5,500
2nd Division 6,000
10th Division 7,500
II Corps
3rd Division 7,000
13th Division 9,000
1st Division 5,000
105th Tank Div. (20 tanks) 1,000
17th Tank Brig. (43 tanks) 500
8th Division 6,500
15th Division 5,000
12th Division 7,000
5th Division 7,000
Newly formed divisions since late June 1950 maintained a relatively 
high filling rate. But, the crack divisions which had been engaged in 
battles continuously since the war began were manned at only half the 
normal strength. The 105th Tank Division had only 40 tanks left. Two 
other armoured units - the 16th and 17th Tank Brigades - were formed 
in late August 1950. These two tank brigades were not the like of the 
105th Tank Brigade which had 150 tanks in 1950. Altogether the KPA 
had about 120 tanks. By US Army standards, these 120 tanks could form 
only two tank battalions. (One US tank battalion had 68 tanks.)
In the same period, the UN Forces in Korea totalled 178,900 men, 
out of which combat troops numbered 124,000 men. Five ROK divisions 
had 52,500 men whereas four US divisions plus one marine brigade had
66,200 men. The 27th UK Brigade had 1,600 men. As of 1 September 
1950 major UN units and their strengths were as follows :
Please see over for table.
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Unit Strength
ROK Army
Capital Division 16,400
1st Division 10,500
3rd Division 7,200
6th Division 9,300
8th Division 9,100
US Army
2nd Infantry Division 17,500
24th Infantry Division 14,700
25th Infantry Division 15,000
1st Cavalry division 14,700
1st Marine Brigade 4,200
UK
27th Brigade 1,600
Compared with the 1st KPA Division which had only 5,000 men remaining, 
the 2nd US Division had 17,000 men. Moreover, the UN divisions were 
supported by 500 tanks, more than four times as much as KPA tanks. 
Counting the absolute superiority of UN naval and air forces and 
overwhelming superiority in artillery, and logistics support, the UN 
Forces under General Walker were far superior to the KPA, at least in 
quantitative analysis.
In spite of the overall superiority in strength and fire power, 
during August and most of September 1950, the UN Forces in the Naktong 
River Defence Line were on the defensive, desperately managing to fill 
the gaps the KPA troops bore out. The worsening situation of the KPA 
was not accurately known to the UN commanders, who were then 
evaluating the KPA much higher than was actually the case. The UN 
soldiers were still caught in a defeatist mood due to the long, 
painful retreat during July 1950. Even if the UN Forces in Pusan 
Perimeter had been positive enough to stage a strategic 
counteroffensive pushing the KPA troops back, it was not the job of 
these UN Forces in the Pusan Perimeter. A strategic counteroffensive 
to decisively destroy the invading KPA troops was to be executed by a 
large-scale landing operation deep in the rear of the enemy - the 
Inch'on landing. The UN Forces in the Pusan Perimeter had only to
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defend the Naktong River Defence Line, which inevitably meant a 
concession of initiative to the KPA. As a consequence, the KPA could 
maintain the offensive against the UN Forces during this period, in 
spite of much inferior strength, firepower, and logistical support.
From 5 August 1950, the KPA began the August offensive against the 
UN Forces along the Walker Line. In total 70,000 troops in ten 
divisions were thrown into this August offensive. The main thrust of 
the offensive was directed towards Taegu, the provisional seat of the 
ROK government and General Walker's headquarters. Altogether five KPA 
divisions were poured towards the UN positions defending the outskirts 
of Taegu. Two ROK divisions - the 1st and 6th Divisions - and the 1st 
US Cavalry Division fought these five KPA divisions and repulsed the 
KPA threat to Taegu by 27 August. In other fronts the KPA offensive 
came to a halt by 20 August. In the August offensive the KPA 
divisions suffered a heavy blow. The force-level of each division was 
reduced to an average of 5,000 men. The crack 4th Division was 
reduced to a strength of 3,500 men. The 12th Division lost all but
1,200 men. The KPA divisions in the northern front succeeded in 
pushing the ROK divisions 20-30km south. However, through this 
withdrawal, the ROK divisions could fill the gaps between divisions 
more tightly because the defence frontage for the ROK divisions shrank 
from 150km to 90km.
From 31 August the KPA began the September offensive. Altogether
98,000 troops in 13 divisions, supported by 120 tanks were thrown into 
this last, desperate offensive. To prepare for this offensive, the 
KPA halted the August offensive at around 20 August. To make up for 
the loss in the August offensive the KPA mobilised 'volunteers' from 
occupied south Korea. More than one third of the 98,000 troops who 
took part in the KPA September offensive were these south Korean 
'volunteers'. The KPA divisions lost too many veteran soldiers in the 
August offensive. Naturally, the south Korean volunteers in the KPA 
divisions were not ardent and experienced soldiers. So the KPA 
strength in the September offensive, 98,000 men, was not a big 
addition to the strength in the August offensive, 70,000 men.
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For the September offensive 13 KPA divisions were organised into 
five assault groups. Each assault group was assigned to one major 
route heading towards Pusan. Each group was to stage a frontal attack 
against opposing UN defence positions. And if a group succeeded in 
breaking through it was to exploit the breakthrough for itself. There 
was no sizable strategic reserve for the Front Command to exploit the 
success which each assault group attained. These frontal attacks 
along the whole front were reminiscent of the initial war plan of the 
invasion. In June 1950, the frontal attacks which assigned each of 
seven assault divisions to one invasion route could succeed because of 
the overwhelming superiority of the KPA over the ROK Army. However, 
in the September offensive,the KPA was outnumbered in strength and 
overwhelmed in firepower and logistical support. In this adverse 
situation, to attain economy of force the KPA leadership should have
u
concentrated assault divisions on one or two objects.
That the KPA leadership did not observe this principle of war was 
one of the main causes of the eventual failure of the September 
offensive. On the other hand there was a possibility that the KPA 
leadership should have worried that too much concentration of force 
would offer the UN Forces a good target for air bombing or artillery 
barrage. (On 16 August, 98 B-29s of the US FEAF executed a carpet- 
bombing over Waegan, supposedly the operation base of the KPA
divisions attacking Taegu. It was the biggest employment of airpower
55in direct support of ground forces since the Normandy invasion.r'' In 
reality, the only hope that the KPA leadership could have was that the 
UN command should have failed to use its reserves effectively to 
recover the gaps brought about by the assaulting KPA divisions. The 
hope did not materialise, to the end, due to the superb employment of 
reserves by General Walker.
The highlight of the KPA September offensive was the battle of 
Yongch'on during 2-12 September 1950. Yongch'on was the axis of the 
northern front defended by ROK divisions. By occupying Yongch'on, the 
KPA could divide the ROK defence line into two and could advance to
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the rear of Taegu, the nucleus of the Naktong River Defence Line. On 
6 September the 15th KPA Division succeeded in occupying Yongch'on by 
a lightning strike. The UN Command estimated this situation as the 
worst crisis in the Naktong River operation. Major-General Yu Chae- 
hung, commanding the II ROK Corps, counterattacked with six regiments. 
On 10 September, the II ROK Corps recovered Yongch'on and by 12 
September regained the original defence line. That the 15th KPA 
Division could not exploit the success of Yongch'on revealed the limit 
of the fighting power of the KPA divisions and the mistake in the KPA 
leadership's conduct of the September offensive. As they were not 
backed up by strategic reserves and logistical support, each assault 
group was unable to exploit their initial successes and were halted by 
UN Forces' counterattack and were eventually forced back to the 
departure line of the attack. By 12 September the KPA September
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offensive had ended in failure.
With the failure of the September offensive, the initiative of the 
war which the KPA had taken since 25 June was turned over to the UN 
Forces. Most of the veteran KPA soldiers who crossed the 38th 
parallel on 25 June had been consumed in the war of attrition during 
early July to mid-September 1950. (In the September offensive alone, 
the KPA was estimated to have lost about 30,000 men.)
At the height of the KPA September offensive, on 8 September Kan 
Gon, Chief of Staff of the Front Command and Chief of the General 
Staff, was killed in action. Due to this sudden death of Kang Gon, a 
major reshuffle in the Front Command and army corps commands became 
inevitable. Kim Ung, Commander of the I Corps, was made Chief of 
Staff to Kim Ch'aek, in place of Kang Gon. In Kim Ung's place, Yi 
Kwon-mu, Commander of the 4th Division, was elevated. Pak Ch'ang-dok 
succeeded Yi Kwon-mu as Commander of the 4th Division. Kang Gon's 
death was a heavy blow to the morale of the KPA leadership. His loss 
was deeply mourned by the North Korean leadership. (Later, the 1st 
Central Military Academy was renamed Kang Gon Military Academy.) In a
sense, Kang Gon's death symbolised the gloomy situation of the KPA
57during this period.
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Throughout this war of attrition in the late summer of 1950, the 
only option the KPA could take not to lose the war was to continue the 
offensive in the Naktong Perimeter at any cost. The'disparity in 
strength between the KPA and the UN Forces was increasing with the 
passing of time. For the KPA, there was no hope, no way of reversing 
this trend. The sea and air was under absolute control of the UN
Forces. The logistic line was too extended. Reserves were running
out. In this situation, it was fully anticipated that the UN Forces 
could launch a strategic counteroffensive by sea or tactical 
counterattacks by air in the rear of the KPA. The North Korean 
leadership were greatly concerned about these contingencies. Though,
what really mattered was the resources at their disposal, not the
apprehensions of these possibilities. They were not in a situation to 
strengthen their defense posture along the coast by pulling frontline 
troops out of the Naktong River Line. This could jeopardize the 
offensive while not considerably strengthening defence posture. 
Therefore they could not help choose one object - to destroy the UN 
Forces along the Naktong River Line at any cost.
It was the only way to press the United States and its allies to 
rethink the wisdom of further engaging in the Korean War. If the UN 
Forces along the Naktong River Line had been overridden and Pusan had 
been occupied by KPA troops, the US government and its allies could 
hardly have persuaded the people of western countries to support the 
Korean expedition. To evacuate the ROK government and remaining ROK
CO
troops could have been performed on 'humanitarian' grounds. 0 
However, it would have been almost inconceivable to retake the Korean 
peninsula by using these Korean troops. Militarily, it could have 
been possible. But, politically, such an enterprise would have been 
unthinkable. So on the part of the North Korean leadership, to 
pressure the UN Forces into a 'Dunkirk' was the only way to end the 
war. The all-out attack along the Naktong River Line was, again, the 
best way to reinforce the fragile defence of the coast. Only by 
continuously pressing UN Forces, could the KPA check the transfer of 
UN Forces to other fronts, according to their strategic reckoning.
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On the other hand, if the UN Forces were to have the resources and 
nerves to withstand the ferocious KPA offensive along the Naktong 
River Line and at the same time had reserves to be deployed to other 
fronts, then that calculation of the North Korean leadership was to be 
of no avail. The collapse of the KPA would be inevitable. The logic 
of the UN Forces' Inch'on landing was based on these calculations.The 
significance of the Inch'on landing was not that it was a superbly 
executed 'surprise'. General MacArthur's excellence was in his use of 
strategic reserves. He believed that General Walker could hold out in 
the Pusan Perimeter. Based on this confidence, MacArthur was 
determined to spare the strategic reserves for a decisive 
counteroffensive. An ordinary general would have consumed these 
strategic reserves to reinforce the Pusan Perimeter defence. General 
MacArthur had the penetration to see that, by the end of July, the 
worst time was over. He also had the determination to act on this 
judgement. The Naktong River campaign of August to September 1950 was 
a confrontation of those two strategic calculations - by the North 
Korean leadership and General MacArthur.
The Unacceptable Defeat
The course of the Korean War turned round 180 degrees with the UN 
Forces' Inch'on landing on 15 September 1950. The UN Forces could 
take the offensive, pushing the KPA to the defensive. To properly 
understand the significance of the landing operation and the following 
development of the war it is necessary to examine the strategic logic 
of the landing operation. First of all, the Inch'on landing was not a 
total surprise as has usually been thought. In his inspection tour of 
the war situation at the southern bank of the Han river on 29 June, 
General MacArthur reached two conclusions; (1) only massive 
introduction of US ground forces could save South Korea from total 
conquest by the KPA; and (2) the decisive counteroffensive to repel 
the KPA troops across the 38th parallel should be executed in the form
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of a large scale landing operation deep in the rear of the advancing 
KPA troops.^
Upon his return to Tokyo General MacArthur gave instructions to 
begin planning for an amphibious operation against the west coast of 
Korea. His initial amphibious plan, code named 'Bluehearts', was 
scheduled for 22 July 1950. But the continuing collapse of the Korean 
front rendered Bluehearts impossible by 10 July. The Joint Strategic 
Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), the Far East Command, had to
discard plan after plan during July and August 1950 due to the
impending situation in the Korean front. On 16 September the
’Chromite' operation, an amphibious landing at the port of Inch'on on
15 September by the X US Corps, was finally approved by the US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. That General MacArthur would execute such a large 
amphibious operation sooner or later was almost an open secret among
military experts. There was effectively no way to keep absolute
security on such a large-scale operation, employing 70,000 troops and 
more than 200 ships. In fact, the KPA was notified of the whole
amphibious plan by a Japanese spy group a week before the Inch'on 
landing.^ The problem for the KPA leadership was that they had no 
resources to effectively defend against the incoming UN amphibious 
forces. And they were reluctant to pull KPA troops from the Naktong 
River Line to reinforce the defence of the Inch'on area. General 
MacArthur was well aware of the KPA leadership's dilemma and exploited 
it to the full.
During July and August 1950 the security of the rear area of the 
advancing KPA troops was the responsibility of the Ministry of the 
Interior. As the security brigades had assumed the security and
defence missions along the 38th parallel before the outbreak of the 
war, during the KPA advance, the security troops of the Ministry of 
the Interior were alleviating the burden of the regular KPA troops. A 
Front Area Security Command was organised under the command of Pak 
Hun-il, Chief of the Constabulary Division of the Interior Ministry. 
With the advance of KPA troops a security unit of regimental size was 
deployed to each occupied province. By the end of August 1950
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altogether eight security regiments and one security brigade were 
deployed throughout the occupied areas of south Korea. On 28 August 
an Inch'on Area Defence Command was organised under the command of Pak 
Hun-il. To the Inch'on Area Defence Command the following units were 
assigned': the 64th Coast Defence Regiment; the 106th and 107 Security 
Regiments; one independent tank regiment; and a battalion from the 
18th Infantry Brigade.^
On 11 September 1950, the defence responsibility for Inch'on and 
its adjacent area was transferred to the Seoul Defence Command, under 
Ch'oe Kwang. The Seoul Defence Command was placed under the West 
Coast Defence Command. Ch'oe Yong-gon, Minister of National Defence 
was appointed Commander of the West Coast Defence Command. As such, as 
of early September, the North Korean leadership was clearly aware of 
the imminent, large scale amphibious landing operation by the UN 
Forces at Inch'on. For tangible evidence, Operation Order No.4 issued 
by the Inch'on Area Defence Command, instructed subordinate units to 
complete coastal defense facilities around Inch'on area by 15 
September.^ So it is not the case that North Korean leadership was 
taken by surprise at the Inch'on landing. The problem was that the 
troops and materials available for the defence of Inch'on were too 
limited for staging a successful defence against overwhelming UN 
Forces.
The landing operation of the UN Forces ended in a great success, 
taking Inch'on on the day of the landing. However, the success of the 
landing did not bring about the immediate collapse of the KPA troops. 
From 15 to 28 September, the KPA troops under Ch'oe Yong-gon\s command 
staged a stiff resistance. The X US Corps liberated Seoul only on 28 
September, in two weeks from the Inch'on landing. The KPA troops 
under Kim Ch'aek's command in the Naktong River Line were resisting 
the UN Forces until 23 September when Kim IlSung ordered the general 
withdrawal of the KPA troops in the Basic Front (The Naktong River 
Line). A synthesis of available sources indicates that, for a week 
after the Inch'on landing, the North Korean leadership was still 
attached to maintaining two fronts in south Korea, by securing Seoul
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at any cost and maintaining the 'Basic Front', (at worst, at the Kum 
River-Sobaek Mountains line). According to this plan, the West Coast 
Defence Command was to eliminate the salient in the Seoul-Inch'on area 
while the Front Command was to absorb the thrust of the UN Forces 
advancing northward across the Naktong River Line.^
However, by 22 September, it became evident that it was impossible 
for the KPA to maintain two fronts in the south. By the order of Kim
IlSung on 23 September troops under Kim Ch'aek's command began to
retreat from the whole Naktong River front. During this retreat 
operation, most of south Korean volunteers deserted KPA units and most 
of the heavy equipment was abandoned. More than 12,000 KPA soldiers 
were captured by UN troops. It is estimated that only 25,000 KPA
troops succeeded in reaching the 38th parallel. On 1 October Kim
IlSung divided the defence along the 38th parallel into two fronts. 
Kim Ch'aek and his Front Command was made accountable for the defence 
of the central and eastern fronts. Ch'oe Young-gon was made
accountable for the western front. Together with the defence along 
the 38th parallel, the North Korean leadership strengthened the 
defence of Wonsan harbour at the east coast. An East Coast Defence 
Command was organised under the command of Han II-mu, Commander-in- 
Chief of the North Korean Navy. With this arrangement of new command 
relationship Kim IlSung became more personally involved in the conduct
of operations. Until the UN Forces' landing at Inch'on Kim IlSung
could delegate much of command authority to Ch'oe Young-gon and Kim 
Ch'aek. But, with the situation worsening, the war came to require 
more central operational control. So Kim IlSung had to assume the 
conduct of operations personally.
On 10 October 1950 troops of the 3rd ROK Division crossed the 38th 
parallel. On 7 October the United Nations General Assembly endorsed 
'all appropriate steps to ensure conditions of stability throughout
K o r e a . U p o n  this sanction, the US Army troops crossed the 38th 
parallel on 9 October. On the east coast, the 3rd ROK Division 
occupied Wonsan on 10 October. On 19 October, the UN Forces entered 
P'yongyang. By 26 October troops of the 6th ROK Division arrived at
178
Ch'osan near the Korean-Manchuria border. The end of the war on the 
United Nations terms seemed at hand, which was, seen from hindsight, a 
premature optimism.
In the middle of October 1950, the North Korean leadership took 
various measures for the future counteroffensive against the UN 
Forces. The massive intervention of the PLA had already been decided 
weeks before and in the middle of October the PLA troops were entering 
North Korea en masse. By 20 October altogether 12 PLA divisions 
entered North Korea. (On 21 October General MacArthur was proudly 
declaring the liberation of P'yongyang.) The following various 
measures which the North Korean leadership took in mid-October 1950 
should be understood in connection with this massive intervention of 
the PLA. Contrary to the UN Command estimate, the North Korean 
leadership was not at all in a mood to acknowledge their defeat in the 
war.
On 11 October Kim IlSung made a radio address, titled, 'Let us
defend every inch of our motherland at the cost of our blood'. He
warned the people that 'The situation at the front is grave'. The
enemy is crossing the 38th parallel into the north.^ It was apparent
that the advance of the US troops across the 38th parallel on 9
October greatly shocked the North Korean leadership. Kim IlSung
declared that 'The Korean people are not alone in their struggle for
the freedom and independence of the country. All the officers and men
of the People's Army, guerrillas behind enemy lines and the entire
Korean people should understand that their struggle in the great cause
is actively supported and aided by the peoples of the Soviet Union,
Chinese People's Republic and other People's Democracies and has the
unanimous sympathy of all progressive mankind.^ Kim IlSung's address
of 11 October was a manifest expression of the determination of the
North Korean leadership to continue the war. It was also a response
to the General MacArthur's ultimatum to Kim IlSung on 1 October, which
67had demanded 'unconditional surrender.'
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On 14 October Kim IlSung issued Order 70 to the KPA troops. The 
order was co-signed by Pak Hon-yong in the capacity of Chief of the 
General Political Bureau of the KPA. This Order 70 is one of the most 
important documents in the study of Korean War history: First, Kim
IlSung made a self-criticism as follows: (1) We have erred in
underestimating the enemy; (2) We have failed to annihilate the enemy,
by simply pushing back the enemy instead of a thorough enveloping; (3) 
Thus, we allowed the enemy to preserve its troops; (4) Some of us had 
illusionary prospect about the possibility of UN Forces' advance 
crossing the 38th parallel; (5) Some cadre members did not exhibit 
model courage before the soldiers in the course of the retreat. 
Having made this criticism Kim IlSung ordered KPA troops as follows; 
(1) Never retreat even one step; (2) Deserters from the battlefield 
shall be executed on the spot; (3) Officers should set an example to
the soldiers by leading in the forefront; (4) Political workers should
upgrade propaganda activities and set an example on the battlefield; 
(5) Strengthen reconnaissance operations in the rear of the enemy; (6) 
Commanders above divisional level shall organise supervising corps by 
15 October. Order 70 is very suggestive in grasping the situation of
the KPA in the course of the retreat and the determination of the
fiftNorth Korean leadership in this period. (Appendix 6)
A week later, on 21 October, at the meeting of the Political
Committee of the Central Committee of the WPK, Kim IlSung made a 
concluding speech on 'Forming WPK organisations in the People's Army'. 
(According to this speech the General Political Bureau of the KPA was 
formally organised on 21 October 1950. But according to 'Order 70', 
the General Political Bureau had already existed at least since 14 
October.) By this decision, party organisations and control in the 
KPA became much strengthened. Until that time, no party organisations
had existed in the KPA except for military academies. At each unit
level the cultural department had been responsible for political 
education of soldiers and for work with the party members. After the 
war began, military commissars were dispatched to the KPA units to 
strengthen party leadership and political education in accordance with 
the wartime conditions. Kim IlSung acknowledged that in the process
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of the war, particularly during the retreat, the leadership came to 
keenly feel the necessity of forming party organisations and enhancing 
their role in the army. Since new divisions were being organised in 
October 1950, there was a strong need to intensify the party's role 
and firmly equip the soldiers politically.^
The Cultural Training Bureau of the Ministry of National Defence 
was reorganised into the General Political Bureau. Cultural 
departments in all echelons were reorganised into political 
departments. A post of assistant commander in charge of political 
affairs was set up in every unit above company level. Party 
organisations were also organised above the company level. In the 
company a party cell was organised. In the battalion and in the 
regiment a party committee was organised. These party organisations 
were guided by the political departments concerned. At the division, 
the corps, and the Ministry of National Defence levels, ad hoc 
committees to discuss and decide on party organisations problems were 
set up. So the KPA came to have, from mid-October 1950, the typical
70
political control system common to communist countries.
Before and during the first three months of the war, the cadres of 
the KPA had been mostly filled with Kim IlSung's followers.
Especially the leaders of the KPA were the most faithful lieutenants
of Kim IlSung among the North Korean leadership structure. So the 
need for a strict political control system paralleling with the normal 
command structure was not strongly felt. The surveillance of the 
political defence department in the KPA was mainly towards non-party 
members in the People's Army rather than high-ranking officers. 
However, as the KPA was to expanding with many make-shift units in 
October to November 1950, the ratio of crack, faithful officers among 
the cadres of the KPA was reduced, particularly among mid-ranking
officers. The strengthening of party organisations in the KPA since
mid-October 1950 was mainly meant to make up for this eroding 
homogeneity of the cadre members of the KPA.
At the same time, the North Korean leadership endeavoured to 
rebuild the battered KPA divisions and to form more divisions from 
available sources. At that time it was estimated that KPA troops 
which had escaped from the pursuit of the UN Forces did not exceed
25.000 men. To make up for this huge loss two sources were available 
for the KPA. One way was to enlist party and government officials. 
Through this method, mid-ranking officers and political workers in the 
KPA could be raised. However, to raise combat troops was another 
matter. Conscripted ’volunteers' could not make seasoned soldiers in 
a short time. The North Korean leadership turned its attention to the 
Koreans in southern Manchuria. Between July 1949 and April 1950
30.000 Korean veterans in the PLA had entered North Korea to form the 
three crack KPA divisions - the 5th, 6th and 7th (later 12th) 
Divisions. In late 1950 it was estimated that there was still a large 
pool of Korean veterans who were living an ordinary life in Manchuria. 
The North Korean leadership decided to make use of these veteran 
Koreans to make up for the loss of the KPA. On the exact timing, 
size, and procedure of the repatriation of these Manchurian-Koreans 
into the KPA, available materials are very limited as yet. It is
alleged that altogether 70,000 men were conscripted to reinforce the
71KPA during October and November 1950. (So in the Korean War, the 
Koreans in Manchuria contributed almost 100,000 veteran soldiers to 
the KPA.) In order to conscript these Manchurian-Koreans, Ch’oe Yong- 
gon was dispatched to southern Manchuria. With him such members of
the Yenan group as Mu Chong, Bang Ho-san, and Kim Ch’ang-dok were
72dispatched to raise the new army.
To streamline the command relationship of rapidly expanding KPA, 
six army corps were newly organised in mid-October 1950, in addition 
to the existing two army corps - the I Corps and the II Corps. Each 
army corps was to control two or three divisions instead of six or 
seven divisions as in the cases of former I Corps and II Corps. 
Mostly divisional commanders in the first four months of the war were 
appointed commanders of army corps in mid-October 1950. Yi Kwon-mu, 
who succeeded Kim Ung on 9 September, was still serving as Commander
of the I Corps. Ch’oe Hyon succeeded Mu Chong as Commander of the II
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Corps. Kim Kwang-hyop, formerly Commander of the II Corps, 
subsequently Chief of Staff of the II Corps , and then Commander of 
the 1st Division, was appointed Commander of the III Corps. Yu Kyong- 
su, formerly Commander of the 105th Tank Division, -was appointed
Commander of the IV Corps. The V Corps was under the command of Pang
Ho-san, formerly Commander of the 6th Division. Ch'oe Yong-jin, 
Commander of the 13th Division, was appointed Commander of the VI 
Corps. Yi Yong-ho, Commander of the 3rd Division, was appointed 
Commander of the VII Corps. Kim Ch'ang-dok, Commander of the 5th 
Division, was elevated to Commander of the VIII Corps.^
On 14 October, after having taken these measures, the North Korean 
government left P'yongyang for Kangge, in the mountainous area of
North P'yongan Province. Kangge was to be the provisional seat of the 
North Korean government for two months. In this situation, the North 
Korean leadership made an extraordinary decision to leave an army
corps - the II Corps under Ch'oe Hyon, in the mountainous area of the 
central part of North Korea, in order to form the 'Second Front'. 
While the UN Forces were advancing along the eastern and western road 
routes northward, a sizable unit of seasoned KPA troops were advancing 
southward along the central mountain routes. The UN intelligence 
sources did not notice these menacing KPA troops at that time 
properly. Mostly caught in a jubilant mood expecting 'the 
Thanksgiving day at home', the UN Command committed grave errors in 
estimating the intent and capability of the KPA in late 1950.
The devastating effect of the KPA Second Front behind the UN 
Forces was exhibited strikingly during UN Forces' retreat in December 
1950. The troops of the II KPA Corps hit hard the flank and rear of 
the retreating UN Forces, in accordance with the pressing PLA 
strength. Every time the UN Forces tried to halt and form a defence 
line, the KPA troops of the II Corps hit the flank and back of the UN 
Forces. Met by this unexpected embarrassment several times, the 
retreating UN Forces began to panic. The shameful collapse of the UN 
Forces in December 1950 was much affected by this largely 
psychological effect of the Second Front KPA troops, as well as the
183
overwhelming superiority of the PLA troops. The North Korean accounts 
of the Second Front in this period tend to exaggerate the contribution 
of Ch'oe Hyon's troops too much?* Even taking this factor into 
account, there is no denying that the activities of the^ II KPA Corps 
were a hard blow to the UN Forces. Had the UN Forces staged more
orderly delaying actions in confronting the PLA troops, and had they 
been able to halt the advance of PLA troops at some line in North 
Korea, for instance, the Ch'ongch'on River line or P'yongyang-Wonsan 
line, the political and opinion leaders of the United States and its 
allies would not have been so badly demoralized on the possibility of 
a military solution of the Korean issue in December 1950. And if it 
had been so, MacArthur would not have had to advocate such a drastic
measure as the expansion of the war into China proper, most likely to
7Ssave his face.
That the KPA could form the Second Front in the rear of the 
advancing UN Forces was largely owing to the complacency and 
misjudgment of General MacArthur in the aftermath of the liberation of 
Seoul. After the Eighth US Army under General Walker reached Seoul 
from the Naktong River Line, MacArthur ordered another large-scale 
amphibious operation, using the X US Corps, at the harbour of Wonsan 
on the east coast of North Korea. But while the X US Corps was still 
afloat, Wonsan had already been liberated by the 3rd ROK Division on 
10 October. The X Corps landed at Wonson only on 26 October. So 
MacArthur had idly kept a 70,000 strength force unused for a couple of 
weeks. To make matters worse MacArthur did not make a proper 
arrangement to achieve unity of command in the Korean theatre. In the 
western sector, the Eighth US Army under General Walker was advancing 
towards the Yalu River. In the eastern sector the X US Corps and the 
I ROK Corps were advancing towards the Tumen River. All these Forces, 
MacArthur commanded directly from Tokyo. This kind of command 
relationship was not an effective one in coping with the rapidly 
changing war situation in this period. Moreover, between the Eight US 
Army and the X US Corps, there was a gap of over 150km frontage. 
MacArthur did not take necessary measures to cover this frontage. So 
the right flank of the 8th US Army and the left flank of the X US
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Corps were exposed to the enemy. The II KPA Corps could operate in 
this gap.7^
The UN Force's 'Thanksgiving offensive' ended in disaster in early 
December 1950. From this time on, for about a month, the famous, 
heartbreaking retreat of the UN Forces was forced by PLA and KPA 
troops. On 6 December, P'yongyang was restored by PLA and KPA troops. 
By 24 December the communist troops reached the 38th parallel, thus 
making a return to a divided Korea. The rest of the war was to be a 
war of no winners even though it continued for another 31 months and 
cost hundreds of thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of 
dollars. So, as far as the KPA was concerned the end of 1950 was an
appropriate point to mark an era in its history.
At the Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the WPK 
during 21-23 December 1950, Kim IlSung summed up the past course of
the war and gave instructions to remedy defects in the conduct of the
war, revealed in the past six months. His sharp self-criticism could
serve as a good summary of the North Korean leaders' defects in the 
conduct of the war. Kim IlSung pointed out the following. First, we 
did not prepare enough reserves for the fight against the United 
States. We did not anticipate many difficulties in our way, nor make 
good preparations for overcoming them. Second, we did not foresee 
that since our army was inexperienced and its cadres were young, it 
would not have that much sense of organisation to tide over 
difficulties facing them. Third, the discipline of the units was
weak. Fourth, we failed to wipe out the enemy and merely dispersed or 
repulsed them. Fifth, our army did not know how to wage battles 
against an enemy with superior air, naval and ground forces. Sixth, 
popular revolt to be led by south Korean communists which we had
expected did not materialise. Seventh, supply service for the front
was not satisfactory. Eighth, political work in the army was not 
carried out at a high level and the education of soldiers in 
revolutionary patriotism was insufficient. Kim IlSung's speech was a 
thorough-going self-criticism covering almost all the aspects of the
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preparation and conduct of the war. So it was itself a conclusive
77verdict on the KPA’s trials in the six months course of the war.
The Korean War revealed the limited calibre of the-KPA leadership 
in their preparation for, and conduct of the war. To do justice to
the KPA, the war which had developed into a major international 
conflict, was beyond the capability of the KPA. However, the
complacency, and lack of flexibility and creativity of the KPA
leadership was no less responsible for the eventual failure of the 
invasion than their political misjudgement. So far the myth that the 
the KPA was a first-rate army exceeding by far the standards
anticipated of an 'oriental indigenous army1 in the initial phase of 
the war has been maintained. North Korean historiography has nurtured 
such a myth consistently. Many western military experts and scholars 
have also perpetuated this myth, largely shocked by the poor
performance of the US troops in the first month of the war. However,
close examination of the performance of the KPA casts serious doubts 
on such a claim. It is true that tactically many KPA units performed 
very well. However, such tactical successes were not channeled into a 
major strategic breakthrough during the summer of 1950. Such defects 
in the strategic direction of the KPA should be given more attention 
in examining the causes of the KPA ddbacle in late 1950. Not only
political misjudgement but also strategic misconduct were central in
the failure of the North Korean invasion of 1950.
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CONCLUSIONS
The organisers of the KPA started to raise an armed force as an
assertive instrument of policy. Unlike the ROK Army which started as
a constabulary for reinforcing the police, and was incessantly engaged 
in quelling internal turbulence during the 1945-50 period, the KPA
was, during the same period, being reserved and strengthened for the
decisive role in the south-north confrontation. The organisers of the 
KPA were aware of what a regular army was and what conditions and
procedures were needed to raise a regular army. To have a clear
conception of these matters and managerial capabilities to steer those 
projects through were a forgotten aspect of statecraft for the ruling 
elite of Korea for the last several hundred years. The North Korean 
leadership, largely owing to Soviet guidance, was awakened to see that 
'war is a continuation of politics by other means, and 'the army is a
valuable tool of policy.' The KPA was a product of this new breed of
Korean ruling elite.
The KPA was the bastion of Kim IlSung and his followers. The 
dominant position of the Kim IlSung group in the making and running of 
the KPA was from the beginning guaranteed by the Soviet occupation 
authorities. In the cases of the party and the government the Soviet 
occupation authorities recruited Koreans relatively widely. Kim 
IlSung was their chief agent. The Soviet authorities could not deal 
alone with the sheer volume of work in the day-to-day business of the 
party and the government. There was also a need to disguise a 
'people's democracy' for the time being by incorporating various 
elements other than the Kim IlSung group and the Soviet-Korean 
functionaries. But, in the case of the KPA, there was no impending 
need to improvise an army hastily in the circumstances in which the 
Soviet troops were guaranteeing external security and the vast police 
system was maintaining internal security effectively. And the army 
should not be a sort of united front incorporating various communist
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groups. In this context, the Soviet occupation authorities and Kim 
Ilsung preferred to build a people's army step-by-step, centred around 
the Kim IlSung group. In accordance with this policy, most of Kim 
IlSung's followers came to have jobs in the people's army, rather than 
in the party or in the government. With the expansion of the people's 
army, many Yenan-Koreans were channelled into the KPA and made a great 
contribution to the people's army. However, the dominant position of 
the Kim IISung group in the KPA was not threatened by this large 
influx of heterogeneous elements into the KPA.
The KPA espoused an army of the people. It goes without saying 
that any national army, at least in theory, professes itself to serve 
the people. However, the reason why the KPA was designated as such - 
the Korean People's Army - needs close examination. In the communist 
jargon, the people does not mean the whole people of a nation. The 
people, in the communist usage, excludes those who fall under the 
category of the oppressors. So the naming of the KPA itself had the 
implication that the KPA was a revolutionary army under the command of 
the communist party which was the vanguard of the revolution. In 
other words, the KPA was (and is) the army of the Workers' Party of 
Korea. The State of North Korea could cease to exist. But it does 
not necessarily mean that the KPA would pass over with the state. As 
long as the party survives and continues to operate, the KPA, as the 
army of the party, should continue to exist. This was (and is) the 
raison d'etre of the KPA.
In the mid-1970s, the North Korean leadership changed the founding 
date of the KPA from 2 February 1948 to 25 April 1932. (On 25 April 
1932, Kim IlSung was allegedly said to have formed an Anti-Japanese 
Guerilla Army in Antu, southern Manchuria, with 18 hand-picked young 
fighters.) This change was part of a campaign to upgrade the 
personality cult of Kim IlSung. Looking at things objectively, it is 
unacceptable that the KPA was founded by Kim IlSung in 1932. But, 
considering that the KPA has been so heavily dominated by Kim IlSung 
and his followers since late 1945, it is, in a sense, understandable 
to seek the origins of the KPA in the early days of this group. In
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reality, the examination of the early days of this group is the key to
the proper understanding of the KPA.
Most of the cadres of the KPA were from the lower classes of the 
Korean people in terms of social and educational backgrounds. Kim 
IISung, whose father was a doctor and an educator, was an exception to 
this trend. They were mostly from the Korean peasants, in southern
Manchuria in the 1930s who were suffering from both Japanese
oppression and feudal landowners. They had experiences of bitter 
lives from their earliest days. Having these backgrounds, the cadres 
of the KPA had a deep sense of affiliation with the rank and file
soldiers of the KPA who were mostly from the peasants. The fact that
officers and soldiers alike were from the grassroots of the society 
was a unique phenomenon in Korean history. In the dynastic era of 
Korean history, officers were mostly from the gentry class in the 
countryside. Officers of the ROK Army in the same period were mostly 
from middle class or above. In this regard, the KPA was a unique
army. The fact that the social and educational backgrounds of the
highest leadership were not alien to the grassroots soldiers was to 
remain a strong point in the KPA.
The incorporation of Korean veterans, who had participated in the 
anti-Japanese war or the Chinese Civil War, into the KPA was a 
decisive factor in the building and rebuilding of the KPA in a short 
time. Those Korean veterans entered North Korea on four occasions
during 1946 and 1950. In the spring of 1946, some hundreds of cadre
members of the KVA returned to North Korea to add cadre members to the 
newly organised Security Cadres Training Centers. Kim Ung, later 
Commander of the II corps, was prominent among them. During July and 
August 1949, seasoned soldiers in the Chinese Civil War were sent to
North Korea to form the 5th and 6th KPA Divisions. The repatriation 
of Korean veterans remaining in the PLA in April 1950 was one of the 
last preparations for the invasion of South Korea. During October and 
November 1950, the severely battered KPA again solicited Korean
veterans in Manchuria to rebuild its rank-and-file structure.
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Altogether 100,000 Manchurian-Koreans contributed to the formation and 
operation of the KPA during 1946 to 1950.
Then why did the North Korean leadership depend oh the Koreans 
living in Manchuria so often and so greatly? Since August 1945 
Manchuria was legally the sovereign territory of China, whether 
Nationalist or Communist. So the Korean residents there were strictly 
speaking foreigners to the North Korean leadership. But, the fact is 
that the North Korean leadership does not seem to have thought so. It 
was not simply because they could make use of these Korean veterans 
easily owing to the influence of the Soviet government over the CCP, 
or the cooperation of the CCP towards the North Korean leadership. It 
is most likely that the North Korean leadership had a sense of 
preemptive rights over the Korean residents in Manchuria, especially 
during the years in which the sovereignty over Manchuria was not 
firmly settled between the Chinese competitors. And it was a sense of 
identification with the Korean residents in Manchuria that induced the 
North Korean leadership to claim such preemptive rights over those 
Manchuri an-Koreans.
Manchuria had been the theatre of the anti-Japanese struggle for 
most of the North Korean leaders for decades. Kim IlSung himself had 
resided in Manchuria more than twenty years. It is understandable 
that the North Korean leadership with such backgrounds and 
affiliations with Manchuria should have thought that they had a right 
to seek help from the Manchurian-Koreans when they were in need. 
Since the Chinese communist leadership was also well aware of the deep 
affiliation of the North Korean leaders with those Manchurian-Koreans, 
they implicitly acknowledged the pre-emptive rights of the North 
Korean leadership over the Korean veterans in the PLA and residents in 
Manchuria. Thus the incorporation of those Korean veterans into the 
KPA was not thought a great 'aid' given by the Chinese communists to 
North Korea. The introduction of these troops did not effectively 
strengthen the Chinese lever of influence over North Korea. It was 
only the massive intervention of the PLA troops which effected an 
increase in the Chinese influence over North Korea.
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The KPA was patterned after the Soviet Army. It was organised, 
equipped and trained with Soviet doctrine and materiel: It was not
only because the Soviet Union was the dominant power in North Korea 
since 1945. By defeating the German army and the Japanese army in the 
Second World War, the prestige of the Soviet Army was at its zenith in 
this period. The 'invincibility' of the Soviet Army and the 
superiority of Soviet military science were accepted by North Korean 
political and military leaders almost with awe. It is admissible that 
in this period the Soviet army was an efficient army hardened and 
tested by the four years' bitter confrontation with the German Army. 
But the Soviet Army had developed a tendency, through the war, of 
depending too much on good but few leaders in the Supreme High 
Command, Stavka. Army commanders, or in some cases, even front 
commanders had only to be good tacticians with indefatigable nerves 
and exalting leadership. As far as the highest leadership consisted 
of first-rate strategists and operation experts, such limits in field 
commanders could be made up for to a large extent. However in the 
case that Stavka failed to prove itself to be the brain of the army, a 
catastrophe was unavoidable. The humiliating defeats of the Red Army
(Soviet Army) at the hands of the German Army in the summer of 1941
was exactly such a case. The KPA was influenced by this Soviet legacy 
to no small extent.
A weak point of the KPA before the Korean War was that it did not 
effectively develop an able General Staff, the brain of the army. It 
was largely due to the fact that the Soviet military missions were 
effectively functioning as the General Staff of the KPA in this
period. In the formation and development of the KPA Major-General
Smirnov and his staff were in charge of formulating policy guidance 
and detailed programmes. The KPA General Staff under Kang Gon was, in 
fact, an operating agency to implement these Soviet made policies and 
programmes rather than a brain of the army. In the formulation of 
the war plan, Lieutenant General Vasiliev and his staff offered 
'service' to the KPA General Staff. While these Soviet military
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advisers were effectively acting for the General Staff of the KPA, the 
brain power of the KPA did not develop in tune with the expansion of 
the KPA troops. In spite of the rapid growth of the KPA in strength, 
a war college, a necessity in a modern army, was not formed in the 
KPA. Three military academies - the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Military 
Academies - were producing lieutenants year-by-year. But there was no 
institute for colonels and generals. They were either their own 
teachers or depended on 'on-the-job training'.
The defect in the brain power of the KPA was revealed with the 
Korean War developing into a worsening situation for the KPA. The war 
plan made by the Soviet operation team was itself a complacent one. 
However, the real test of the brain power of the KPA was the response 
of the its leadership to the newly developing situation with the UN 
intervention in the war. As a hypothesis in July 1950 there was still 
a chance the KPA could have won the war had it adopted itself to the 
changing situation more flexibly and resolutely. It was evident that 
with the passing of time the strength of the KPA vis-a-vis the UN 
Forces weakened. In this rapidly worsening situation, there was only 
one option left for the KPA so as not to lose the war. It was the 
'twenty-four hour a day and seven day a week advance' at any cost.
To implement this new strategy effectively, KPA tactics should 
also have been changed. Large concentrations of tanks and troops 
along road routes would inevitably become prey for the UN Air Force. 
How to achieve concentration of force without such force being 
targeted by the UN Force was the tactical problem to which the KPA 
General Staff should have provided an answer. Employment of an 
unprecedently large special force in the rear of the UN Forces was a 
strong option. During the advance southward in July 1950 the KPA 
divisions had very often succeeded in breaking through US defence 
positions by adeptly infiltrating into the flanks and rear of the US 
divisions, using small-size light infantry units. But these successes 
remained tactical ones. The KPA should have employed these methods in 
strategic context. It is no wonder that Kim IISung later lamented 
that if he had one light-infantry brigade in July 1950, he should have
192
taken Pusan. The unique structure and tactics of present KPA, 
emphasising strategic employment of special forces, is based on this
bitter self-criticism of their conduct of the Korean War.
In July 1950, the KPA leadership did not exhibit such necessary 
flexibility in strategy and tactics. In early July the Soviet
operation team left North Korea with the introduction of US ground 
forces in the Korean theatre. Even if the Soviet operation team had 
remained in North Korea, it is doubtful whether they could have 
offered appropriate advice to meet the new situation. They themselves 
were not top-class staff officers in the Soviet Army. There could not 
be that many Zhukovs or Vasilievskys. With the Soviet operation team 
gone, Kim Ch’aek and Kang Gon were responsible for the conduct of
operations. As Chief of the General Staff since December 1947, Kang
Gon had been closely affiliated with the Soviet military mission and
the Soviet operation team more than any other figure among the KPA
leadership. During this period Kang Gon was chief liaison officer 
between the North Korean leadership and the Soviet military missions.
It is open to question whether such a deep affiliation with Soviet
officers should have rather limited Kang Gon's intellectual 
flexibility, the crucial quality required of a Chief of the General 
Staff in an unanticipated crisis. The judgement, from results, is 
that this 33 year old, KPA Chief of the General Staff does not seem to 
have achieved the intellectual breakthrough in strategy and tactics
which was badly needed in the KPA in the summer of 1950.
If the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 had ended
in a success as was anticipated in the initial war plan, such a defect 
in the KPA leadership would not have been so manifestly exposed. A 
'modern regular army without a war college' is itself a contradiction 
in terms. Even if the Soviet government was, understandably, not 
positive in rendering such aid as was needed for developing the 
intellectual capacity of the KPA it does not exempt the North Korean 
leadership from the responsibility for failing to develop the brain of 
the army. In the Korean War many divisional commanders of the KPA 
proved themselves to be able field commanders. However, their
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tactical successes could not make up for the shortcomings in strategic
guidance of the highest leadership of the KPA.
Kim IlSung*s concluding speeches at the Third Enlarged Meeting of
the Central Committee of the WPK during 21 to 23 December 1950 was
clear evidence showing that at last the North Korean political and 
military leadership reached some standard of independent strategic 
thinking after six months* bitter experience. The forming of the 
Second Front in the rear of the UN Forces in October 1950 was an 
earlier sign of this new development. Since the Third Enlarged 
Meeting of the Central Committee of the WPK in December 1950 the 
rebuilding of the KPA has been carried out along the lines decided at 
the meeting. Thus, the bitter experience of the Korean War served the 
North Korean leadership as a midwife of the truth that an army becomes 
truly independent only when it has an independent intellectual 
capacity.
In examining the origins and nature of the Korean War it is a key 
question as to how to interpret the North Korean decision on the war. 
One way of thinking is to see the all-out attack against South Korea 
in June 1950 as the only alternative left to the North Korean 
leadership regarding the reunification issue. A good embodiment of 
this interpretation is produced by John Merril as follows:
North Korean hopes of achieving unification through a united 
front with opponents of Rhee, through the Soviet initiative 
for simultaneous troop withdrawals, and through armed 
guerrilla struggle had been successively dashed. The only 
weapon remaining was its conventional military force, which 
held an overwhelming advantage over the south. So long as 
the guerrilla movement seemed to have a chance of success, 
the DPRK held back from exercising this option, exhibiting 
some restraint in the border clashes over the summer of 1949.
But by the spring of 1950, a conventional military attack was 
the only alternative leftl
194
To put the conclusion first, I disagree with this line of 
interpretation on this issue. The invasion of June 1950 was rather 
the finalisation of the 'southern strategy' which had'been pursued 
through different tactics at different times and situations rather 
than the only alternative left.
Since 1945, North Korea had been pursuing two basic policy lines - 
the Democratic Base Line and the United Front Line. The policy goal 
of these lines was, in short, 'to strengthen the north, and to weaken 
the south.' The strategies in pursuing this policy goal may well be 
called the 'northern strategy' and the 'southern strategy' 
respectively. The northern strategy underwent three phases - the 
Democratic Reforms in 1946, the transitory stage in 1947-1948, and the 
economic building stage from 1949. The southern strategy underwent 
two stages in this period. From late 1945 to late 1947, the North 
Korean leadership concentrated on a 'Provisional Korean Democratic 
Government' formula. From early 1948 emphasis moved on to subversive 
activities to undermine the South Korean government. In terms of 
their frame of reference the North Korean leadership pursued those two 
strategies side by side, giving equal weight to them. However in 
practical terms, they concentrated more concern and resources in 
strengthening the north first, at least until early 1949. Until that 
time the North Korean leadership delegated the greater part of the 
southern strategy to the south Korean communist leadership. From mid- 
1949, the North Korean leadership assumed the southern strategy by 
themselves. The intensifying peace offensive and guerrilla 
provocations from May 1949 was the expression of this upgraded 
southern strategy.
While intensifying the southern strategy, the North Korean 
leadership did not expect that such undermining activities could alone 
topple the South Korean government. The North Korean leadership did 
know well that without a major North Korean initiative, the weakening 
of South Korea by south Korean communists could not suffice for the 
achievement of the final goal. The subversive activities and
195
guerrilla provocations in south Korea were in nature, a subsidiary 
blow. That is why the North Korean leadership did not give its full 
weight to guerrilla provocations in the south. While pursuing 
different tactics subsequently in the southern strategy the North 
Korean leadership was preparing the finishing touches to the southern 
strategy. It was the military prowess of North Korea which could be 
made available by the successful construction of the Democratic Base - 
North Korea. Entering late 1949, the North Korean leadership began to 
think that the Democratic Base had been strengthened enough to afford 
the final blow against the south.
The Korean War decision in the winter of 1949-1950 and subsequent 
quantum build-up of the KPA could well be understood in this context. 
The military option was not the last card in the circumstances in 
which all the other alternatives had been dashed. From the south 
Korean communists' standpoint the guerrilla activities in 1949 were a 
bitter setback. But, from Kim IlSung's standpoint, the guerrilla 
activities attained some results, though not wholly satisfying. Kim 
IlSung, as a shrewd practitioner of real politics, did not expect the 
south Korean communists to achieve more than was possible (in his 
evaluation). In conclusion, the Korean War was not the only 
alternative left to the North Korean leadership. It was the final 
blow of the 'southern strategy', made possible by the successful 
achievement of the 'northern strategy'. The origins of the Korean War 
should be pursued from many standpoints. But as far as Kim IlSung's 
reasoning on the war is concerned, this author abides by the above 
theory.
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